{"id":70021,"date":"2008-07-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-07-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/07\/05\/bmde-pologne-et-usa-nyet-desenchantement-et-guerre-de-communication\/"},"modified":"2008-07-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-07-05T00:00:00","slug":"bmde-pologne-et-usa-nyet-desenchantement-et-guerre-de-communication","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/07\/05\/bmde-pologne-et-usa-nyet-desenchantement-et-guerre-de-communication\/","title":{"rendered":"BMDE, Pologne et USA : \u201cNyet<\/em>\u201d, d\u00e9senchantement et guerre de communication"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les derni\u00e8res p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties dans la question du syst\u00e8me anti-missiles US en Europe (le BMDE) confirment combien cette affaire est devenue presque exclusivement une guerre de communication, une guerre de l’information, de la d\u00e9sinformation, de la d\u00e9formation de l’information, qui se livrent entre les trois amis en cause, USA, Pologne et Tch\u00e9quie, mais surtout Pologne et USA pour l’instant. Il est difficile de trouver un pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, en intensit\u00e9 et en dur\u00e9e, dans une affaire de cette importance, o\u00f9 l’information soit aussi fortement manipul\u00e9e, jusqu’\u00e0 des d\u00e9clarations publiques explicitement fausses, des pressions grossi\u00e8res, des manuvres d’intimidation. Les USA ont \u00e9videmment une activit\u00e9 consid\u00e9rable, voire exclusive, dans ce domaine. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSuccessivement, ces derniers jours, on a pu relever les faits suivants, alors qu’il s’av\u00e8re finalement qu’un nouveau cycle de n\u00e9gociations entre les USA et la Pologne s’est termin\u00e9 sur un refus polonais pr\u00e9visible depuis un certain temps. (Les sources et informations rapport\u00e9es sont certainement loin d’\u00eatre exclusives. Elles sont cit\u00e9es ici comme exemplaires de l’\u00e9trange cheminement de l’information dans tous les sens.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 3 juillet<\/a> au matin, un article de Leigh Phillips, de EU Observer<\/em>, annonce, en se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant \u00e0 Associated Press, que l’accord entre Pologne et USA pour le stationnement des anti-missiles du syst\u00e8me BMDE est sign\u00e9. Un officiel polonais \u00e9tait nomm\u00e9, avec confirmation d’officiels US anonymes. La formulation \u00e9tait cat\u00e9gorique: \u00abThe US and Poland have reached an agreement that will see sections of the American missile defence system based in the former Eastern Bloc nation, according to officials from both countries. Poland’s deputy foreign minister, Witold Waszcykowski has said that he had completed negotiations with US negotiator John Rood on the matter on Tuesday (1 July), according to the AP. Officials from the Bush administration confirmed the conclusion of the deal, but remained nameless as the deal must still be approved by the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 3 juillet<\/a> (dans la nuit en Europe, puisque la publication est faite aux USA, par le biais de Defense News<\/em>), une d\u00e9p\u00eache AFP d\u00e9taille une chronologie contradictoire. Elle revient sur une d\u00e9claration pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente, venue du d\u00e9partement d’Etat et annon\u00e7ant qu’il y a eu un accord pr\u00e9liminaire entre les Polonais et les USA. \u00abOn Wednesday<\/em> [2 July] a senior State Department official who asked not to be named told AFP that a tentative agreement had been reached after two days of talks between Polish and U.S. officials. At this point, I am really happy that we made real good progress in the past few days, the unnamed official said.<\/em>\u00bb Dans la m\u00eame veine, la d\u00e9p\u00eache rappelait une semi-confirmation, dans tous les cas des progr\u00e8s r\u00e9alis\u00e9s, par le haut fonctionnaire charg\u00e9 des n\u00e9gociations : \u00abAssistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, a former ambassador to Poland, has said the last round of talks had made real progress, but he declined to confirm that an agreement had been reached.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Pourtant, dans le m\u00eame<\/strong> d\u00e9p\u00eache du 3 juillet, AFP nuan\u00e7ait diablement toutes ces d\u00e9clarations tr\u00e8s optimistes du c\u00f4t\u00e9 US, rapportant des d\u00e9clarations (le 3 juillet) du ministre polonais de la d\u00e9fense Bogdan Klich \u00e0 Radio Zeit de Varsovie (priv\u00e9): \u00abThe negotiations have not ended another round of talks was concluded. For the time being, we are not at the finish line. We completed an important, a significant, round of talks two days ago but the finish line of talks is still ahead of us July is a long month.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 3 juillet<\/a>, le groupe Stratfor.com<\/em> annon\u00e7ait effectivement (acc\u00e8s payant): \u00abPoland and the United States have reached an agreement on the U.S. missile base to be deployed in the former Eastern Bloc country.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 4 juillet, de Varsovie, Reuters confirme la d\u00e9claration du ministre de la d\u00e9fense en la renfor\u00e7ant, en rapportant des d\u00e9clarations du Premier ministre polonais Tusk, le m\u00eame jour, exposant que ce cycle de n\u00e9gociations est un \u00e9chec. Reuters retranscrit, ce 4 juillet<\/a>, des d\u00e9clarations de Tusk au cours d’une conf\u00e9rence de presse: \u00abPoland has rejected a U.S. offer to boost its air defenses in return for basing a missile shield on Polish soil but remains open for further talks with Washington, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Friday.<\/em> [] We have not reached a satisfactory result on the issue of increasing the level of Polish security, Tusk told a news conference after studying the U.S. proposal.