5 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) lamented growing signs that the insurgency was expanding from the south of Afghanistan into northern provinces, with rebels learning lessons from Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t() <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbIn Afghanistan, the annual study said the NATO-led operation was most at risk where its technical advantage was reduced, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, the scene of intense fighting with militia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbFailure in these actions would risk boosting Islamic extremism (not just in Afghanistan), would produce a failed state in an area of strategic importance, and would offer safe haven to terrorist organisations and the narcotics trade<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt would also undermine the credibility of NATO in its first major out-of-area combat operation, the study said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe IISS said that although NATO’s 41,000-strong force was bolstering President Hamid Karzai’s fledgling government, the administration still lacks authority in much of the country.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe rapport est publi\u00e9 deux jours avant une r\u00e9union informelle des ministres de la d\u00e9fense de l’OTAN \u00e0 Vilnius (aujourd’hui et demain), qui se tient dans une atmosph\u00e8re cr\u00e9pusculaire. C’est dans ce sens que vont les commentaires des experts de l’IISS. Cr\u00e9pusculaire, indeed<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tThis is a critical week for the alliance, said Christopher Langton of the IISS.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThere is a big question over countries’ ability to sustain operations for what is now coming to a seventh year, and that is a weakness in NATO which perhaps it had not forseen when it set out on this venture.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCe pessimisme est accrtu par la vision de la situation irakienne que pr\u00e9sente l’IISS. Tout en reconnaissant, conform\u00e9ment au cat\u00e9chisme pro-am\u00e9ricaniste, que le surge<\/em> en Irak a donn\u00e9 des r\u00e9sultats, le rapport d\u00e9crit une situation qui reste tr\u00e8s instable et potentiellement explosive, une situation o\u00f9 les UUSA sont enferm\u00e9s dans un engagement impuissant de tr\u00e8s longue dur\u00e9e. L’IISS n’envisage pas de changements significatifs avec la nouvelle administration en 2009. Elle d\u00e9crit les USA comme une puissance sur la d\u00e9fensive, qui r\u00e9duit autant que faire se peut les implications de sa doctrine d’intervention pr\u00e9ventive, simplement parce qu’elle n’a plus les moyens de le faire et qu’elle en a de moins en moins l’allant et la volont\u00e9. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abWhile violence towards military and civilians was dramatically down, criminality, intra-communal military violence and sectarian strife remain commonplace, and still undermine political and economic initiatives, <\/em>[the study said.]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAnd it warned that even if<\/em>[troop] reductions can happen in 2008, it is estimated that President Bush’s successor will inherit a situation whereby at least 100,000 troops are still stationed in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIISS expert Dana Allin said: There is arguably going to be less of a dramatic change (post-Bush), mainly because the changes have already come.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe salience of a policy of pre-emptive war has been lowered anyway.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 7 f\u00e9vrier 2008 \u00e0 15H06<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L’Afghanistan semble devoir se concr\u00e9tiser comme la crise la plus exemplaire de notre \u00e9volution psychologique, la plus cr\u00e9atrice d’angoisse et de d\u00e9stabilisation psychologique pour l’Ouest. Dans ce cas, on assiste \u00e0 une v\u00e9ritable \u00e9volution auto d\u00e9pressive de la part des Occidentaux, \u00e0 cause des transferts et des espoirs faits et mis g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement dans l’affaire afghane… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,5861,3590,3060,4071],"class_list":["post-69662","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-crepusculaire","tag-iiss","tag-occident","tag-ouest"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69662","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69662"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69662\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69662"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69662"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69662"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}