{"id":69932,"date":"2008-05-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-05-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/05\/29\/jsf-la-hollande-bouge\/"},"modified":"2008-05-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-05-29T00:00:00","slug":"jsf-la-hollande-bouge","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/05\/29\/jsf-la-hollande-bouge\/","title":{"rendered":"JSF : la Hollande bouge<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

JSF : la Hollande bouge<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\t29 mai 2008 On trouvera ci-dessous une analyse de notre ami Johan Boeder (d\u00e9j\u00e0 mis en ligne sur ce site, le 21 novembre 2007<\/a>) sur les derniers d\u00e9veloppements parlementaires concernant le programme JSF en Hollande. Ces d\u00e9veloppements sont importants. On distingue, pour la premi\u00e8re fois dans un contexte et une orientation s\u00e9rieuses, une \u00e9volution vers une attitude critique du programme JSF. La chose est effectivement d’importance parce que, dans le programme JSF, la Hollande est un pays-fondateur, \u00e0 la fois pour le prestige du programme et, dans le chef de la Royal Netherland Air Force (RNethAF) qui a beaucoup travaill\u00e9 pour cela, pour la manipulation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des plans de Lockheed Martin et du DoD visant \u00e0 fixer nombre de pays occidentaux et europ\u00e9ens hors de toute option europ\u00e9enne en mati\u00e8re d’avions de combat. (A cet \u00e9gard, le JSF est d’abord une machine de guerre ant-europ\u00e9enne.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe Parlement n\u00e9erlandais a ouvert la voie \u00e0 un r\u00e9examen de facto<\/em> de l’engagement hollandais dans le programme, d’abord en d\u00e9cidant qu’il y aura une nouvelle \u00e9valuation du JSF contre d’autres concurrents (pour la commande de la RNethAF), ensuite en d\u00e9cidant que cette \u00e9valuation, si elle reste sous le contr\u00f4le du minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense, sera r\u00e9alis\u00e9e par des experts ind\u00e9pendants. Le parti social-d\u00e9mocrate hollandais (le PvdA) voulait une \u00e9valuation compl\u00e8tement ind\u00e9pendante, ses partenaires de la coalition voulaient une \u00e9valuation compl\u00e8tement sous le contr\u00f4le du ministre, avec des experts du minist\u00e8re. La d\u00e9cision est un compromis entre ces deux positions. Ce compromis ouvre \u00e9ventuellement la voie \u00e0 des pol\u00e9miques lorsque le r\u00e9sultat de l’\u00e9valuation sera connu.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’autres d\u00e9cisions sont prises, qui traduisent une nouvelle approche critique du programme de la part de la Hollande. Ces d\u00e9cisions impliquent de nouveaux d\u00e9bats (notamment en f\u00e9vrier 2009, sur l’opportunit\u00e9 d’acheter les deux premiers F-35A), qui entretiendront la pol\u00e9mique autour du programme. L’intensit\u00e9 des d\u00e9bats au Parlement, de mardi \u00e0 ce matin, a montr\u00e9 que le JSF \u00e9tait \u00e0 nouveau, comme il l’avait \u00e9t\u00e9 au printemps 2002, un sujet politique br\u00fblant en Hollande. Les forces politiques sont loin de lui \u00eatre majoritairement favorables et la description des journ\u00e9es de d\u00e9bat montre que le sujet (le programme JSF) a suffisamment de potentiel de pol\u00e9mique politique pour mettre en danger l’existence du gouvernement dans certaines circonstances. D\u00e9sormais, l’\u00e9volution du programme JSF en Hollande revient sous le contr\u00f4le du pouvoir politique et du Parlement, dans le contexte d’un d\u00e9veloppement du programme dont on sait bien qu’il est litt\u00e9ralement cribl\u00e9 de pol\u00e9miques, d’incertitudes, de manuvres bureaucratiques, de probl\u00e8mes pesants, tout cela apr\u00e8s des difficult\u00e9s qui handicapent d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 gravement ce m\u00eame programme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour bien mesurer l’importance de ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements, il faut les placer dans la perspective historique et \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de nos certitudes diverses. Lorsque le gouvernement hollandais choisit d’entrer<\/a> dans le programme JSF et que son choix fut approuv\u00e9 par le Parlement, dans des conditions \u00e9minemment suspectes<\/a>, tout cela au printemps 2002, il \u00e9tait \u00e9vident que le JSF avait \u00e9t\u00e9 choisi de facto<\/em> comme successeur du F-16. La d\u00e9cision formelle n’\u00e9tait plus qu’une simple formalit\u00e9. Six ans apr\u00e8s<\/strong>, nous voil\u00e0 barbotant \u00e0 nouveau, \u00e0 La Haye, dans des manuvres parlementaires pour ne pas faire tomber le gouvernement sur l’affaire du JSF, y compris, avec la perspective d’une \u00e9valuation concurrente du JSF et des alternatives au JSF dont on pensait qu’elle avait \u00e9t\u00e9 faite en 2002. L’\u00e9valuation de l’automne 2008 devrait relancer toutes sortes de pol\u00e9miques qui pourraient r\u00e9server des surprises, si les Europ\u00e9ens y sont attentifs et cessent d’\u00e2nonner la sempiternelle rengaine sur la puissance des USA irr\u00e9sistibles. Pour une hyperpuissance qui se fait ob\u00e9ir au doigt et \u00e0 l’il, on a vu mieux. <\/p>\n

