{"id":69949,"date":"2008-06-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-06-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/06\/06\/le-prix-du-jsf-et-les-verites-par-inadvertance-du-senateur-levin\/"},"modified":"2008-06-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-06-06T00:00:00","slug":"le-prix-du-jsf-et-les-verites-par-inadvertance-du-senateur-levin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/06\/06\/le-prix-du-jsf-et-les-verites-par-inadvertance-du-senateur-levin\/","title":{"rendered":"Le prix du JSF et les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s par inadvertance du s\u00e9nateur Levin"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Dans son long pr\u00e9ambule aux auditions du 3 juin de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es du S\u00e9nat qu&rsquo;il pr\u00e9side, o\u00f9 il annonce <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5175\" class=\"gen\">la cr\u00e9ation<\/a> d&rsquo;un service ind\u00e9pendant de contr\u00f4le des co\u00fbts des syst\u00e8mes d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s par le Pentagone, le s\u00e9nateur Carl Levin cite divers exemples de syst\u00e8mes en cours de d\u00e9veloppement. Ses appr\u00e9ciations,  elles sont deux, volontaire et involontaire pour le cas,  nous permettent ainsi d&rsquo;entendre une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 int\u00e9ressante \u00e0 propos du JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici les deux passages, avec notre intervention soulign\u00e9e de gras<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>We don&rsquo;t have to look very far to find examples. Over the last five years, unit costs on the Air Force&rsquo;s largest acquisition program, the Joint Strike Fighter, have grown by<\/em> <strong><em>almost 40 percent<\/em><\/strong><em>, costing us an extra $37 billion<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>GAO tells us that the cost overruns on these MDAPs now total $295 billion over the original program estimates, even though we have cut unit quantities and reduced performance expectations on many programs in an effort to hold costs down. Just to put the size of these cost overruns in perspective: for $295 billion, we could buy, at current prices, 2 new aircraft carriers for $10 billion each, and 8 Virginia class submarines for $2.5 billion each, and 500 V-22 Ospreys for $120 million each, and 500 Joint Strike Fighters for<\/em> <strong><em>$100 million each<\/em><\/strong><em><\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est notre confr\u00e8re Giovanni de Brigandi, sur son site <em>Defense Aerospace.com<\/em> (article du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defense-aerospace.com\/cgi-bin\/client\/modele.pl?session=dae.37545205.1211813469.T2GJ3X8AAAEAAD9W4vcAAAAC&#038;modele=jdc_34\" class=\"gen\">5 juin<\/a>), qui a signal\u00e9 le premier la chose dans le sens qui importe,  c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire, en notant qu&rsquo;une personnalit\u00e9 du calibre et de la fonction du s\u00e9nateur Levin annonce publiquement le prix du JSF \u00e0 $100 millions. (En fait, Brigandi semble avoir fait une erreur puisqu&rsquo;il parle de $110 millions, alors que le <a href=\"http:\/\/levin.senate.gov\/newsroom\/release.cfm?id=298687\" class=\"gen\">document officiel<\/a> de Levin porte bien $100 millions. Mais cette erreur sans doute d\u00fbe \u00e0 un copier-coller d\u00e9fectueux n&rsquo;a aucune importance. Nous restons dans l&rsquo;ordre de grandeur qui importe, qui d\u00e9nonce la fraude de Lockheed-Martin continuant \u00e0 \u00e2nonner le JSF \u00e0 $40 millions aux oreilles \u00e9blouies des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux italiens et hollandais.) Bien s\u00fbr, celui qui <strong>veut<\/strong> savoir sait sans la moindre difficult\u00e9 que le JSF est \u00e0 $100 millions et plus. Mais dans notre univers \u00e0 au moins trois langages, l&rsquo;utilisation par un s\u00e9nateur, pr\u00e9sident de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es du S\u00e9nat des Etats-Unis, de ce prix de $100 millions comme r\u00e9f\u00e9rence en passant, sans m\u00eame discuter de la chose mais plut\u00f4t comme si la chose allait de soi, fait passer un degr\u00e9 de plus dans l&rsquo;affirmation de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 \u00e0 ce propos.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMais Brigandi ajoute un li\u00e8vre int\u00e9ressant avec le cas <a href=\"http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/2\/hi\/uk_news\/7434763.stm\" class=\"gen\">extraordinaire<\/a> des h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res Boeing CH-47 <em>Chinook<\/em> acquis par les Britanniques. Ces h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res, achet\u00e9s en 1995 et auxquels on a voulu rajouter des syst\u00e8mes plus performants, puis qu&rsquo;on a d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de ramener au standard initial, sont toujours immobilis\u00e9s, avec un prix qui a grimp\u00e9 dans les proportions qu&rsquo;on imaginer, alors que les soldats britanniques en Afghanistan ont urgemment besoin d&rsquo;h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res. La description des arcanes de l&rsquo;affaire nous permet d&rsquo;appr\u00e9hender ce qui se passera avec le JSF lorsque les Britanniques voudront changer le cendrier de leurs propres exemplaires&#8230;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>A separate development this week again raises the question of the degree of sovereign control that foreign JSF partners will have over their own aircraft. Britain, the program&rsquo;s largest foreign partner, has been insistent on having full control of the aircraft&rsquo;s software source codes and other technologies, such as stealth coatings, that would allow it to autonomously operate, modify and upgrade its JSFs.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In a June 4 report , Britain&rsquo;s National Audit Office found that the UK Ministry of Defence had been unable to modify eight Chinook Mk 3 helicopters it had bought in part because Boeing and its sub-contractors, in seeking to protect their intellectual property rights, resisted the [MoD]&rsquo;s requests for access to the source code. This meant that only Boeing could carry out the necessary modifications, and In the end it took 30 months for [MoD] and Boeing to agree an affordable programme of work.The final estimate for the in-service date was 2011-12 with a predicted cost of \u00a3215 million, the NAO reports.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Given this painful experience, the British are likely to be even more insistent on obtaining full access to JSF source codes and technologies, which the United States may be unable to grant even if it wanted to because of the restrictions imposed by its own International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 6 juin 2008 \u00e0 09H53<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Dans son long pr\u00e9ambule aux auditions du 3 juin de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es du S\u00e9nat qu&rsquo;il pr\u00e9side, o\u00f9 il annonce la cr\u00e9ation d&rsquo;un service ind\u00e9pendant de contr\u00f4le des co\u00fbts des syst\u00e8mes d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s par le Pentagone, le s\u00e9nateur Carl Levin cite divers exemples de syst\u00e8mes en cours de d\u00e9veloppement. Ses appr\u00e9ciations, elles sont deux,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5596,7616,3285,3767,250,4780,2746],"class_list":["post-69949","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-brigandi","tag-chinook","tag-congres","tag-cout","tag-jsf","tag-levin","tag-souverainete"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69949","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69949"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69949\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69949"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69949"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69949"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}