{"id":69863,"date":"2008-04-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-04-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/04\/29\/le-general-suleimani-est-il-le-vrai-maitre-de-lirak\/"},"modified":"2008-04-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-04-29T00:00:00","slug":"le-general-suleimani-est-il-le-vrai-maitre-de-lirak","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/04\/29\/le-general-suleimani-est-il-le-vrai-maitre-de-lirak\/","title":{"rendered":"Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Suleimani est-il le vrai ma\u00eetre de l&rsquo;Irak?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le groupe McClatchy Newspaper, connu pour la qualit\u00e9 de ses informations sur l&rsquo;Irak, publie une longue analyse ce <a href=\"http:\/\/www.mcclatchydc.com\/227\/v-print\/story\/35146.html\" class=\"gen\">29 avril<\/a> sur le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Qassem Suleimani, commandant de la Force Quds des Gardiens de la R\u00e9volution iraniens. Suleimani est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9, au travers de nombreux faits et t\u00e9moignage, comme l&rsquo;homme le plus puissant de l&rsquo;Irak, celui qui contr\u00f4le r\u00e9ellement la situation dans le pays. Un officiel irakien, cit\u00e9 dans l&rsquo;article r\u00e9sume ainsi la position de Suleimani: \u00ab<em>Whether we like<\/em> [Suleimani] <em>or not, whether Americans like him or not, whether Iraqis like him or not, he is the focal point of Iranian policy in Iraq. The Quds Force have played it all, political, military, intelligence, economic. They are Iranian foreign policy in Iraq.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est Suleimani qui \u00e9tait intervenu le 30 mars dernier pour n\u00e9gocier un accord mettant fin \u00e0 l&rsquo;affrontement entre chiites \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur de l&rsquo;Irak. Son activisme et son influence en Irak semblent d\u00e9sormais un point politique et militaire essentiel de la situation en Irak. Par cons\u00e9quent, la position de force de Suleimani et l&rsquo;influence iranienne qui se diffuse par son interm\u00e9diaire constituent d\u00e9sormais une pr\u00e9occupation strat\u00e9gique majeure des USA. (L&rsquo;article semble lier directement cette situation \u00e0 la r\u00e9cente recrudescence de menaces US d&rsquo;attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran, y compris de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/story\/2008\/04\/25\/ST2008042502033.html\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;amiral Mullen<\/a>, pr\u00e9sident du comit\u00e9 des chefs d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major, pourtant consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme faisant partie du camp hostile \u00e0 une attaque de l&rsquo;Iran au Pentagone.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>As Tehran&rsquo;s point man on Iraq, he funnels military and financial support to various Iraqi factions, frustrating U.S. attempts to build a pro-Western democracy on the rubble of Saddam Hussein&rsquo;s dictatorship.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>According to Iraqi and American officials, Suleimani has ensured the elections of pro-Iranian politicians, met frequently with senior Iraqi leaders and backed Shiite elements in the Iraqi security forces that are accused of torturing and killing minority Sunni Muslims.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>McClatchy reported on March 30 that Suleimani intervened to halt the fighting between mostly Shiite Iraqi security forces and radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr&rsquo;s Mahdi Army militia in the southern city of Basra. Iraqi officials now confirm that in addition to that meeting, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani personally met Suleimani at a border crossing to make a direct appeal for help.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Iraqi and U.S. officials told McClatchy that Suleimani also has:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em> Slipped into Baghdad&rsquo;s Green Zone, the heavily fortified seat of the U.S. occupation and the Iraqi government, in April 2006 to try to orchestrate the selection of a new Iraqi prime minister. Iraqi officials said that audacious visit was Suleimani&rsquo;s only foray into the Green Zone; American officials said he may have been there more than once.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em> Built powerful networks that gather intelligence on American and Iraqi military operations. Suleimani&rsquo;s network includes every senior staffer in Iran&rsquo;s embassy in Baghdad, beginning with the ambassador, according to Iraqi and U.S. officials.