La France meilleure alli\u00e9e des USA? La possible Grande Nouvelle a encore \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9voqu\u00e9e dans une interview de GW Bush par le Times<\/em> de Londres, dans un article publi\u00e9 aujourd’hui<\/a>. La chose \u00e9tait \u00e9voqu\u00e9e en m\u00eame temps que la question de savoir si l’Angleterre est encore ou n’est plus<\/a> l’alli\u00e9e au traitement privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 qu’elle avait coutume d’\u00eatre. Grande interrogation \u00e0 ce propos. Le d\u00e9bat, grotesque comme tout ce qu’il y a autour de cette question d’image de communication sans la moindre substance (sinon les liens de servilit\u00e9 automatiques des Britanniques vis-\u00e0-vis des USA \u00e9tablis du temps de la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale et de la Guerre froide), nous a permis de nous rappeler que GW est toujours pr\u00e9sident des USA en m\u00eame temps que des habiles ambitions sarkozystes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’intervention sur les exclamations de satisfaction de GW Bush \u00e0 propos du comportement de l’\u00e9l\u00e8ve Sarkozy intervient \u00e0 propos des intentions fran\u00e7aises d’envoyer 1.000 soldats de plus en Afghanistan. La chose semble susciter une satisfaction intense de Washington. Il est possible qu’on avertisse les talibans qu’ils n’ont plus aucune chance et qu’ils feraient mieux d’abandonner la partie illico presto<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abHis comments came before a visit next week to Eastern Europe and the final Nato summit of his presidency, being held in Bucharest. Despite being hobbled by unpopularity abroad and at home where attention is focused on the race to succeed him Mr Bush appears determined to shape his legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe President gave a glimpse of some of the resentment felt by Washington towards other Nato allies whom he said needed to be encouraged to take obligations in Afghanistan seriously. The definition of the summit’s success, he added, would be to ensure Nato stayed relevant.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut he heaped praise on President Sarkozy of France, who has announced his intention to send another 1,000 troops to the Afghan battlefields. It was notable, perhaps, that he avoided expressing similar sentiments about Gordon Brown after a period, since Tony Blair’s departure from Downing Street, in which differences of tone, if not substance, have emerged between Britain and the US.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAsked if Mr Sarkozy now represented America’s most important bilateral partner, Mr Bush replied that the relationship with Britain was never as special as during times of war, before citing the alliance between Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as the current relationship the more modern relationship between Tony Blair and myself.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHe added: It’s going to be hard for any nation to trump the United Kingdom as our greatest ally. Having said that, no question that the relationship is changing for the better. President Sarkozy whom he described as a highly energetic and decisive leader deserved credit, he said, for not being interested in creating divisions in the transatlantic relationship.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFrance’s offer of an additional 1,000 troops pretty much ensured next week’s summit would be a success, he said, adding that the British, French and Canadian troops who will be in harm’s way represented a strong statement that Nato was ready to rise to the challenge in Afghanistan.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn est toujours surpris par le caract\u00e8re sommaire, aussi bien des sentiments am\u00e9ricanistes en la mati\u00e8re, que des esp\u00e9rances fran\u00e7aises par cons\u00e9quent. Le profit diplomatique principal offert \u00e0 la France est effectivement d’\u00eatre \u00e9ventuellement nomm\u00e9e meilleure alli\u00e9e des USA, et pas beaucoup d’autre chose en plus, lorsqu’on voit les r\u00e9cempenses dont sont gratifi\u00e9s les Britanniques depuis cinquante ans. Pour arriver \u00e0 ce r\u00e9sultat s\u00e9duisant, il faudra tout de m\u00eame encore beaucoup, beaucoup d’efforts (\u00abIt’s going to be hard for any nation to trump the United Kingdom as our greatest ally. Having said that, no question that the relationship is changing for the better<\/em>\u00bb). Il est manifeste que 1.000 soldats de plus en Afghanistan, c’est un pas ferme et entreprenant dans la bonne direction, mais que ce n’est pas vraiment suffisant (\u00e0 combien d’hommes en plus gagnera-t-on le badge du meilleur alli\u00e9? 2.500? 5.000?).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDans la perception US, il semble que Sarkozy a d\u00e9j\u00e0 montr\u00e9 qu’il semblait comprendre ce qu’on attend d’un bon alli\u00e9: \u00ab not being interested in creating divisions in the transatlantic relationship.<\/em>\u00bb Cela revient \u00e0 recommander sans discussion d’occuper la position standard de respecter l’alignement dans les rangs puisque l’absence de division transatlantique signifie effectivement l’alignement sur on sait fort bien quoi. Cela rejoint les avantages \u00e0 attendre pour la France dans ce cas, r\u00e9sdum\u00e9s par Hubert V\u00e9drine dans son rapport<\/a> de septembre dernier: \u00abSur les \u00c9tats-Unis cela donnerait \u00e0 la France une influence comparable \u00e0 celle des autres alli\u00e9s, c’est-\u00e0-dire quasi nulle.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPour l’instant, avec l’intention fran\u00e7aise d’envoyer ce renfort dans le gu\u00e9pier afghan dont nul ne sait o\u00f9 il m\u00e8ne, sinon \u00e0 des d\u00e9boires grotesques et \u00e9ventuellement sanglants, l’approche US est particuli\u00e8rement aimable pour la France, ce qui conduit \u00e0 mesurer paradoxalement, psychologie sommaire US oblige, quel degr\u00e9 de servilit\u00e9 on attend des Fran\u00e7ais. En toute logique, l’incompr\u00e9hension franco-am\u00e9ricaniste dans ce domaine de l’exercice de la servilit\u00e9 \u00e9tant une constante historique qui d\u00e9passe de cent coud\u00e9es les id\u00e9es originales des r\u00e9formistes qui passent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement dans le paysage, cette bonne entente devrait se dissoudre en acrimonie au premier accrochage \u00e0 venir. En attendant, on peut appr\u00e9cier le go\u00fbt saum\u00e2tre qui attend, pour la France, la voie transatlantique tant qu’elle sera affirm\u00e9e. Avec un peu d’\u00e0-propos, cette manoeuvre sarkozyste en eaux \u00e9videmment troubles serait bienvenue si elle occasionnait une nouvelle chute dans les sondages en France.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en place le 27 mars 2008 \u00e0 15H41<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La France meilleure alli\u00e9e des USA? La possible Grande Nouvelle a encore \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9voqu\u00e9e dans une interview de GW Bush par le Times de Londres, dans un article publi\u00e9 aujourd’hui. La chose \u00e9tait \u00e9voqu\u00e9e en m\u00eame temps que la question de savoir si l’Angleterre est encore ou n’est plus l’alli\u00e9e au traitement privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 qu’elle avait… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,6756,7494,3198,7493,584,2766,4590,4983],"class_list":["post-69788","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-alignement","tag-allie","tag-gw","tag-meilleur","tag-otan","tag-relations","tag-sarkozy","tag-speciales"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69788","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69788"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69788\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69788"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69788"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69788"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}