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Une autre d\u00e9p\u00eache Reuters, le m\u00eame 4 juillet<\/a>, dramatise ce qui est d\u00e9sormais qualifi\u00e9 comme ceci: \u00abPoland rejects U.S. missile shield offer<\/em>\u00bb, avec ce commentaire: \u00abThe decision by Poland, a staunch NATO ally, is a setback for the Bush administration drive to counter perceived threats from what Washington calls rogue states, particularly Iran.<\/em>\u00bb Il semble que le d\u00e9partement d’Etat en vienne finalement \u00e0 accepter l’\u00e9vidence, ou la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 c’est selon, mais avec une prudence bien reconnaissable: \u00abIn Washington, the State Department said it was studying Tusk’s remarks closely. Poland remains a close and important ally of the United States, Sean McCormack, a department spokesman, said in an e-mailed statement. We remain in negotiations with Poland and do not plan to comment publicly on the details.<\/em>\u00bb Cette fois, la d\u00e9p\u00eache ne parle plus d’une n\u00e9gociation de deux jours mais d’une month-long negociation cycle<\/em>, ce qui implique que c’est tout un cycle de n\u00e9gociation qui est \u00e0 son terme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Il commence \u00e0 y avoir des commentaires polonais, venus d’experts non-gouvernementaux, qui tentent d’appr\u00e9cier ce qui est de plus en plus per\u00e7u comme un tournant dans la n\u00e9gociation: \u00abPolitical analysts said Tusk’s rebuff to Washington demonstrated a new Polish self-confidence on the global stage. Warsaw is one of Washington’s firmest allies in the region and has troops serving alongside its ally in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the first time that Poland has said ‘no’ to the U.S. … It certainly sends a signal to Washington that Poland’s support should not be taken for granted in any circumstances, said Pawel Swieboda, head of demosEuropa, a Warsaw think tank.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Une autre appr\u00e9ciation va plus loin dans l’analyse en y introduisant une dimension politique et psychologique importante. Il s’agit de celle de Maria Wagrowska, experte au Centre des Relations Internationales de Varsovie. Elle explique que, jusqu’il y a quelques ann\u00e9es, les USA avaient en Pologne un statut de v\u00e9ritable mythe, renvoyant \u00e0 la Guerre froide puis \u00e0 la lib\u00e9ration de la Pologne, avec le r\u00f4le pr\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 Reagan dans cette lib\u00e9ration. Cette position compl\u00e8tement id\u00e9aliste s’est consid\u00e9rablemet \u00e9rod\u00e9e. \u00abMany problems in the bilateral relationship became apparent during the missile defense talks. And they are not only political they are also psychological. <\/em>[] If the U.S. had tried to get a deal before the Iraq war, it would have been much easier. Today, Polish politicians feel burned by the Bush administration, largely because Warsaw’s staunch military support for the U.S. war in Iraq failed to win substantial contracts for Polish companies in Iraq’s reconstruction, as many here had expected. As a result, Warsaw has decided that if it is going to link its fate to another major American military project, it’s going to get what it wants beforehand and in writing. Poland took an idealistic approach when it decided to support the U.S. in Iraq. Now there is a much more reasonable, commercial approach because of the disappointment that we didn’t earn anything in Iraq.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAu-del\u00e0 de ces diverses consid\u00e9rations, l’autre facteur signal\u00e9 plus haut, s’il n’est pas signal\u00e9 en tant que tel, entre fortement en ligne de compte dans le durcissement polonais. La guerre de communication entre les deux pays, avec les USA manuvrant sans la moindre vergogne pour exercer toutes sortes de pression sur les Polonais, y compris par la diffusion de fausses nouvelles, a laiss\u00e9 des traces profondes et acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 la prise de conscience des Polonais. Le ministre polonais de la d\u00e9fense s’est plaint publiquement de la d\u00e9marche US annon\u00e7ant que les USA consultaient la Lituanie pour y trouver un substitut \u00e0 la Pologne pour d\u00e9ployer son BMDE, comme d’une manuvre de pression typique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tComme on l’a d\u00e9j\u00e0<\/a> \u00e9galement signal\u00e9, USA et Pologne sont loin, tr\u00e8s loin de la possibilit\u00e9 d’un accord sur le point des compensations que demandent les Polonais. La partie am\u00e9ricaniste, elle, n’a qu’un seul objectif en t\u00eate: contraindre la Pologne \u00e0 un accord d’ici la fin de l’administration GW Bush, pour tenter de lier la future administration au projet. Si ce n’est pas le cas, il est probable que le programme BMDE \u00e9voluera vers l’abandon<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 5 juillet 2008 \u00e0 08H42<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les derni\u00e8res p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties dans la question du syst\u00e8me anti-missiles US en Europe (le BMDE) confirment combien cette affaire est devenue presque exclusivement une guerre de communication, une guerre de l’information, de la d\u00e9sinformation, de la d\u00e9formation de l’information, qui se livrent entre les trois amis en cause, USA, Pologne et Tch\u00e9quie, mais surtout Pologne et… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3453,4314,5859,2827,2828],"class_list":["post-70021","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anti-missiles","tag-bmde","tag-communications","tag-pologne","tag-tusk"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70021","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70021"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70021\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70021"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70021"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70021"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}