A l’occasion du 5\u00e8me anniversaire du d\u00e9but de la guerre contre l’Irak, la revue Foreign Policy<\/em> a effectu\u00e9 une enqu\u00eate tr\u00e8s d\u00e9taill\u00e9e, d’une apmpleur sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, aupr\u00e8s de 3.400 officiers d’active ou \u00e0 la retraite des forces arm\u00e9es US. Les r\u00e9sultats chiffr\u00e9s de cette enqu\u00eate sont publi\u00e9s depuis hier<\/a> en version pdf tandis que les r\u00e9sultats sont comment\u00e9s, \u00e9galement depuis hier<\/a>, sur le site du magazine. Quelques d\u00e9tails permettent de se faire une id\u00e9e de la vari\u00e9t\u00e9 et de la repr\u00e9sentativ\u00e9 de l’\u00e9chantillopnnage des personnes interrog\u00e9es:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAbout 35 percent of the participants hailed from the Army, 33 percent from the Air Force, 23 percent from the Navy, and 8 percent from the Marine Corps. Several hundred are flag officers, elite generals and admirals who have served at the highest levels of command. Approximately one third are colonels or captainsofficers commanding thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marinesand 37 percent hold the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander. Eighty-one percent have more than 20 years of service in the military. Twelve percent graduated from one of America’s exclusive military academies. And more than two thirds have combat experience, with roughly 10 percent having served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tParmi les tr\u00e8s nombreux sujets abord\u00e9s, sur lesquels nous reviendrions \u00e9ventuellement, il y a celui d’une prochaine guerre, avec comme hypoth\u00e8ses envisag\u00e9es notamment l’Iran, la Syrie, la Cor\u00e9e du Nord, la d\u00e9fense de Ta\u00efwan. Les r\u00e9ponses sont extr\u00eamement pesimistes. 80% des personnes interrog\u00e9es estiment que les USA ne sont pas pr\u00e9par\u00e9s pour faire une nouvelle guerre, notamment parmi les quatre options pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s. Parmi ces quatre options de guerre, le niveau de pr\u00e9paration (de 1 \u00e0 10, 10 \u00e9tant la pr\u00e9paration maximale) des pays concern\u00e9s sont not\u00e9s ainsi: Syrie (5,1), Ta\u00efwan (4,9), Cor\u00e9e du Nord (4,7), Iran (4,5). Une guerre contre l’Iran, dont on parle r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement depuis trois ans et dont on reparle depuis la d\u00e9mission d l’amiral Fallon, est donc l’hypoth\u00e8se pour laquelle ces 3.400 officiers estiment les USA comme \u00e9tant les moins pr\u00e9par\u00e9s. Ces r\u00e9sultats mesurent ce que serait la puissance de la r\u00e9sistance de l’appareil militaire \u00e0 tout projet d’attaque de cette sorte envisag\u00e9 \u00e9ventuellement par le pouvoir politique. (Comme il est dit dans l’extrait ci-dessous: \u00ab… in war, it is easier to talk tough than it is to deliver<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhen it comes to addressing threats such as the nuclear ambitions of Iran or North Korea, American officials are fond of saying that all options are on the table. But given the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, how credible is it to assume that the United States could successfully conduct another major military operation somewhere else in the world today? According to the index’s officers, not very.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAsked whether it was reasonable or unreasonable to expect the U.S. military to successfully wage another major war at this time, 80 percent of the officers say that it is unreasonable. The officers were also asked about four specific hot spotsIran, North Korea, Syria, and the Taiwan Straitand how prepared they believe the United States is to successfully fight a major combat operation there, were a war to break out today. Using a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 meaning that the United States is fully prepared and 1 meaning that the United States is unable to execute such a mission, the officers put America’s preparedness for war against Iran at just 4.5. The average readiness score for America’s armed forces to go to war in those four hot spots was 4.8.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOf course, any future conflict could strain some parts of the military more than others. How burdensome any war is for a particular service depends on the adversary, the geography of the conflict, the strategy U.S. commanders adopt, and a host of other factors. One is the level of readiness of the services today. When asked to grade the readiness of each of the military services, again on a 10-point scale, the officers judged the Army’s readiness to be the worst, with an average score of just 4.7. The Navy and Air Force fared the best, with scores of 6.8 and 6.6, respectively. The Marine Corps, which along with the Army shares the bulk of the burden in Iraq and Afghanistan, scored just above an average level of readiness, at 5.7. It’s a reminder that, in war, it is easier to talk tough than it is to deliver.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 18 mars 2008 \u00e0 14H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A l’occasion du 5\u00e8me anniversaire du d\u00e9but de la guerre contre l’Irak, la revue Foreign Policy a effectu\u00e9 une enqu\u00eate tr\u00e8s d\u00e9taill\u00e9e, d’une apmpleur sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, aupr\u00e8s de 3.400 officiers d’active ou \u00e0 la retraite des forces arm\u00e9es US. Les r\u00e9sultats chiffr\u00e9s de cette enqu\u00eate sont publi\u00e9s depuis hier en version pdf tandis que les… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2870,4739,2863,2773,2864],"class_list":["post-69764","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-attaque","tag-enquete","tag-foreign","tag-iran","tag-policy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69764","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69764"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69764\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69764"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69764"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69764"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}