\t4 juillet 2008 On lit par ailleurs sur ce site une analyse<\/a> de Stratfor.com<\/em> sur un raid lanc\u00e9 contre Phoenix, Arizona. Les circonstances sont assez exceptionnelles pour m\u00e9riter d’\u00eatre rapport\u00e9es par le menu, comme il est fait dans cette analyse; c’est m\u00eame le rapport dans le menu, c’est-\u00e0-dire le d\u00e9tail m\u00eame de la chose, qui est int\u00e9ressant. Il appara\u00eet que ce n’est nullement une op\u00e9ration exceptionnelle mais un exemple classique d’op\u00e9rations men\u00e9es d\u00e9sormais dans la partie Sud des USA, \u00e0 partir du Mexique. Il va de soi que notre commentaire, ici m\u00eame, doit \u00e9galement \u00eatre lu avec, \u00e0 l’esprit, la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence de notre autre commentaire du 10 juin 2008<\/a> sur une analyse de William S. Lind, constatant, selon son appr\u00e9ciation, que les conditions d’affrontement entre les autorit\u00e9s l\u00e9gales mexicaines et les cartels de la drogue, avec des d\u00e9bordements dans le Sud des Etats-Unis, commencent \u00e0 ressembler \u00e0 une guerre de la 4\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’analyse prend pour point d’int\u00e9r\u00eat central un raid effectu\u00e9 \u00e0 Phoenix, capitale de l’Arizona, le 22 juin dernier, par un groupe (un commando) appartenant aux cartel mexicains de la drogue. Effectivement, le d\u00e9tail des \u00e9quipements, du mode d’action, de l’intensit\u00e9 de l’action, etc., constitue l’int\u00e9r\u00eat central de l’analyse. Nous reproduisons certains passages que nous jugeons particuli\u00e8rement illustratifs \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, tandis que l’on peut consulter le texte dans son enti\u00e8ret\u00e9 pour confirmation de l’impression produite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Les circonstances de l’attaque:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abLate on the night of June 22, a residence in Phoenix was approached by a heavily armed tactical team preparing to serve a warrant. The members of the team were wearing the typical gear for members of their profession: black boots, black BDU pants, Kevlar helmets and Phoenix Police Department (PPD) raid shirts pulled over their body armor. The team members carried AR-15 rifles equipped with Aimpoint sights to help them during the low-light operation and, like most cops on a tactical team, in addition to their long guns, the members of this team carried secondary weapons pistols strapped to their thighs.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut the raid took a strange turn when one element of the team began directing suppressive fire on the residence windows while the second element entered a tactic not normally employed by the PPD. This breach of departmental protocol did not stem from a mistake on the part of the team’s commander. It occurred because the eight men on the assault team were not from the PPD at all. These men were not cops serving a legal search or arrest warrant signed by a judge; they were cartel hit men serving a death warrant signed by a Mexican drug lord.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe tactical team struck hard and fast. They quickly killed a man in the house and then fled the scene in two vehicles, a red Chevy Tahoe and a gray Honda sedan. Their aggressive tactics did have consequences, however. The fury the attackers unleashed on the home firing over 100 rounds during the operation drew the attention of a nearby Special Assignments Unit (SAU) team, the PPD’s real tactical team, which responded to the scene with other officers. An SAU officer noticed the Tahoe fleeing the scene and followed it until it entered an alley. Sensing a potential ambush, the SAU officer chose to establish a perimeter and wait for reinforcements rather than charge down the alley after the suspects. This was fortunate, because after three of the suspects from the Tahoe were arrested, they confessed that they had indeed planned to ambush the police officers chasing them.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Les conditions et les causes initiales de l’intervention tactique du commando et, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, d’autres commandos de cette sorte. Il s’agit de conditions de type droit de suite, parlant ainsi comme si le cartel \u00e9tait une force constitu\u00e9e menant une guerre et \u00e9tendant son territoire d’action au-del\u00e0 des fronti\u00e8res en fonction de ses imp\u00e9ratifs tactiques. On observe que ce territoire ne cesse de s’\u00e9tendre vers le Nord, aux USA, \u00e0 mesure que les objectifs des cartels, des individus ou des groupes d’individus cherchant \u00e0 fuir leurs repr\u00e9sailles, cherchant \u00e0 trouver refuge de plus en plus loin aux USA, au Nord de la fronti\u00e8re.