Le 12 mars, \u00e0 une audition de la commission s\u00e9natoriale des appropriations de d\u00e9fense, une premi\u00e8re attaque fondamentale, de type strtucturelle, a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e contre le programme JSF. Cette attaque vient \u00e0 la suite de la publication le 11 mars<\/a> des rapports du GAO sur le programme JSF, notamment les points o\u00f9 le GAO annonce une augmentation de $38 milliards en un an du programme de d\u00e9veloppement et d’acquisition de l’avion (\u00e0 partir d’un co\u00fbt d\u00e9j\u00e0 major\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises de $299 milliards l’ann\u00e9e derni\u00e8re) et un co\u00fbt global probable du programme (d\u00e9veloppement, acquisition, maintenance, utilisation) d\u00e9passant les $950 milliards et approchant le trillion. (Ces chiffres valent pour l’intention officielle annonc\u00e9e d’acqu\u00e9rir 2.458 avions pour les trois services, intention largement mise en doute de diff\u00e9rentes fa\u00e7ons.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’attaque vient du s\u00e9nateur Christopher Kit Bond, un r\u00e9publicain du Missouri, qui estime que le programme JSF\/F-35 est sur le point de tomber sous le coup de l’amendement Nunn-McCordy<\/a>. Cet amendement requiert une notification officielle au Congr\u00e8s d’une augmentation de 15% puis de 25% selon le cas, pour un programme, pour une compl\u00e8te r\u00e9\u00e9valuation officielle du programme (dans le cas de 15%) et pour l’abandon du programme (25%). Il s’agit de notifications officielles portant sur une augmentation tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment \u00e9tablie sur une p\u00e9riode de temps tr\u00e8s limit\u00e9e, par rapport \u00e0 l’estimation officielle initiale communiqu\u00e9e par le Pentagone. D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, Nunn-McCurdy, qui date de 1981, n’aboutit pas \u00e0 l’abandon du programme mais oblige \u00e0 une r\u00e9vision g\u00e9n\u00e9rale publique des conditions du programme, voire \u00e0 une restructuration compl\u00e8te du programme. Dans le cas hautement pol\u00e9mique du JF\/F-35, soumis depuis deux ans \u00e0 des tensions grandissantes de la part du Congr\u00e8s, dans un contexte de crise o\u00f9 le F-35 est oppos\u00e9<\/a> au F-22, un tel d\u00e9veloppement aurait un \u00e9norme effet m\u00e9diatique et aurait des effets au minimum de d\u00e9lais tr\u00e8s importants \u00e0 cause de la possibilit\u00e9 de la refonte du programme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici ce qu’en dit le Daily Report<\/em> de l’AFA en date du 14 mars<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abBond Claims F-35 Nunn-McCurdy<\/em><\/strong>: Sen. Christopher Kit Bond (R-Mo.) thinks the Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter program faces an imminent breach of Nunn-McCurdy cost-monitoring thresholds. Bond, in whose state rival Boeing builds F-15s, made the comments during the March 12 hearing of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee with the Air Force’s top leadership. Citing a just-released Government Accountability Office report indicating that the F-35 program now has a total estimated lifetime price tag approaching one trillion dollars and will experience more delays, he said he was told that there will most likely be a breachmeaning program costs have risen sharply. But somehow, he said, the Defense Acquisition Board is claiming scheduling delays, which delays the announcement of what I believe is inevitably a Nunn-McCurdy breach and possibly delays our taking action in this committee. Bond also laid into the Air Force leaders for what he characterized as the service’s unrealistic fighter modernization efforts. I remain extremely troubled and concerned about Air Force management and its unwillingness to consider alternative courses of action to meet current and future threats, he told Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Gen. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff. The current strategy of building the F-35 as well as Lockheed Martin’s F-22 fails to address the impact on the fighter aircraft industrial base, he said. (Such as giving Boeing more fighter work with additional buys of F-15s.) Sole sourcing the F-35 to Lockheed Martin was a stupendously bad decision, he claimed. And with cost overruns and the number of F-22s capped, there will never be enough F-22s to supply the Air National Guard, making it impossible to fill gaps when older fighters are retired, he said. The Air Force needs to come up with a Plan B, such as pursuing a mix of F-22s, and modernized F-15s and F-16s, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tComme on le lit, Bond repr\u00e9sente un Etat-Boeing, puisque la cha\u00eene des F-15 se trouve dans le Missouri. Son int\u00e9r\u00eat est donc \u00e9vident. Il n’emp\u00eache que sa plaidoirie, qui porte \u00e9galement sur la crise de l’USAF<\/a> et sur la crise de la base industrielle<\/a>, touche un probl\u00e8me d’une pressante actualit\u00e9. Son \u00e9vocation pr\u00e9cise de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’un plan B (poursuite du F-22, relance du F-15 et du F-16 dans des versions modernis\u00e9es pour palier \u00e0 la carence hypoth\u00e9tique du JSF) est une hypoth\u00e8se extr\u00eamement actuelle, une possibilit\u00e9 jusqu’ici \u00e9voqu\u00e9e en th\u00e9orie mais qui acquiert une actualit\u00e9 grandissante devant les probl\u00e8mes rencontr\u00e9s par le JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe fait que cette hypoth\u00e8se soit pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e publiquement montre que les partisans d’une alternative au JSF dans le plan de modernisation de l’USAF (et des autres armes, pour d’autres plans B, comme \tMis en ligne le 15 mars 2008 \u00e0 05H35<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le 12 mars, \u00e0 une audition de la commission s\u00e9natoriale des appropriations de d\u00e9fense, une premi\u00e8re attaque fondamentale, de type strtucturelle, a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e contre le programme JSF. Cette attaque vient \u00e0 la suite de la publication le 11 mars des rapports du GAO sur le programme JSF, notamment les points o\u00f9 le GAO annonce… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3192,7470,464,3302,6515,249,4248,250,7471],"class_list":["post-69755","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-boeing","tag-bond","tag-f","tag-f-15","tag-f-18e","tag-f-22","tag-gao","tag-jsf","tag-nunn-mccordy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69755","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69755"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69755\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69755"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69755"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69755"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}