{"id":69765,"date":"2008-03-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-03-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/03\/19\/un-flot-de-petrole-pour-conquerir-le-petrole\/"},"modified":"2008-03-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-03-19T00:00:00","slug":"un-flot-de-petrole-pour-conquerir-le-petrole","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/03\/19\/un-flot-de-petrole-pour-conquerir-le-petrole\/","title":{"rendered":"Un flot de p\u00e9trole pour conqu\u00e9rir le p\u00e9trole"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>La guerre contre l&rsquo;Irak a-t-elle \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e pour verrouiller l&rsquo;acc\u00e8s \u00e0 des r\u00e9serves importantes de p\u00e9trole (6% des r\u00e9serves mondiales de p\u00e9trole en Irak)? Les arguments, les th\u00e9ories de complot et le reste ne manquent pas pour une r\u00e9ponse qui se veut \u00eatre le contraire de n\u00e9gative. On conna\u00eet le d\u00e9bat et les d\u00e9batteurs qui sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral honorables et p\u00e9remptoires. Cette sorte de d\u00e9bat \u00e9carte en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral certains aspects du probl\u00e8me irakien qui ne manquent pas d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat. L&rsquo;un des plus paradoxaux et certainement le plus symbolique et le plus r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur nous est d\u00e9taill\u00e9 par Robert Bryce, directeur de la r\u00e9daction de <em>Energy Tribune<\/em>. Voici des pr\u00e9cisions tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rentes du courant sur la question Irak-p\u00e9trole, dans cet article de Bryce, dans <em>The American Conservative<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/amconmag.com\/2008\/2008_03_10\/print\/coverprint.html<D\" class=\"gen\">10 mars 2008<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCi-apr\u00e8s, quelques extraits significatifs de l&rsquo;article, portant sur la consommation de p\u00e9trole par les forces arm\u00e9es US en Irak:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Today the average American G.I. in Iraq uses about 20.5 gallons of fuel every day, more than double the daily volume consumed by U.S. soldiers in Iraq in 2004. Thus, in order to secure the third-richest country on the planet, the U.S. military is burning enormous quantities of petroleum. And nearly every drop of that fuel is imported into Iraq. These massive fuel requirementsjust over 3 million gallons per day for Operation Iraqi Freedom, according to the Pentagon&rsquo;s Defense Energy Support Centerare a key reason for the soaring cost of the war effort.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But America&rsquo;s presence in Iraq isn&rsquo;t making use of the local riches. Indeed, little, if any, Iraqi oil is being used by the American military. Instead, the bulk of the fuel needed by the U.S. military is being trucked in from the sprawling Mina Abdulla refinery complex, which lies a few dozen kilometers south of Kuwait City. In 2006 alone, the Defense Energy Support Center purchased $909.3 million in motor fuel from the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. In addition to the Kuwaiti fuel, the U.S. military is trucking in fuel from Turkey. But some of that Turkish fuel actually originates in refineries as far away as Greece.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In 2007 alone, the U.S. military in Iraq burned more than 1.1 billion gallons of fuel. (American Armed Forces generally use a blend of jet fuel known as JP-8 to propel both aircraft and automobiles.) About 5,500 tanker trucks are involved in the Iraqi fuel-hauling effort. That fleet of trucks is enormously costly. In November 2006, a study produced by the U.S. Military Academy estimated that delivering one gallon of fuel to U.S. soldiers in Iraq cost American taxpayers $42and that didn&rsquo;t include the cost of the fuel itself. At that rate, each U.S. soldier in Iraq is costing $840 per day in fuel delivery costs, and the U.S. is spending $923 million per week on fuel-related logistics in order to keep 157,000 G.I.s in Iraq. Given that the Iraq War is now costing about $2.5 billion per week, petroleum costs alone currently account for about one-third of all U.S. military expenditure in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Soaring fuel costs are largely a product of the fact that U.S. forces have been forced to defend themselves against improvised explosive devices. The majority of American casualties in Iraq have been due to IED attacks, primarily on motor vehicles. The U.S. military has spent billions of dollars on electronic countermeasures to combat the deadly devices, but those countermeasures have largely failed. Instead, the troops have had to rely on old-fashioned hardened steel. Since the beginning of the war, the Pentagon has introduced numerous programs to add armor skins to its fleet of Humvees.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But even the newest armored Humvees, which weigh about six tons, haven&rsquo;t been enough to protect soldiers against the deadly explosives. Last year, Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon agreed on a four-year plan to spend about $20 billion on a fleet of 23,000 mine-resistant ambush protection vehicles or MRAPs. Last August, the Pentagon ordered 1,520 of the vehicles at a cost of $3.5 million each.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The MRAPs mean even greater demand for fuel from U.S. troops in Iraq. An armored Humvee covers perhaps 8 miles per gallon of fuel. One version of the MRAP, the Maxxpro, weighs about 40,000 pounds, and according to a source within the military, gets just 3 miles per gallon. The increased demand for fuel for the MRAPs will come alongside the need for an entirely new set of tires, fan belts, windshields, alternators, and other gear.