Le budget FY2009 du Pentagone marque une tendance extr\u00eamement remarquable au niveau de l’\u00e9quipement en avions de combat des forces arm\u00e9es US. Un article de Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> (AW&ST) du 11 f\u00e9vrier (acc\u00e8s payant<\/a>) donne quelques pr\u00e9cisions sur cette nouvelle tendance apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9taill\u00e9 le sort d\u00e9sormais plus que jamais incertain du programme F-22 Raptor<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhile the Raptor’s fate is uncertain, the Pentagon is turning to upgrade existing aircraft like the Boeing F-15 and F\/A-18 and Lockheed Martin F-16. Aerospace executives suggest that the F-22 fleet won’t increase beyond about 200 aircraft, and a plan is being crafted to buy an additional 100 Boeing F-15Es with new, advanced radars that can identify small ground and stealthy air targets instead of purchasing more F-22s. The Air Force says it needs a minimum of 381 F-22s, but so far production has been capped at 183. The choice is between new technologyfor example, the stealthy fifth-generation F-22or older, but upgraded, technology like new model F-15Es or F\/A-18 Super Hornets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA proposal from Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne to include $497 million in the Fiscal ’09 request for F-22 shutdown or advance procurement was squelched by the Pentagon. USAF had planned to buy only stealthy fighters in the future. Stanley says that money has been shifted to the F-15 account, in part to pay for structural fixes for the F-15A-D fleet; a defective longeron caused a Missouri Air National Guard F-15C to split apart in midair and led to the temporary grounding of the entire F-15 fleet.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt’s estimated that about 80 F-15Cs can be structurally upgraded for $150,000-250,000 each. The Air Force is now pricing the flyaway cost of a new F-15E at $60 million for a buy of 100 aircraft compared with $140 million for an F-22. Boeing is now producing F-15Es for foreign customers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSeveral aerospace officials from outside Boeing and Lockheed Martin predict USAF will buy a few more F-22s, enough so the total will be more than 200, but state that 381 is not likely. They say the temptation will be great for the Navy to buy Block III Super Hornets and for USAF to procure more F-15Es.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn the last 15 years, the Air Force and Navy have put three times the flying time on their aircraft than they predicted before the first Gulf War, says a veteran USAF force-planner. And once again in this budget, the Navy and Air Force have had to use modernization money for current operations. Recapitalization isn’t happening in the Fiscal ’09 budget or the following years.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl faut bien appr\u00e9cier les causes de ces d\u00e9cisions, causes qui n’en sont pas vraiment, qu’on d\u00e9crirait plut\u00f4t comme la cons\u00e9quence de ce que nous nommons la d\u00e9route de la volont\u00e9. Les dirigeants du Pentagone, la bureaucratie, etc., renoncent de plus en plus nettement \u00e0 forcer des d\u00e9cisions, comme c’est le cas avec le programme F-22. Il est \u00e9vident, du point de vue de l’USAF et du Pentagone, que le F-22, arriv\u00e9 o\u00f9 il est arriv\u00e9, avec des masses consid\u00e9rables d’argent d\u00e9j\u00e0 d\u00e9pens\u00e9es dans son d\u00e9veloppement, devrait \u00eatre poursuivi au moins jusqu’\u00e0 381 exemplaires (le chiffre que voulait l’USAF). Les prix unitaires seraient notablement r\u00e9duits, pour une forte augmentation d’une capacit\u00e9 essentielle dans la seule mission fondamentale de la force a\u00e9rienne qui est la mission de souverainet\u00e9<\/a> par excellence de la sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 a\u00e9rienne et du contr\u00f4le de l’espace national.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl n’y a \u00e9videmment aucun choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 dans cette politique d’acqu\u00e9rir de plus en plus d’avions neufs d’anciens mod\u00e8les (type F-15, F-16, F-18). Il ne s’agit nullement de r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 l’argument sur l’int\u00e9r\u00eat ou pas de la technologie avanc\u00e9e. C’est une simple capitulation de la direction politique et de la bureaucratie impos\u00e9e par le chaos budg\u00e9taire par d\u00e9finition incontr\u00f4lable o\u00f9 se trouve le Pentagone, qui conduit \u00e0 une paralysie de la modernisation des forces qui devrait affecter tous les programmes nouveaux. Il appara\u00eet \u00e9vident que la m\u00e9thode, qui est celle de la d\u00e9route et du laisser-faire, va prolif\u00e9rer. Les braves pays coop\u00e9rants du programme JSF peuvent commencer (ou continuer, en fait) \u00e0 trembler, car le JSF subira le m\u00eame sort que le F-22, la compensation se faisant au niveau de l’acquisition des vieux mod\u00e8les. C’est une curieuse mais instructive orientation d’une structure la structure de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale aux USA qui n’a jamais jur\u00e9 que par la modernisation, la technologie avanc\u00e9e, etc. Le blocage du syst\u00e8me n’a pas fini de nous r\u00e9server bien des surprises.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 13 f\u00e9vrier 2008 \u00e0 11H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le budget FY2009 du Pentagone marque une tendance extr\u00eamement remarquable au niveau de l’\u00e9quipement en avions de combat des forces arm\u00e9es US. Un article de Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST) du 11 f\u00e9vrier (acc\u00e8s payant) donne quelques pr\u00e9cisions sur cette nouvelle tendance apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9taill\u00e9 le sort d\u00e9sormais plus que jamais incertain du programme… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4195,3127,4843,3194,4247],"class_list":["post-69675","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aviation","tag-budget","tag-f22","tag-pentagone","tag-week"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69675","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69675"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69675\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69675"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69675"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69675"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}