{"id":69673,"date":"2008-02-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-02-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/02\/12\/le-moteur-et-le-reste-les-problemes-de-damage-control-de-limage-du-jsf\/"},"modified":"2008-02-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-02-12T00:00:00","slug":"le-moteur-et-le-reste-les-problemes-de-damage-control-de-limage-du-jsf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/02\/12\/le-moteur-et-le-reste-les-problemes-de-damage-control-de-limage-du-jsf\/","title":{"rendered":"Le moteur et le reste : les probl\u00e8mes de \u201cdamage control<\/em>\u201d de l’image du JSF"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le programme JSF danse sur une chaine de volcans en danger constant d’\u00e9ruption, avec la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 imp\u00e9rative de tenter d’obtenir un soutien effectif (un engagement de commande serait si bienvenu) d’un des coop\u00e9rants non-US. Jusqu’ici, sans succ\u00e8s, malgr\u00e9 les nombreuses amiti\u00e9s outre-mer, malgr\u00e9 des pressions renouvel\u00e9es r\u00e9cemment sur les Australiens et les Isra\u00e9liens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe probl\u00e8me r\u00e9cemment pos\u00e9 par un accident<\/a> survenu au moteur F135 de Pratt & Whitney, pour la version ADAC\/V F-35B, accro\u00eet encore la pression exerc\u00e9e sur le programme, \u00e0 l’\u00e9poque critique d’un changement d’administration et d’un changement d’\u00e9volution du budget de la d\u00e9fense (les augmentations r\u00e9guli\u00e8res sont d\u00e9sormais frein\u00e9es, sans doute vers un palier de plusieurs ann\u00e9es commen\u00e7ant en 2010). Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> (AW&ST) du 11 f\u00e9vrier<\/a> (acc\u00e8s payant), qui donne des nouvelles sans grande nouveaut\u00e9 \u00e0 propos de la panne, montre surtout les officiels de LM et de Pratt occup\u00e9s \u00e0 faire du damage control<\/em> en assurant que le probl\u00e8me technique n’aura aucune cons\u00e9quence importante sur l’activit\u00e9 de d\u00e9veloppement du programme. Cette insistance montre de fa\u00e7on convaincante que les industriels sont pour l’instant dans la plus compl\u00e8te incertitude et que rien n’exclut que la panne ne conduise pas \u00e0 un nouveau d\u00e9lai important du programme JSF (F-35B).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abPratt & Whitney is speeding up clearance tests of a follow-on F135 engine to try to minimize delays to the planned first flight of the Lockheed Martin F-35B. The scramble follows a turbine failure in the engine originally destined to power the short takeoff\/vertical landing (Stovl) variant.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThis is a known risk in the program, and we knew we’d find other LP turbines that had to be removed. We knew that schedule risk was there and accepted it. We also knew that, once these engines passed this test, they were good, says Gostic, who adds that a Stovl engine that already passed the proof test has now accumulated more than 900 out of a planned 1,000 cycles during accelerated mission testing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNeither Lockheed Martin nor the F-35 Joint Program Office is commenting on the impact that the proof test failure is expected to have on the timing of the first flight of BF-1, the first Stovl F-35B variant. Hover pit testsin which the tethered F-35B would be run up to full power in Stovl mode but not actually lift offwere originally expected to start in April.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAt the December rollout of the BF-1 in Fort Worth, Lockheed Martin said the aircraft was expected to make its first flight from a conventional takeoff roll in late May or early June with a gradual build-down to Stovl tests by around the end of 2008. Program sources say the original first-flight target date of May 19 is widely expected to slip.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais sans doute le plus int\u00e9ressant dans l’article de AW&ST vient-il \u00e0 la fin, d’une fa\u00e7on somme toute anodine, volontairement ou pas c’est selon. Il s’agit de la pr\u00e9cision que l’USAF a plac\u00e9 la possibilit\u00e9 d’acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer le programme JSF, qui a grand besoin d’un coup de pouce pour tenter de stopper les d\u00e9rives de retard et les augmentations de co\u00fbt qui vont avec, \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur d’un budget qu’elle ne poss\u00e8de pas. Pourtant, cette acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration lui a \u00e9t\u00e9 explicitement demand\u00e9e par le DoD. Depuis plus d’un an, l’USAF annonce qu’il lui manque, dans les projections de programmation du Pentagone, autour de $20 milliards par an en budget d’acquisition. C’est dans ces $20 milliards qu’elle n’a pas et qu’elle a de moins en moins de chance d’avoir que l’USAF a plac\u00e9 le poste acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de la production du F-35 dont on attend qu’elle (cette acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration) fasse baisser le prix unitaire de l’avion ou, du moins, le maintienne \u00e0 son niveau actuel (lequel est difficile \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer mais se situe pour les premi\u00e8res ann\u00e9es d’acquisition autour de $120-$130 millions l’exemplaire). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe disruption also adds unwelcome stress to the program, which is once again coming under budgetary pressure. Last year, senior U.S. Air Force officials had included accelerating F-35 buys as part of a wish list worth $20 billion over their existing annual procurement budget. The extra $20 billion has not materialized, though, leaving the ramp-up in production below projections and raising concerns that the per-unit cost will continue to creep upward.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 12 f\u00e9vrier 2008 \u00e0 13H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le programme JSF danse sur une chaine de volcans en danger constant d’\u00e9ruption, avec la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 imp\u00e9rative de tenter d’obtenir un soutien effectif (un engagement de commande serait si bienvenu) d’un des coop\u00e9rants non-US. Jusqu’ici, sans succ\u00e8s, malgr\u00e9 les nombreuses amiti\u00e9s outre-mer, malgr\u00e9 des pressions renouvel\u00e9es r\u00e9cemment sur les Australiens et les Isra\u00e9liens. Le probl\u00e8me… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5223,5222,7409,250,41],"class_list":["post-69673","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-control","tag-damage","tag-f135","tag-jsf","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69673","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69673"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69673\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69673"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69673"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69673"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}