Le pr\u00e9sident Karza\u00ef fait fl\u00e8che de tous bois. Ses interventions sont d\u00e9sormais caract\u00e9ris\u00e9es par une critique implicite virulente du comportement de ses alli\u00e9s occidentaux. D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les seuls qui semblent \u00e9chapper en partie \u00e0 sa vindicte sont d\u00e9sormais les talibans. Cette attitude r\u00e9pond \u00e0 des critiques diverses et nombreuses, lanc\u00e9es contre lui par ses alli\u00e9s justement, notamment et pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment par les USA. Tout cela rend compte de l’habituelle \u00e9volution de la situation, o\u00f9 les partenaires r\u00e9unis par leurs int\u00e9r\u00eats chaotiques, des rapports de corruption et d’all\u00e9geance achet\u00e9e, un cat\u00e9chisme de valeurs morale sans la moindre substance et une totale absence de sens politique, n’ont entre eux aucune solidarit\u00e9 politique, aucune coordination tactique, et \u00e9mettent en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des jugements caract\u00e9ris\u00e9s par le m\u00e9pris et l’incompr\u00e9hension r\u00e9ciproques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tL’interview que Karza\u00ef a donn\u00e9 le 2 juin<\/a> au Spiegel<\/em> est d’un r\u00e9el int\u00e9r\u00eat. Les questions sont incisives, les r\u00e9ponses \u00e0 mesure. Karza\u00ef ne cache pas les pratiques diverses de corruption, les interf\u00e9rences de ses alli\u00e9s et une certaine admiration qu’il professe pour les talibans. La personnage n’en est pas grandi pour autant mais, apr\u00e8s tout, il ne vaut pas moins en substance que la plupart de nos bonshommes politiques; et lui, au moins, ne nous accable pas d’ennui et de m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9 avec un discours charg\u00e9 d’une vertu standardis\u00e9e et homog\u00e9n\u00e9is\u00e9e, absolument insupportable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNous choisissions ce passage avec ces quelques questions. On y trouve suffisamment d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments pour nous offrir une bonne description de la situation en Afghanistan. On y trouve l’admiration de Karza\u00ef pour les talibans en tant que soldats, les critiques de Karza\u00ef envers les Occidentaux (les USA) pour avoir soutenu et renforc\u00e9 les positions des seigneurs de guerre corrompus jusqu’\u00e0 la moelle, la justification par impossibilit\u00e9 d’agir autrement de cette m\u00eame corruption utilis\u00e9e pour entretenir ces m\u00eames seigneurs de guerre. On peut comparer l’interview avec les jubilations<\/a> triomphantes des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de l’OTAN si contents d’eux-m\u00eames et commencer \u00e0 se demander s’il y a pas, quelque part dans cette affaire, quelque chose de pourri.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSPIEGEL<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abSome of your closest aides are suspected of stealing land, drug smuggling and having illegal militias, among them respected governors and police chiefs. Your attorney general, Abdul Jabar Sabet, just named a few of them, including the governor of Nangarhar. Why do you still protect these people?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tKarzai<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abI am not protecting anybody. We are trying to govern Afghanistan and bring peace and stability. I know about the problems with the police. The international community finally agreed after two years of very intense and angry negotiations that the police are a problem and in the middle of 2007 they began to work with us. The checkpoints on the roads, for example, were developed during the years of the Soviet invasion, a time when the country became lawless and each local commander set up his own checkpoint to collect money.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSPIEGEL<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abDuring the Taliban times there were no checkpoints at all.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tKarzai<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abThat was the best aspect of the Taliban. They did a lot wrong, but they also did a few things right. I wish I had the Taliban as my soldiers. I wish they were serving me and not people in Pakistan or others. When we came back to Afghanistan, the international community brought back all those people who had turned away from the Taliban <\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSPIEGEL<\/em><\/strong>: \u00ab you mean the brutal commanders who fought in the civil war <\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tKarzai<\/em><\/strong>: \u00ab who then became partners with the foreign allies and are still paid by them today for their support. It is not always easy for me to find a way that can enable Afghanistan’s administration to function. <\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSPIEGEL<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abDirty deals are still necessary for the stability of Afghanistan?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tKarzai<\/em><\/strong>: \u00abAbsolutely necessary, because we lack the power to solve these problems in other ways. What do you want? War? Let me give you an example. We wanted to arrest a really terrible warlord, but we couldn’t do it because he is being protected by a particular country. We found out that he was being paid $30,000 a month to stay on his good side. They even used his soldiers as guards <\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 5 juin 2008 \u00e0 19H17<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le pr\u00e9sident Karza\u00ef fait fl\u00e8che de tous bois. Ses interventions sont d\u00e9sormais caract\u00e9ris\u00e9es par une critique implicite virulente du comportement de ses alli\u00e9s occidentaux. D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les seuls qui semblent \u00e9chapper en partie \u00e0 sa vindicte sont d\u00e9sormais les talibans. Cette attitude r\u00e9pond \u00e0 des critiques diverses et nombreuses, lanc\u00e9es contre lui par ses… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,4575,5522],"class_list":["post-69945","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-karzai","tag-taliban"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69945","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69945"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69945\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69945"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69945"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69945"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}