Les effets combin\u00e9s de la mont\u00e9e du prix du p\u00e9trole, des remous aux USA autour des prix \u00e0 la consommation domestique dans le cadre de la campagne \u00e9lectorale, des consid\u00e9rations autour du voyage de Bush au Moyen-Orient et de sa demande d’augmentation de pompage faite \u00e0 l’Arabie, ont pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9 le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de la perception<\/a> de la crise. D\u00e9sormais, la crise entre, si l’on veut, dans le domaine public. C’est ce que le Financial Times<\/em> traduit par le mot mainstream<\/em> dans le titre de son long texte d’analyse du 19 mai<\/a>: \u00abRunning on empty? Fears over oil supply move into the mainstream.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tComme \u00e0 l’habitude dans les longues analyses de prospective sur le futur, on se trouve confront\u00e9 \u00e0 des visions optimistes et \u00e0 des visions pessimistes. Le FT pose donc la question (les questions), apr\u00e8s avoir instruit le dossier : \u00abSo what if politics, an ageing workforce and a dearth of equipment get in the way and Saudi Arabia cannot or will not come to the rescue? Will the peak oilists turn out to be right, for the wrong reasons?<\/em>\u00bb Apr\u00e8s cela, les r\u00e9ponses, o\u00f9 l’on voit que l’argument des optimistes est notablement plus document\u00e9 que celui des pessimistes. Il est vrai que, du point de vue des conceptions \u00e9conomiques et id\u00e9ologiques dont le FT se fait l’\u00e9cho, la version pessimiste est d\u00e9courageante.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe answer depends on the market’s ability to adjust. For optimists, the worst that could happen is high oil prices eventually damp demand while giving the entrepreneurially inclined time to think of ingenious ways to produce and conserve energy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbGrowth in demand is in fact already slowing, especially in the US and other developed countries. Neil McMahon, an analyst at Sanford Bernstein, suggests the downturn in developed countries may prove large enough to allow hungrier nations, such as those within Opec and China, to continue to demand increasing volumes of oil. The question is: Have these [developed] nations been squeezed enough yet, or will prices have to go higher? he asks in a recent report. Though he leaves open the possibility that prices will continue to rise for a while, he argues: Based on 3.5 per cent [growth in] global GDP, overall oil demand growth will be close to zero.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbGuy Caruso, head of the Energy Information Administration, the statistical and forecasting arm of the US Department of Energy, also points to the power of the market to drive changes in government policy and the behaviour of consumers and oil companies. As you know, we are not believers in peak oil. We believe the above-ground risk is the issue, he says.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe EIA predicts that US imports of oil and petroleum products will decrease slightly in the next 22 years. This means the import dependence of the world’s biggest oil consumer is forecast to drop from 60 per cent to 50 per cent by 2015 before climbing again slightly to 54 per cent by 2030. The reasons for the drop include improved car efficiency, slower demand, higher use of biofuels and a 1m b\/d increase in oil production from the US’s Gulf of Mexico by 2012. One of the things M. King Hubbert couldn’t have known is about the technology to drill in 12,000 feet of water and to drill horizontally, Mr Caruso says.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA pessimist’s version of events would include a more serious and widespread downturn, as developing countries buckle under the burden of subsidising their citizens’ swelling fuel and food bills. At the extreme end are the views of Jeremy Leggett, a geologist turned entrepreneur and author of Half Gone: Oil, Gas, Hot Air and the Global Energy Crisis. In his worst-case scenario parable, he writes: The price of houses collapsed. Stock markets crashed … Companies went bankrupt … Workers fell into unemployment by the hundreds of thousands and then millions. Once affluent cities with street caf\u00e9s now had queues at soup kitchens and armies of beggars on the streets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIndustry executives dismiss this as doom-mongering so corrosive that it has the power to distort policy and investment decisions. But such visions also have the power to prompt people to use energy more efficiently. The bagpipers and didgeridoo players of Transition Towns are indeed already a part, if only a small one, of the solution to the uncertainties ahead even if the world never has to experience quite the disaster that they predict.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’appr\u00e9ciation critique de la r\u00e9ponse pessimiste est caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e par cette remarque tr\u00e8s r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice: \u00abIndustry executives dismiss this as doom-mongering so corrosive that it has the power to distort policy and investment decisions.<\/em>\u00bb Il s’agit de l’appr\u00e9ciation selon laquelle la perception d’une crise catastrophique est tr\u00e8s dangereuse parce qu’elle pourrait influer sur les d\u00e9cisions de politique et d’investissement; mais non, notre traduction, venue naturellement avec le verbe influer, est mauvaise: le verbe to distort<\/em> signifie alt\u00e9rer, d\u00e9former, d\u00e9naturer, fausser Tout est dans cette nuance, qui caract\u00e9rise la perception des milieux dirigeants occidentaux, plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment anglo-saxons et \u00e9conomistes lib\u00e9raux. Il existe une vision id\u00e9ologique du monde, traduite dans la politique \u00e9conomiste qu’on conna\u00eet (les march\u00e9s, l’\u00e9conomie lib\u00e9rale, le libre-\u00e9change, etc.). Cette vision d\u00e9termine la politique et les investissements. L’essentiel est que rien ne vienne alt\u00e9rer ou d\u00e9naturer cette politique et ces investissements qui sont garants de la vision id\u00e9ologique. Les pr\u00e9visions pessimistes sont rejet\u00e9es, non pas sur leur valeur mais selon les effets d\u00e9naturants de ces pr\u00e9visions sur la vision id\u00e9ologiques. La certitude de l’id\u00e9ologie est pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9e \u00e0 l’incertitude de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Rien de nouveau sous le soleil, plus \u00e7a change plus c’est la m\u00eame chose.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe FT juge n\u00e9anmoins n\u00e9cessaire de temp\u00e9rer cette condamnation brutale par une version temp\u00e9r\u00e9e d’optimisme, que les m\u00eames pessimistes, qui sont inform\u00e9s que d’autres crises syst\u00e9miques vont conjuguer leurs effets \u00e0 ceux de la crise du p\u00e9trole, pourraient qualifier d’ang\u00e9lique. Il s’agit de la pr\u00e9vision que la crise catastrophique (syst\u00e9mique) peut conduire \u00e0 des comportements salvateurs (\u00abBut such visions also have the power to prompt people to use energy more efficiently<\/em>\u00bb) face \u00e0 ce que le FT qualifie finalement, et d’une fa\u00e7on r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice sur sa pens\u00e9e profonde, d’incertitudes de l’avenir (uncertainties ahead<\/em>). Dans ce cas, il faudrait alors encourager la prise en consid\u00e9ration des pr\u00e9visions pessimistes, lui faire une grande publicit\u00e9 contrairement aux vux de nos chers industry executives<\/em>? Sur ce point fondamental de la perception, l’incertitude est aussi bien caract\u00e9ristique du pr\u00e9sent que de l’avenir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 20 mai 2008 \u00e0 05H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Les effets combin\u00e9s de la mont\u00e9e du prix du p\u00e9trole, des remous aux USA autour des prix \u00e0 la consommation domestique dans le cadre de la campagne \u00e9lectorale, des consid\u00e9rations autour du voyage de Bush au Moyen-Orient et de sa demande d’augmentation de pompage faite \u00e0 l’Arabie, ont pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9 le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de la perception de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7586,3228,2851,5953,3600,2852],"class_list":["post-69907","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-catastrophique","tag-crise","tag-financial","tag-perception","tag-petrole","tag-times"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69907","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69907"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69907\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69907"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69907"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69907"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}