{"id":69834,"date":"2008-04-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-04-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/04\/17\/mesure-du-desastre\/"},"modified":"2008-04-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-04-17T00:00:00","slug":"mesure-du-desastre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/04\/17\/mesure-du-desastre\/","title":{"rendered":"Mesure du d\u00e9sastre"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le Teal Group, conduit par Richard Aboulafia, a publi\u00e9 un rapport sur l&rsquo;\u00e9tat du programme JSF. (On conna\u00eet l&rsquo;imperturbable <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1643\" class=\"gen\">optimisme<\/a> du Teal Group pour ce qui concerne le JSF. Du coup, le ton beaucoup plus dubitatif de cette \u00e9dition nous appara\u00eet extr\u00eamement significatif.) Les indications ci-dessous nous sont donn\u00e9es par Michael Fabey, de <em>Aerospace Daily &#038; Defense Report<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aviationweek.com\/aw\/generic\/story.jsp?id=news\/F35041508.xml&#038;headline=JSF%20Program%20Improving,%20Still%20In%20Crosshairs&#038;c\" class=\"gen\">15 avril<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe rapport prend en compte le dernier rapport SAR du Pentagone, comme un aspect positif bien qu&rsquo;il apparaisse d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on \u00e9vidente que cet aspect positif est extr\u00eamement <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5060\" class=\"gen\">contestable<\/a>: \u00ab<em>While the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program&rsquo;s recent Selected Acquisition Report points to some cost stability within the program, the program still faces some serious challenges ahead, a recent Teal Group report says.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPlusieurs faits int\u00e9ressants sont mis en \u00e9vidence :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le rapport constate la d\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9rescence g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la coop\u00e9ration industrielle multinationale qui constituait l&rsquo;argument essentiel du programme. Le JSF avait \u00e9t\u00e9 propos\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;exportation comme une porte ouvrant sur l&rsquo;\u00e9tablissement d&rsquo;un tissu multinational fond\u00e9 sur la capacit\u00e9 technologique de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique. Le r\u00e9sultat est du chacun pour soi, du point de vue US, chaque coop\u00e9rant voulant profiter d&rsquo;avantages propres: \u00ab<em>Industrial greed abroad and program commitment at home continue to put the F-35 in the crosshairs, according to the report. The industrial situation has degenerated into a beg-a-thon, the report says. For a program that was supposed to break the cycle of offset demands, F-35 has actually engendered nothing but industrial greed, fueled by implied promises and aggressive salesmanship.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le rapport reconna\u00eet l&rsquo;apparition d&rsquo;une certaine concurrence, notamment le <em>Gripen<\/em>, et admet : \u00ab<em>there could be one or two defectors.<\/em>\u00bb C&rsquo;est certainement la premi\u00e8re fois qu&rsquo;un groupe d&rsquo;analyse si compl\u00e8tement align\u00e9 sur les consignes du complexe militaro-industriel admet la possibilit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9fection de l&rsquo;un ou\/et l&rsquo;autre coop\u00e9rant(s) international dont on attend automatiquement une commande de JSF. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une indication tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse d&rsquo;une pr\u00e9occupation du Pentagone dans ce sens. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Les questions internes sont abord\u00e9es L&rsquo;exemple le plus pr\u00e9cis et le moins encourageant est celui de la Navy. \u00ab<em>Teal Group says the Navy embraces the JSF as much as it would a proposal to go drink bleach. They aren&rsquo;t sold on stealth, and they seem unwilling to pay a premium for it  in price or payload.  The Navy also is no fan of a single-engine plane, especially one that could actually threaten the linchpin of the service&rsquo;s survival: the aircraft carrier. There&rsquo;s also the unpleasant prospect that the STOVL F- 35 version (U.S. Marine Corps version) could be nearly as effective as the CTOL naval variant, making large nuclear carriers relatively less appealing. The Navy&rsquo;s biggest problem with the F-35, the report says, seems to be that it is a joint plane. Joint planes threaten the Navy&rsquo;s hope of ever getting a purely Navy combat aircraft again.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La question du prix est reconnue comme \u00e9tant d\u00e9sormais tr\u00e8s importante, avec comme limite \u00e0 ne pas d\u00e9passer un prix par exemplaire de $70 millions La remarque est d&rsquo;autant plus importante que le prix officiel approche d\u00e9sormais les <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5050\" class=\"gen\">$70 millions<\/a> et que le prix r\u00e9el est consid\u00e9r\u00e9 par nombre de coop\u00e9rants comme <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5041\" class=\"gen\">autour de $120 millions<\/a>. \u00ab<em>Still, prime contractor Lockheed Martin has to keep the unit price down. The basic A model&rsquo;s unit recurring flyaway cost needs to stay in the $50 million-$60 million range, Teal says. If costs rise higher than $70 million, the qualities that make the F-35 unique will diminish.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 17 avril 2008 \u00e0 08H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le Teal Group, conduit par Richard Aboulafia, a publi\u00e9 un rapport sur l&rsquo;\u00e9tat du programme JSF. (On conna\u00eet l&rsquo;imperturbable optimisme du Teal Group pour ce qui concerne le JSF. Du coup, le ton beaucoup plus dubitatif de cette \u00e9dition nous appara\u00eet extr\u00eamement significatif.) Les indications ci-dessous nous sont donn\u00e9es par Michael Fabey, de Aerospace Daily&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4605,4142,250,4606],"class_list":["post-69834","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aboulafia","tag-group","tag-jsf","tag-teal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69834","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69834"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69834\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69834"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69834"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69834"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}