Holland Keeps All Options Open in F-16 Replacement New Independent, Transparent and extended investigation<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tBy Johan Boeder, Holland<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTuesday May 27, 2008 in the Dutch Parliament’s Defence Committee was a debate about the progress of the Dutch F-16 replacement project. After a long debate in the evening, on Wednesday the debate was continued in the plain Parliament. The surprising outcome is that The Netherlands will start an independent evaluation of all possible options in the replacement of the F-16 and that there is a conditional approval of the procurement of the first two F-35A’s. Only the conditional signing of the MoU-IOT&E was approved and the payment of 10% of the long lead items for the first two F-35A’s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Netherlands are participating in the SDD stage of the JSF and the JSF is since the 2002 the clear favourite in the replacement. Last April the Deputy Defence Minister Jack de Vries wrote the Parliament, after questions, that since 2002, indeed, there is no level playing field in the F-16 replacement and that the decision from 2002 to participate in the SDD of the JSF was and is a strong commitment to the JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe agenda for the May 27, 2008 meeting of the Dutch Parliament’s Defence Committee contained a long list of reports, letters and questions on the Dutch F-16 replacement and JSF industrial projects.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDeputy Defence Minister Jack de Vries said he wants an agreement with the aircraft builder, Lockheed Martin, that the Netherlands along with other customers will together take a guaranteed 1.000 JSF aircraft. If the Netherlands and the other customers promise this, the manufacturer is prepared to set a fixed price in which the development costs are more fairly divided between the customers. De Vries also proposed (February 29, 2008) to participate in the IOT&E phase from 2011-2013 of the JSF. He wants to sign a declaration of intend this month for the purchase of two test aircraft ( 274 million). De Vries confirmed that he still wishes to buy 85 JSF’s in two batches of 59 and 26 aircraft. In the corridors, there is talk of 57 or just even 48 aircraft. These are in due course to replace the existing F-16 fleet of 102 F-16’s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Socialist Party (SP), leftwing Greens (GroenLinks), liberals (D66) and Party for Freedom (PVV) are opposed to Dutch participation in the IOT&E phase. The CDA, conservatives (VVD) and small Christian parties ChristenUnie and SGP are in favour of the JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo in the debate, the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA, Partij van de Arbeid) support is essential for this participation. PvdA was previously an opponent of the JSF but feels itself bound by the coalition accord. The PvdA is one of the three coalition parties in the Dutch government. The cabinet agreed in the coalition accord (2006) a very rigid document that it will do a series of steps in the F-16 replacement process. Conform this accord in 2007 a decision about the participation in the IOT&E was planned, delayed now for 6 months. In july 2008 there has to be an evaluation of the industrial business case and Dutch industrial participation in SDD phase. In the autumn of 2008 there will be a report on the possibilities of an end-life update of the F-16. And, autumn 2008 there would be a short, formal evaluation of the JSF in comparison with Eurofighter, Rafale and F-16 Block 60, to be executed by Dutch defence officials and organisations already involved in the JSF project. A decision about the purchase of the first batch of JSF aircraft had to be made in 2010, before the end of the current administrative period.