{"id":69819,"date":"2008-04-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-04-09T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/04\/09\/la-navy-hamlet-to-get-or-not-to-get-the-jsf\/"},"modified":"2008-04-09T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-04-09T00:00:00","slug":"la-navy-hamlet-to-get-or-not-to-get-the-jsf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/04\/09\/la-navy-hamlet-to-get-or-not-to-get-the-jsf\/","title":{"rendered":"La Navy-Hamlet : \u201cto get or not to get the JSF<\/em>\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’U.S. Navy est engag\u00e9e dans un grand m\u00e9lodrame, ou bien est-ce une trag\u00e9die shakespearienne, \u00e0 propos du JSF. Elle entend bien n’\u00eatre accus\u00e9e en aucune fa\u00e7on d’entretenir contre le programme une vindicte quelconque. Elle place donc son probl\u00e8me au vu et au su de tout le monde, en ajoutant mezzo voce<\/em> qu’il ne tient qu’au JSF de s’arranger pour satisfaire la Navy en suscitant pour lui-m\u00eame un consid\u00e9rable effet de promotion, en acc\u00e9l\u00e9rant son entr\u00e9e en service. C’est ajouter le chantage \u00e0 la calomnie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe 7 avril (acc\u00e8s payant<\/a>), Defense News <\/em> nous pr\u00e9sente le probl\u00e8me<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe U.S. Navy is mulling proposals to bridge a strike fighter gap next decade by buying more F\/A-18 E\/F fighters or delaying the naval version of F-35 Lightning II, and that’s worrying other Joint Strike Fighter customers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Navy is definitely looking at another buy of F-18s and both accelerating or slowing down F-35, and we have run some numbers to help them answer their questions, said Air Force Maj. Gen. C.R. Davis, the F-35 program executive officer. Any time there is a discussion of a service or country pulling out airplanes from the program, the other service leaderships get very concerned. But we have told the Navy that buying them sooner at greater rates gives you a lower cost and more capability on your decks than any other buying profile.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNavy leaders say they’re fully committed to the JSF, but are facing a strike fighter gap between 2016 and 2025 as F\/A-18 jets are retired but before the JSFs come on line, Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, told lawmakers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbTo fill the gap, the Navy is looking at options that include upgrading some older planes to delay their retirements, buying from 50 to 282 more F-18s, and either speeding or delaying JSF.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tR\u00e9sumons : le JSF a pris du retard partout, donc aussi dans sa version F-35C (embarqu\u00e9e). En cons\u00e9quence, les plus vieux chasseurs embarqu\u00e9s actuels, des F-18A\/B Hornet<\/em> et les plus vieux F-18E\/F Super Hornet<\/em> arrivent en bout de vie op\u00e9rationnelle sans rempla\u00e7ant sinon poursuivre la s\u00e9rie en cours des Super Hornet<\/em>. Si rien n’est fait, ce n’est plus 69<\/a> nouveaux Super Hornet<\/em> qu’il faudra en attendant le JSF, mais 200. (L’option de moderniser les vieux avions en bout de vie op\u00e9rationnelle est \u00e0 peine \u00e9voqu\u00e9e, comme un investissement \u00e0 fonds perdus par rapport \u00e0 l’avantage obtenu.) Tout cela fait beaucoup d’argent, qui devra \u00eatre n\u00e9cessairement pris sur les cr\u00e9dits destin\u00e9s \u00e0 l’achat du JSF, ce qui implique que le JSF F-35C serait largement retard\u00e9 par cette ponction, de 3 ans au moins, amenant de nouveaux surco\u00fbts qui seront \u00e0 leur tour la cause de nouvelles h\u00e9sitations de la Navy, voire d’un choix de nouveaux Super Hornet<\/em> et peut-\u00eatre l’abandon du F-35C.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSi le JSF F-35C veut \u00e9viter ce sort funeste, il faut qu’il acc\u00e9l\u00e8re son d\u00e9veloppement pour entrer en service plus t\u00f4t et \u00e9viter \u00e0 la Navy l’achat de nouveaux Super Hornet<\/em>. Il faudra se d\u00e9cider au plus tard en 2010. Le march\u00e9 est l\u00e9onin. L’on sait bien que le retard du JSF est du \u00e0 des ennuis de d\u00e9veloppement, et exiger que ce retard soit r\u00e9sorb\u00e9 implique des risques insupportables, voire une quasi-impossibilit\u00e9 technique. Moyennent quoi, les amiraux affirment qu’ils restent compl\u00e8tement acquis aux vertus du JSF. (\u00abThe Navy pushed back vigorously on any suggestion that its support of the JSF program was shaky. For the record, we stand by JSF, said Cmdr. Jeff Davis, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon. It will bring enhanced capabilities to the fight and is the future strike fighter for the Navy and the joint force, and we stand by it.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPersonne ne s’y trompe. Si la Navy retarde sa version du JSF, c’est tout le programme qui souffrira d’un d\u00e9s\u00e9quilibre peut-\u00eatre radical succ\u00e9dant \u00e0 une succession de d\u00e9s\u00e9quilibre, surco\u00fbts, retards, etc. Vision cauchemardesque. Les habituels consultants qui font bien dans le paysage, dont nos amis Aboulafia et Loren B., ont donc \u00e0 nouveau d\u00e9terr\u00e9 la hache de guerre, un peu us\u00e9e \u00e0 force de l’\u00eatre de fa\u00e7on r\u00e9p\u00e9titive, pour d\u00e9fendre le JSF avec des impr\u00e9cations contre l’incons\u00e9quence des amiraux qui veulent r\u00e9duire la Navy \u00e0 une force c\u00f4ti\u00e8re de seconde zone si le magic<\/em> JSF n’est pas achet\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab[Pentagon consultant Robbin] Laird said that without the stealthy JSF to do Day One attacks on a heavily defended enemy, the service will struggle to justify having so many expensive nuclear aircraft carriers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLoren B. Thompson of the Lexington Institute agreed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNaval aviation will not survive beyond the next 20 years unless it fields the carrier version of the F-35 in large numbers, Thompson said. Without the F-35, the Navy has little future in littoral warfare.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRichard Aboulafia of the Teal Group agreed that a Navy delay could hurt the overall program.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBy moving away from JSF, the Navy is transmitting the message that current planes are good enough, and that is really damaging to JSF, which is all about stealth and fifth-generation capabilities, Aboulafia said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Navy has never been a fan of the program, Thompson and others said<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 9 avril 2008 \u00e0 14H53<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’U.S. Navy est engag\u00e9e dans un grand m\u00e9lodrame, ou bien est-ce une trag\u00e9die shakespearienne, \u00e0 propos du JSF. Elle entend bien n’\u00eatre accus\u00e9e en aucune fa\u00e7on d’entretenir contre le programme une vindicte quelconque. Elle place donc son probl\u00e8me au vu et au su de tout le monde, en ajoutant mezzo voce qu’il ne tient qu’au… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6515,7525,4711,250,3319,3487],"class_list":["post-69819","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-f-18e","tag-f-35c","tag-hornet","tag-jsf","tag-navy","tag-super"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69819","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69819"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69819\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69819"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69819"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69819"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}