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAlthough the victim in the Phoenix killing, Andrew Williams, was reportedly a Jamaican drug dealer who crossed a Mexican cartel, there are many other targets in the United States that the cartels would like to eliminate. These targets include Mexican cartel members who have fled to the United States due to several different factors. The first factor is the violent cartel war that has raged in Mexico for the past few years over control of important smuggling routes and strategic locations along those routes. The second factor is the Calderon administration’s crackdown, first on the Gulf cartel and now on the Sinaloa cartel. Pressure from rival cartels and the government has forced many cartel leaders into hiding, and some of them have left Mexico for Central America or the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbTraditionally, when violence has spiked in Mexico, cartel figures have used U.S. cities such as Laredo, El Paso and San Diego as rest and recreation spots, reasoning that the general umbrella of safety provided by U.S. law enforcement to those residing in the United States would protect them from assassination by their enemies. As bolder Mexican cartel hit men have begun to carry out assassinations on the U.S. side of the border in places such as Laredo, Rio Bravo, and even Dallas, the cartel figures have begun to seek sanctuary deeper in the United States, thereby bringing the threat with them.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLes analystes de Stratfor.com<\/em> semblent juger que l’action des commandos des cartels vont rapidement s’\u00e9tendre, en profondeur, dans le territoire des USA: \u00abWe anticipate that as the Mexican cartels begin to go after more targets inside the United States, the spread of cartel violence and these dangerous tactics beyond the border region will catch some law enforcement officers by surprise. A patrol officer conducting a traffic stop on a group of cartel members who are preparing to conduct an assassination in, say, Los Angeles, Chicago or northern Virginia could quickly find himself heavily outgunned and under fire.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Les caract\u00e8res des incursions des commandos du cartel, qui attaquent des objectifs pr\u00e9cis et s’abstiennent d’interf\u00e9rence avec les populations locales, pour \u00e9viter des r\u00e9actions locales, de forces l\u00e9gales am\u00e9ricanistes contre eux.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abOther cartel targets in the United States include Drug Enforcement Administration and other law enforcement officers responsible for operations against the cartels, and informants who have cooperated with U.S. or Mexican authorities and been relocated stateside for safety. There are also many police officers who have quit their jobs in Mexico and fled to the United States to escape threats from the cartels, as well as Mexican businessmen who are targeted by cartels and have moved to the United States for safety.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbTo date, the cartels for the most part have refrained from targeting innocent civilians. In the type of environment they operate under inside Mexico, cartels cannot afford to have the local population, a group they use as camouflage, turn against them. It is not uncommon for cartel leaders to undertake public relations events (they have even held carnivals for children) in order to build goodwill with the general population. As seen with al Qaeda in Iraq, losing the support of the local population is deadly for a militant group attempting to hide within that population.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t L’un des effets de ces interventions extr\u00eamement s\u00e9lectives, ne s’exer\u00e7ant que contre des individus ou groupes d’individus impliqu\u00e9s dans la guerre en cours au Mexique, est de susciter une certaine indiff\u00e9rence, une certaine passivit\u00e9 dans les r\u00e9actions US sur les territoires concern\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abCartels have also attempted to minimize civilian casualties in their operations inside the United States, though for a different operational consideration. The cartels believe that if a U.S. drug dealer or a member of a rival Mexican cartel is killed in a place like Dallas or Phoenix, nobody really cares. Many people see such a killing as a public service, and there will not be much public outcry about it, nor much real effort on the part of law enforcement agencies to identify and catch the killers. The death of a civilian, on the other hand, brings far more public condemnation and law enforcement attention.