{"id":69690,"date":"2008-02-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-02-18T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/02\/18\/le-kosovo-pour-dire-on-a-ga-gne\/"},"modified":"2008-02-18T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-02-18T00:00:00","slug":"le-kosovo-pour-dire-on-a-ga-gne","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/02\/18\/le-kosovo-pour-dire-on-a-ga-gne\/","title":{"rendered":"Le Kosovo, \u2013 pour dire: \u201con-a-ga-gn\u00e9 !\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Pourquoi les USA \u00e9taient-ils tant acharn\u00e9s en faveur de l&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance du Kosovo? Les hypoth\u00e8ses abondent mais vraiment rien de convaincant. Tout le monde sait par ailleurs que l&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance va \u00e0 un nouveau pays dont les milieux politiques dirigeants sont hautement suspects, avec des connexions mafieuses, ill\u00e9gales, des liens de corruption et de banditisme divers. Le cat\u00e9chisme  humanitariste n&rsquo;a pas am\u00e9lior\u00e9 grand&rsquo;chose dans cette aventure. L&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance du Kosovo, pour toutes ses cons\u00e9quences n\u00e9gatives, notamment une instabilit\u00e9 aggrav\u00e9e dans la r\u00e9gion et des relations avec la Russie un peu plus ex\u00e9crables, est une catastrophe postmoderne de plus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Postmoderne, le qualificatif convient bien, finalement, pour ce qui s&rsquo;av\u00e9rerait \u00eatre la cause de l&rsquo;engagement US pour l&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance unilat\u00e9rale, dans la s\u00e9quence actuelle, sous la forme la plus abrupte. On la trouve chez Steve C. Clemons, qui semble parfaitement convenir. L&rsquo;explication est de source russe, dans une petite note que Clemons publie sur son site le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thewashingtonnote.com\/archives\/002866.php\" class=\"gen\">17 f\u00e9vrier<\/a><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Kosovo has declared independence and America will recognize it as a state. Consequently, Russia will eventually make us pay a high price in other aspects of our national security portfolio for this international sleight-of-hand.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>What saddens me is that I have learned from a source close to the Kremlin that the Russians secretly suggested a road map and time table for Kosovo independence to the Bush administration. The Russians would never have been pleased with Kosovo going it alone   but there were things to manage Russian issues with Georgia, Serbia, Kosovo and the region that could have been simultaneously managed to keep both sides from undermining the other.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Russians believe that their suggestions were ignored because the U.S. wanted to be able to declare a victory  which is harder to do when negotiating outcomes that are face-saving to both sides.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici donc la cause centrale de la position US: \u00ab<em>because the U.S. wanted to be able to declare victory.<\/em>\u00bb La simplicit\u00e9 et la stupidit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;argument nous invitent pareillement \u00e0 le prendre avec le plus grand s\u00e9rieux. C&rsquo;est effectivement de cette fa\u00e7on que fonctionne aujourd&rsquo;hui la diplomatie US, ou ce qui en tient lieu. Et la diplomatie occidentale applaudit et s&rsquo;en r\u00e9jouit, tenant la pr\u00e9sence US en Europe pour une cause fondamentale de stabilit\u00e9.  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 18 f\u00e9vrier 2008 \u00e0 15H22<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Pourquoi les USA \u00e9taient-ils tant acharn\u00e9s en faveur de l&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance du Kosovo? Les hypoth\u00e8ses abondent mais vraiment rien de convaincant. Tout le monde sait par ailleurs que l&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance va \u00e0 un nouveau pays dont les milieux politiques dirigeants sont hautement suspects, avec des connexions mafieuses, ill\u00e9gales, des liens de corruption et de banditisme divers. Le&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6179,2628,3085,2671],"class_list":["post-69690","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-clemons","tag-diplomatie","tag-kosovo","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69690","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69690"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69690\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69690"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69690"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69690"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}