toujours<\/strong> au bord du gouffre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe Fed became involved on March 13 when Bear Stearns notified it and other government agencies that its liquidity position had deteriorated and that it would have to file for bankruptcy the next day unless alternative sources of funds were found. Bear Stearns had been experiencing increasing difficulty since the previous June when two major hedge funds it owned collapsed, losing about $1.6 billion of investors’ funds.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe Fed’s board of governors met at 9.15 the following morning to authorise a bailout operation. As the minutes make clear, there was a real fear that the entire financial system was on the point of collapse.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBoard members agreed that, given the fragile condition of the financial markets at the time, the prominent position of Bear Stearns in those markets, and the expected contagion that would result from the immediate failure of Bear Stearns, the best alternative available was to provide temporary emergency financing to Bear Stearns through an arrangement with JPMorgan Chase & Co. also in New York. Such a loan would facilitate efforts to effect a resolution of the Bear Stearns situation that would be consistent with preserving financial stability, the minutes read.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbNot only did the board authorise credit to Bear Stearns via JPMorgan Chase, it also decided to make funds available more broadly.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe minutes note that given the unusual and exigent circumstances, the board authorised the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in consultation with Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, to provide financing to other primary securities dealers, when the Reserve Bank finds that adequate credit accommodations are not available to the borrower from other banking institutions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn other words, the board feared the collapse of Bear Stearns would induce a general crisis of confidence across financial markets leading to the drying up of credit.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSuch was the haste with which the meeting had been called that the board could not summon the requisite five governors, and so invoked emergency powers enabling it to make decisions with only four present.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbFed chairman Bernanke elaborated on the potential for a US and global financial collapse in his later testimony to the US Congress on the crisis. Because Bear Stearns was extensively involved in a range of critical markets, he said, its sudden failure likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in those markets and could have shaken confidence. The company’s failure could also have cast doubt on the financial positions of some of Bear Stearns’ thousands of counterparties and perhaps of companies with similar businesses.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbGiven the exceptional pressures on the global economy and the financial system, the damage caused by a default by Bear Stearns could have been severe and extremely difficult to contain. Moreover, the adverse impact of a default would not have been confined to the financial system but would have been felt broadly in the real economy through its effects on asset values and credit availability.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 30 juin 2008 \u00e0 07H51<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Selon l’ancien secr\u00e9taire au tr\u00e9sor de l’administration Clinton Lawrence Summers, nous nous trouvons \u00e0 un moment d\u00e9cisif de la crise financi\u00e8re. Summers fait de cette id\u00e9e le th\u00e8me de sa chronique du jour du Financial Times. Il sugg\u00e8re les actions qui doivent \u00eatre d\u00e9cid\u00e9es. On citera ici l’introduction et la conclusion du texte, qui fixent,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6936,3228,6937,5029],"class_list":["post-70006","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bernanke","tag-crise","tag-fed","tag-summers"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70006","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70006"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70006\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70006"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70006"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70006"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}