{"id":69746,"date":"2008-03-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-03-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/03\/12\/la-demission-de-fallon-ou-la-question-des-prerogatives-des-cinc\/"},"modified":"2008-03-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-03-12T00:00:00","slug":"la-demission-de-fallon-ou-la-question-des-prerogatives-des-cinc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/03\/12\/la-demission-de-fallon-ou-la-question-des-prerogatives-des-cinc\/","title":{"rendered":"La d\u00e9mission de Fallon, ou la question des pr\u00e9rogatives des \u201cCinC<\/em><\/strong>?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Il est int\u00e9ressant d’avoir l’analyse de Gareth Porter sur la d\u00e9mission de l’amiral Fallon, dans la mesure o\u00f9 Porter a \u00e9t\u00e9 constamment le meilleur pourvoyeur d’informations sur le comportement de Fallon. Il donne cette analyse dans Antiwar.com<\/em>, aujourd’hui<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPorter rappelle l’historique du commandement controvers\u00e9 de Fallon et donne une interpr\u00e9tation de sa d\u00e9mission. Il la voit comme un acte provoqu\u00e9 par l’amiral lui-m\u00eame \u00e0 la suite d’une situation devenue intenable moins en raison sp\u00e9cifiquement de la crise iranienne que de son activit\u00e9 en tant que commandant en chef de th\u00e9\u00e2tre (qui implique \u00e9videmment des activit\u00e9s autour de la crise iranienne).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abBut Fallon’s role in regional diplomacy proved to be an even greater source of friction with the White House than his position on military policy toward Iran. Personal relations with military and political leaders in the Middle East had already become nearly as important as military planning under Fallon’s predecessors at Centcom.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFallon clearly relished his diplomatic role and did not hesitate to express views on diplomacy that were at odds with those of the administration. Last summer, as Dick Cheney was maneuvering within the administration to shift U.S. policy toward an attack on bases in Iran allegedly connected to anti-U.S. Shi’ite forces in Iraq, Fallon declared in an interview, We have to figure out a way to come to an arrangement with Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhen Sunni Arab regimes in the Middle East became alarmed about the possibility of a U.S. war with Iran, Fallon made statements on three occasions in September and November ruling out a U.S. attack on Iran. Those statements contradicted the Bush administration’s policy of keeping the military option "on the table" and soured relations with the White House.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFallon also antagonized administration officials by pushing for a faster exit from Iraq than the White House and Gen. Petraeus wanted. Fallon had a highly publicized personal and policy clash with Petraeus, for whom he reportedly expressed a visceral dislike. Sources familiar with reports of his meetings with Petraeus in Baghdad last March told IPS last spring that he called him an ass-kissing little chickens**t in their first meeting.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFallon later denied that he had used such language, suggesting to Esquire that the sources of the report were probably army officers who were indulging in inter-service rivalry with the Navy. In fact, however, the sources of the report were supporters of Fallon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFallon’s quarrel with Petraeus was also related to the latter’s insistence on keeping U.S. troops in Iraq, even while the NATO position in Afghanistan was growing more tenuous. Fallon was strongly committed to a strategy that gave priority to Afghanistan and Pakistan as the central security challenges to the United States in the Middle East and Asia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFallon was playing a complex political game at Centcom by crossing the White House on the two most politically sensitive issues in Middle East policy. As a veteran bureaucratic infighter, he knew that he was politically vulnerable. Nevertheless, he chose late last year not to lower his profile but to raise it by cooperating fully with the Esquire article.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe probl\u00e8me des CinC<\/em> (abr\u00e9viation de Commander in Chief<\/em>, souvent prononc\u00e9 par ironie King<\/em>, pour roi) remonte \u00e0 l’\u00e9poque Clinton. L’affaiblissement du pouvoir civil au profit du pouvoir militaire \u00e0 Washington a, d\u00e8s cette \u00e9poque, tendu \u00e0 donner aux commandants de th\u00e9\u00e2tre des activit\u00e9s diplomatiques en plus de leurs activit\u00e9s militaires, qui ont interf\u00e9r\u00e9 de plus en plus souvent sur la diplomatie officielle US. Il semble que les pr\u00e9rogatives de sa fonction, ainsi que le caract\u00e8re personnel de l’homme, aient pouss\u00e9 Fallon tr\u00e8s loin dans ce sens, d’autant que les circonstances (la crise iranienne) l’y poussaient irr\u00e9sistiblement comme elles poussaient les dirigeants politiques de la r\u00e9gion \u00e0 l’y inciter. L’article de Esquire<\/em> y fait d’ailleurs largement allusion, d\u00e9taillant ses rencontres avec l’Egyptien Moubarak, avec le Pakistanais Musharaf, etc., comme s’il s’agissait de v\u00e9ritables missions diplomatiques. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 12 mars 2008 \u00e0 09H37<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Il est int\u00e9ressant d’avoir l’analyse de Gareth Porter sur la d\u00e9mission de l’amiral Fallon, dans la mesure o\u00f9 Porter a \u00e9t\u00e9 constamment le meilleur pourvoyeur d’informations sur le comportement de Fallon. Il donne cette analyse dans Antiwar.com, aujourd’hui. Porter rappelle l’historique du commandement controvers\u00e9 de Fallon et donne une interpr\u00e9tation de sa d\u00e9mission. Il la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3274,6296,6333],"class_list":["post-69746","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cinc","tag-fallon","tag-porter"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69746","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69746"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69746\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69746"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69746"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69746"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}