{"id":69792,"date":"2008-03-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-03-28T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/03\/28\/la-treve-est-finie-le-pire-a-triomphe\/"},"modified":"2008-03-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-03-28T00:00:00","slug":"la-treve-est-finie-le-pire-a-triomphe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/03\/28\/la-treve-est-finie-le-pire-a-triomphe\/","title":{"rendered":"La tr\u00eave est finie, le pire a triomph\u00e9"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Depuis trois jours, un nouveau courant de violence se r\u00e9pand en Irak, ajoutant une <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5014\" class=\"gen\">nouvelle dimension<\/a> \u00e0 cette guerre. Pour William S. Lind, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.spacewar.com\/reports\/Military_Matters_Iraqs_new_storm_999.html\" class=\"gen\">27 mars<\/a> sur <em>SpaceWar.News<\/em> (UPI), c&rsquo;est la fin de la tr\u00eave (<em>lull<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Most wars move not at a steady pace but in a series of fits and starts. For about half a year, we have been enjoying something of a lull in the war in Iraq. Anything that reduces casualties is to be welcomed. But the bulletins&rsquo; claims that the downward trend in violence will continue should be seen more as political vaporing than military analysis. Events begin to suggest that the lull is ending and Mars is in the ascendant.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLind analyse rapidement les quatre points qui, selon lui, ont effectivement favoris\u00e9 la tr\u00eave antam\u00e9e \u00e0 partir du printemps 2007, et leur d\u00e9gradation actuelle et parall\u00e8le jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 un point o\u00f9 il juge que la violence est repartie au-del\u00e0 du contr\u00f4lable. D&rsquo;o\u00f9 sa conclusion:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The main story of the current lull is one of lost opportunity. Whether soon or in the more distant future, the war in Iraq will get hotter again. The lull gave us what might be our only opportunity to leave Iraq with some tail feathers intact. Just as the Bush administration&rsquo;s blindness got us into this war, so its rigidity made us pass over our best chance to get out. Like opportunity, Mars, the God of War, only knocks once. Next time, he blows the building.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est une curieuse histoire, qu&rsquo;on pourrait refaire comme on fait une r\u00e9trospective. Fin 2006, le <em>surge<\/em>, qui a abouti \u00e0 la tr\u00eave, avait \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9 par GW Bush pour <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3492\" class=\"gen\">contrer<\/a> le plan de stabilisation puis de retrait du groupe Baker (le plan du ISG, ou Iraq Study Group). Consid\u00e9r\u00e9es r\u00e9trospectivement, \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de l&rsquo;analyse qu&rsquo;en fait William S. Lind, on s&rsquo;aper\u00e7oit que les deux choses auraient du en fait s&rsquo;ajouter l&rsquo;une \u00e0 l&rsquo;autre, et ainsi se compl\u00e8ter. Id\u00e9alement, l&rsquo;effet de quelques mois produit par le <em>surge<\/em> \u00e9tait l&rsquo;occasion pour les USA d&rsquo;amorcer un spectaculaire retrait d&rsquo;Irak,  le plan de l&rsquo;ISG,  et d&rsquo;esp\u00e9rer ainsi mettre en marche une dynamique qui aurait permis aux USA de se sortir compl\u00e8tement du bourbier irakien. Mais cela impliquait un autre point de vue, une autre perception de la situation, une autre vision de la politique avec une certaine mesure et une certaine modestie de ce qui existe aujourd&rsquo;hui \u00e0 Wasdhington. Les compl\u00e9ments ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s pour \u00eatre oppos\u00e9s, le pire a donc triomph\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 28 mars 2008 \u00e0 14H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Depuis trois jours, un nouveau courant de violence se r\u00e9pand en Irak, ajoutant une nouvelle dimension \u00e0 cette guerre. Pour William S. Lind, le 27 mars sur SpaceWar.News (UPI), c&rsquo;est la fin de la tr\u00eave (lull) \u00abMost wars move not at a steady pace but in a series of fits and starts. For about half&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4094,857,6014,1012,6263,7496],"class_list":["post-69792","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-baker","tag-irak","tag-isg","tag-lind","tag-surge","tag-treve"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69792","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69792"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69792\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69792"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69792"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69792"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}