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Enfin, en mettant l’accent sur les tactiques, les \u00e9quipements, les m\u00e9thodes, l’efficacit\u00e9 de leurs intervention, le soin que les cartels mettent \u00e0 ne plus impliquer les populations civiles, etc., l’analyse montre que le cartels agissent \u00e0 l’instar de groupes, voire des arm\u00e9es r\u00e9volutionnaires classiques et, r\u00e9f\u00e9rence plus moderne (postmoderne), de groupes terroristes ou milices organis\u00e9s engag\u00e9s dans de v\u00e9ritables G4G.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn a vu plus haut cette remarque dans un des extraits cit\u00e9s (en gras, le passage qui nous importe): \u00ab As seen<\/em> with al Qaeda in Iraq<\/em><\/strong>, losing the support of the local population is deadly for a militant group attempting to hide within that population.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl y a aussi ceci, entre autres remarques, avec, soulign\u00e9 en gras, la remarque qui nous importe: \u00abThe vast majority of police officers and federal agents in the United States simply are not prepared or equipped to deal with a highly trained fire team using insurgent tactics. That is a task suited<\/em> more for the U.S. military forces currently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n \tNous avons voulu pr\u00e9senter un tableau aussi complet que possible des conditions parcellaires de ces raids et incursions des cartels mexicains de la drogue aux USA. Elles nous paraissent impressionnantes et significatives. Elles sont caract\u00e9ris\u00e9es par plusieurs points qui confirment l’analyse de Lind: il y a une guerre, de type G4G, en cours au Mexique, qui se r\u00e9pand dans le Sud des USA, sans aucune limitation pour la suite de la voir s’\u00e9tendre vers plus au Nord dans le pays.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCette situation est rendue possible, notamment et d’une fa\u00e7on significative, par l’extension du domaine de la d\u00e9finition du concept de guerre, notamment dans le domaine le plus trivial des conditions techniques et op\u00e9rationnelles. La guerre s’est d\u00e9cisivement rapproch\u00e9e, ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, des conditions de l’activit\u00e9 de banditisme organis\u00e9, y compris dans le chef des arm\u00e9es occidentales, avec diverses marques sp\u00e9cifiques, id\u00e9ologiques notamment, qui peuvent \u00eatre int\u00e9gr\u00e9es sans modifier ces nouvelles conditions. Il en r\u00e9sulte que des organisations criminelles peuvent beaucoup plus ais\u00e9ment acc\u00e9der, dans leurs activit\u00e9s, \u00e0 l’\u00e9tablissement des conditions d’une guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAujourd’hui, qu’est-ce qui diff\u00e9rencie, dans l’\u00e9quipement, dans les m\u00e9thodes, dans l’activit\u00e9, dans le contr\u00f4le politique l\u00e9gitime, dans la l\u00e9galit\u00e9 stricto sensu<\/em>, les activit\u00e9s des Special Forces occidentales (essentiellement anglo-saxonnes, sp\u00e9cialistes de l’ill\u00e9gitimit\u00e9), des contractants US de Blackwater op\u00e9rant en Irak, des milices diverses, notamment islamistes, des arm\u00e9es des divers chefs de guerre en Afghanistan ou au Soudan, de celles des cartels de drogue mexicains? A l’inverse, les activit\u00e9s des groupes en apparence les moins l\u00e9gitimes et donc les moins aptes \u00e0 se pr\u00e9tendre en guerre avec la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 th\u00e9orique que cela implique, dont les cartels pour le cas qui nous occupe, \u00e9voluent vers des activit\u00e9s paramilitaires de type social et presque patriotique, ce que les Occidentaux avec leur go\u00fbt du slogan virtualiste ont nomm\u00e9 gagner les curs et les esprits. Souvent, ils y excellent, comme le Hezbollah<\/a> au Liban. On peut voir une esquisse de cette d\u00e9marche dans le cas des cartels, avec la remarque suivante : \u00abIt is not uncommon for cartel leaders to undertake public relations events (they have even held carnivals for children) in order to build goodwill with the general population.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\nSi ce n’est la guerre, cela y ressemble tant<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n