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>This swelling of the logistics train creates yet another problem for the military: an increase in supply trucks on the road, which demands yet more fuel and provides insurgents with a greater range of targets to attack.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>While the U.S. military chases its own fuel tail in Iraq, a country that sits atop 115 billion barrels of oilabout 9.5 percent of the world&rsquo;s totalthe global energy industry is racing forward with new alliances and deals, many of which would have been unthinkable before the invasion. Those alliances have far-reaching significance for America&rsquo;s foreign and energy policy. The world&rsquo;s oil market is no longer shaped by U.S. military power. Markets are trumping militarism. As one analyst put it recently, dollars are replacing bullets as shapers of the geopolitical picture.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The importance of this point is obvious: as the effectiveness of militarism in controlling global energy trends is declining, the U.S. is spending billions of dollars a week in Mesopotamia on a war effort thatif John McCain is rightcould drain the American treasury for decades to come. Meanwhile, America&rsquo;s key rivals, China and Russia in particular, are using their influence to forge economic alliances that are realigning the global balance of power. They are creating a multi-polar world in which America&rsquo;s influence will be substantially diminished.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCes pr\u00e9cisions sont d&rsquo;un int\u00e9r\u00eat consid\u00e9rable si on les place dans le contexte d&rsquo;une appr\u00e9ciation compl\u00e8tement novatrice de la guerre, comme nous tentons de le faire. Elles viennent comme une d\u00e9monstration de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4965\" class=\"gen\">la th\u00e8se<\/a> que sugg\u00e8rent les travaux de Stiglitz,  dans un domaine parmi d&rsquo;autres, qui n&rsquo;est pas le plus important du point de vue des d\u00e9penses, dont est constitu\u00e9 la guerre moderne. Il s&rsquo;agit de la d\u00e9monstration que la violence de la guerre s&rsquo;exerce plus contre ceux qui la d\u00e9clenchent en position de puissance et d&rsquo;avantages technologiques et bureaucratiques, et d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on indirecte contre les ressources qui fondent cette puissance plus encore que contre les outils de cette puissance. Le fait qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agisse ici de consommation de p\u00e9trole permet de mieux comprendre le sens le plus large qu&rsquo;il faut donner au mot violence; il s&rsquo;agit de toutes les destructions caus\u00e9es par la guerre, affectant les personnes, les biens divers, toutes les structures existantes du syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa d\u00e9monstration est d&rsquo;autant plus int\u00e9ressante qu&rsquo;elle rend compte \u00e9galement de l&rsquo;absence de contr\u00f4le et du caract\u00e8re presque myst\u00e9rieux des d\u00e9penses directes caus\u00e9es par cette guerre, par rapport aux efforts apparemment fournis, \u00e0 l&rsquo;intensit\u00e9 apparente du conflit, etc. Le constat qu&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui la consommation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de carburant revient en moyenne \u00e0 faire consommer pour chaque soldat US 20,5 gallons (autour de 95 litres) d&rsquo;essence par jour, soit plus de deux fois plus qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;en consommait en 2004, est particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur. Entre 2004 et 2008, l&rsquo;activit\u00e9 militaire US directe (engagement avec l&rsquo;ennemi) aurait plut\u00f4t diminu\u00e9 puisque la tactique depuis fin 2006 est de r\u00e9duire les engagements US. On a une mesure de l&rsquo;importance dans les violences de la guerre de l&rsquo;intervention myst\u00e9rieuse des processus bureaucratiques, l&rsquo;usage de mat\u00e9riels extraordinairement consommateurs, les n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s de consommation des processus de protection et ainsi de suite. Les aspects parasitaires et annexes, les co\u00fbts indirects et compl\u00e9mentaires constituent aujourd&rsquo;hui, sans le moindre doute, une partie colossalement plus importante que les co\u00fbts directs de la guerre. Les situations de paradoxe par rapport \u00e0 notre conception traditionnelle de la guerre deviennent la caract\u00e9ristique essentielle de la guerre, sa substance m\u00eame.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 19 mars 2008 \u00e0 08H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La guerre contre l&rsquo;Irak a-t-elle \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e pour verrouiller l&rsquo;acc\u00e8s \u00e0 des r\u00e9serves importantes de p\u00e9trole (6% des r\u00e9serves mondiales de p\u00e9trole en Irak)? Les arguments, les th\u00e9ories de complot et le reste ne manquent pas pour une r\u00e9ponse qui se veut \u00eatre le contraire de n\u00e9gative. On conna\u00eet le d\u00e9bat et les d\u00e9batteurs qui&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2894,7481,6152,857,3600,2671],"class_list":["post-69765","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-armee","tag-bryce","tag-consommation","tag-irak","tag-petrole","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69765","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69765"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69765\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69765"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69765"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69765"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}