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em> Trained and directed Shiite Muslim militias and given them cash and arms, including mortars and rockets fired at the U.S. Embassy and explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, the sophisticated roadside bombs that have caused hundreds of U.S. and Iraqi casualties.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe long article de McClatchy Newspapers d\u00e9taille la puissance des positions iraniennes en Irak, qui semblent d\u00e9sormais constituer un facteur strat\u00e9gique majeur. L&rsquo;article commente, pla\u00e7ant le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne en perspective: \u00ab<em>Suleimani&rsquo;s role in Iraq illustrates how President Bush&rsquo;s decision to topple Saddam has enabled Shiite, Persian Iran to extend its influence in Iraq, frustrating U.S, aims there, alarming America&rsquo;s Sunni Arab allies in the Persian Gulf and prompting new Israeli fears about Iran&rsquo;s ambitions.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl semble que cet article donne une illustration politique acceptable d&rsquo;une situation effectivement exceptionnelle, laissant appara\u00eetre comment et avec quelle puissance l&rsquo;influence iranienne s&rsquo;est install\u00e9e en Irak. La situation est telle que m\u00eame la perspective d&rsquo;une attaque US de l&rsquo;Iran devient de plus en plus risqu\u00e9e, notamment \u00e0 cause des cons\u00e9quences militaires graves que pourraient subir les forces US en Irak, dans un pays o\u00f9 les \u00e9l\u00e9ments iraniens contr\u00f4lent tant de forces. On en reviendrait \u00e0 une hypoth\u00e8se d\u00e9j\u00e0 plusieurs fois d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e par William S. Lind, notamment pour la derni\u00e8re fois le <a href=\"http:\/\/antiwar.com\/lind\/?articleid=12583\" class=\"gen\">26 mars 2008<\/a>, lorsqu&rsquo;il \u00e9crivait: \u00ab<em>The purpose of this column is not to warn of an imminent assault on Iran, though personally I think it is coming, and soon. Rather, it is to warn of a possible consequence of such an attack. Let me state it here, again, as plainly as I can: an American attack on Iran could cost us the whole army we now have in Iraq.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl est vrai que, si la situation que d\u00e9crit McClatchy Newspapers correspond \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, on a la description d&rsquo;un pi\u00e8ge gigantesque dans lequel les USA se sont enferr\u00e9s en Irak. Les pressions et les menaces US contre l&rsquo;Iran depuis quatre ans n&rsquo;ont fait que conforter les partisans iraniens d&rsquo;une politique dure anti-US et accentuer leur activisme, et la p\u00e9n\u00e9tration cons\u00e9cutive en Irak. Le <em>surge<\/em> a accentu\u00e9 encore cette situation, en laissant le champ libre \u00e0 diverses forces autonomes en Irak contre un affaiblissement de la violence, et en permettant aux r\u00e9seaux iraniens de s&rsquo;implanter encore plus fortement. D\u00e9sormais, les USA sont confront\u00e9s \u00e0 une \u00e9volution de la situation qui rend leurs menaces d&rsquo;attaque de l&rsquo;Iran, et une attaque effective, de plus en plus risqu\u00e9es dans la mesure o\u00f9 les r\u00e9percussions sur leurs arri\u00e8res (l&rsquo;Irak) risquent de rendre leur position effectivement intenable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 29 avril 2008 \u00e0 16H52<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le groupe McClatchy Newspaper, connu pour la qualit\u00e9 de ses informations sur l&rsquo;Irak, publie une longue analyse ce 29 avril sur le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Qassem Suleimani, commandant de la Force Quds des Gardiens de la R\u00e9volution iraniens. Suleimani est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9, au travers de nombreux faits et t\u00e9moignage, comme l&rsquo;homme le plus puissant de l&rsquo;Irak, celui qui&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[857,2773,7556,7555],"class_list":["post-69863","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-mcclatchy","tag-suleimani"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69863","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69863"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69863\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69863"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69863"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69863"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}