4 f\u00e9vrier<\/a> (acc\u00e8s toujours payant) qui d\u00e9veloppe la nouvelle<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abBoeing is trying to chip away at Lockheed Martin’s lead in the future fighter stakes by pitching further variants of the F\/A-18 Super Hornet, followed with the promise of a leap to what some now dub a sixth-generation combat aircraft.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe company is continuing to push both the Super Hornet and the F-15 Eagle in the export arena, and may be eroding some potential Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter markets. In the mid-term, however, Boeing requires a new platform if it wants to sell combat aircraft beyond the final iterations of its current generation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe underlying economic message is that in a time of flat defense spending, there’s money to be saved through extending the life of Super Hornets by adding advanced technologies instead of buying some versions of the F-35 (in particular, the U.S. Navy’s F-35C). By postponing fifth-generation fighter purchases, some technology investments could be delayed to around 2024, when Pentagon officials say potential air defense threats will make their next major advance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBoeing is touting an even newer version of the Super Hornet that would be paired with an advanced sixth-generation fighter that has a combat radius of more than 1,000 mi., stealth against low-frequency radars, and that would be available about 2024. In particular, Boeing analysts have targeted the C-version designed for conventional aircraft carrier operations, particularly if it slips schedule and gains cost. They hasten to add that they’re not suggesting the U.S. Air Force buy the Super Hornet instead of the F-35A. Fifth-generation fighter characteristics are generally held to be all-aspect stealth and the ability to sustain supersonic speed without the use of afterburner.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tAW&ST pr\u00e9sente la nouvelle, pourtant d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e dans un article consistant, avec un certain scepticisme (\u00aba still-nebulous sixth-generation, multipurpose fighter design<\/em>\u00bb). La revue pr\u00e9cise tout de m\u00eame que Lockheed Martin, qui d\u00e9veloppe le JSF, travaille lui aussi sur un tel projet (\u00abMeanwhile, Lockheed Martin and the companies with which it may partner are not ignoring their own next-generation designs. Advanced programs researchers at Lockheed Martin say they want to build a multirole aircraft that, with a few modifications, can handle the missions of long-range surveillance, sixth-generation fighter and long-range strike.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tOn observera que, dans l’environnement budg\u00e9taire actuel, le projet de Boeing a du sens, l’on dirait m\u00eame, ou plut\u00f4t: du sens politique. L’aspect principal de ce projet est en fait qu’il se d\u00e9compose en deux s\u00e9quences, la premi\u00e8re \u00e9tant la prolongation du Boeing Super Hornet<\/em> modernis\u00e9 jusqu’\u00e0 l’arriv\u00e9e du futur chasseur. (Et l’on serait tent\u00e9 de poursuivre en avan\u00e7ant l’hypoth\u00e8se que, des deux s\u00e9quences, c’est celle du Super Hornet<\/em> prolong\u00e9 qui int\u00e9resse Boeing pour l’instant. L’id\u00e9e lui rapporte de l’argent, lui ach\u00e8te du temps en bloquant une partie du programme JSF, et lui ouvre des opportunit\u00e9s pour l’avenir, dito<\/em> la deuxi\u00e8me s\u00e9quence du chasseur de sixi\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLes deux mesures se combinent pour appara\u00eetre comme une tentative de r\u00e9duire, sinon \u00e9liminer le programme JSF. (L’offre est, en elle-m\u00eame, parce qu’elle est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e dans ces conditions, une indication des difficult\u00e9s du programme JSF. Si le JSF se d\u00e9veloppait sans \u00e0-coup, il serait insubmersible et Boeing ne perdrait pas son temps \u00e0 de telles initiatives.) La combinaison s’adresse essentiellement \u00e0 la Navy, qui n’aime gu\u00e8re le JSF et qui se trouve tr\u00e8s \u00e0 l’aise avec le Super Hornet<\/em>. La proposition comblerait les vux de nombre d’amiraux, qui pourraient ainsi d\u00e9gager dans les ann\u00e9es \u00e0 venir un peu de budget pour leur flotte. Elle trouverait \u00e9galement sa logique dans une perspective budg\u00e9taire, au Pentagone, qui implique \u00e0 la fois l’incertitude (nouvelle administration en 2009) et les restrictions (diverses impasses budg\u00e9taires vont appara\u00eetre \u00e0 partir de 2009-2010, qui vont imposer de fortes pressions contre des programmes actuellement en d\u00e9veloppement).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tC’est une situation in\u00e9dite dans l’histoire de la programmation a\u00e9ronautique des grands programmes d’armement. L’\u00e9vocation s\u00e9rieuse d’une offre de mettre en chantier un successeur d’une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration d’avion de combat ultra-moderne encore en d\u00e9veloppement et pr\u00e9vu pour une production massive, pour \u00e9ventuellement le remplacer, est effectivement un cas sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en service le 6 f\u00e9vrier 2008 \u00e0 14H12<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Le JSF, le fameux F-35 du Pentagone, est loin, tr\u00e8s loin de son entr\u00e9e en service. Un nouveau probl\u00e8me apparu sur le moteur F135 de Pratt & Whitney (voir Aviation Week & Sopace Technology [AW&ST] sur le site [acc\u00e8s payant] Aviationweek.com du 5 f\u00e9vrier) rend probable un nouveau d\u00e9lai dans le premier vol du premier… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3192,2969,7409,4711,250,7410,3487],"class_list":["post-69659","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-boeing","tag-f-35","tag-f135","tag-hornet","tag-jsf","tag-stovl","tag-super"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69659","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69659"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69659\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69659"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69659"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69659"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}