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut in this week’s debate the Labour Party expressed serious doubts about the whole JSF project. The Labour Party says the estimate of costs for the JSF is flawed and that the information from the Americans on the aircraft is too one-sided. Negative reports about the JSF have also appeared in the US media and is reported by the US GAO. In clear and unexpected sharp word, Mrs. Angelien Eijsink of the Labour Party criticized the incomplete and unreliable information to the Parliament. She said that Labour only would agree in the MoU-IOT&E under three strict conditions. First, the promise that the industrial business case of the SDD would be conform the original calculation model without costs for the taxpayer. No problems, Mr. De Vries and all parties agreed. Second, the promise that the evaluation of the end-life update of the F-16 would be independent. Because she said: Lockheed Martin is manufacturer of both the old F-16 and new JSF. There are indications of fast rising prices of F-16 spare parts. So Lockheed Martin has a key role in the JSF, how to decide on an end life update, in an independent way?. Third, the promise, that the formal evaluation of the possible options for the JSF would be completely independent and transparent and would be extended to all possible options.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDeputy Defence Minister Jack de Vries said an investigation to all options by the Ministry of Defence would be reliable, but he opposed any idea of external and independent experts involved in the investigation. Also he was not prepared to do an evaluation of other candidates than JSF, Eurofighter, Rafale and F-16 Block 60.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Labour (PvdA) coalition party persisted in there wish to have an independent investigation of all options. MP Angelien Eijsink said: Because employees of the Dutch Defence organisation are working at the Lockheed Martin plant, involved in the JSF development, they will not be independent, a different situation from the 2002 evaluation. After intense deliberations it didn’t appear the Government wanted to create a crisis over the cabinet’s decision to participate in the next phase of the Joint Strike Fighter. In a debate in the full parliament on Wednesday the Lower House Deputy Defence Minister De Vries did support an investigation, primarily under responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, but with independent external experts involved and extended to all possible options, including Boeing F\/A-18 Super Hornet and Saab Gripen Next Generation. Labour (PvdA) MP Angeline Eijsink reluctantly agreed that the Christian democrat (CDA) state secretary would carry out the study himself. She trusts that De Vries is in a position to guarantee the independence and transparency of the research.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn Thursday May 29, 2008 the Dutch parliament voted and approved those proposals:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Signing of the participation of the MoU-IOT&E of the JSF in 2011-2013, but with the condition that at this moment only a commitment is made of maximum 10% of the budget to finance long-lead items.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t In February 2009 there will be a new debate on the approval of the procurement of the first two F-35A’s<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t In October 2008 an independent and transparent investigation on the end-life update of the F-16 will be done<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t In October-December 2008 an independent and transparent investigation on all possible options for the replacement of the current F-16 will be done, including the Lockheed Martin F-35A, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale, the Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 60, the Boeing F\/A-18E-F Super Hornet and the Saab JAS39 NG (Super) Gripen.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

JSF : la Hollande bouge 29 mai 2008 On trouvera ci-dessous une analyse de notre ami Johan Boeder (d\u00e9j\u00e0 mis en ligne sur ce site, le 21 novembre 2007) sur les derniers d\u00e9veloppements parlementaires concernant le programme JSF en Hollande. Ces d\u00e9veloppements sont importants. On distingue, pour la premi\u00e8re fois dans un contexte et une… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[7247,3203,250],"class_list":["post-69932","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-boeder","tag-hollande","tag-jsf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69932","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69932"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69932\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69932"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69932"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69932"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}