Il est vrai que la th\u00e8se du protectionnisme pour expliquer l’action du GAO et tout ce qui s’ensuit dans l’affaire du programme KC-45 ne fait pas un pli en Europe<\/a>. Les milieux atlantistes et pro-US sont les plus acharn\u00e9s \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, ce que nous observons d’un il int\u00e9ress\u00e9 et assez vif, avec une ombre d’ironie bien dissimul\u00e9e. Il n’emp\u00eache, et nous tenons \u00e0 notre interpr\u00e9tation, que nous ne croyons pas une seconde que l’intervention du GAO soit partiale et biais\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl semble bien qu’il y ait eu, dans la s\u00e9lection de EADS\/Northrop, une certaine complaisance de l’USAF. La cause en est bien connue: l’USAF avait une peur bleue d’une s\u00e9lection de Boeing, dans un march\u00e9 (exclusivement avec Boeing \u00e0 l’origine) d\u00e9j\u00e0 pourri par d’innombrables scandales, cas de corruption, erreurs, etc., et que le s\u00e9nateur McCain et le Congr\u00e8s derri\u00e8re lui avaient pris en ligne de mire. Depuis, certes, la vertu a chang\u00e9 de camp puisque c’est Boeing qui en est par\u00e9, mais nous parlons des conditions de s\u00e9lection par l’USAF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLes trouvailles faites par le GAO sont s\u00e9rieuses, telles qu’expos\u00e9es plus en d\u00e9tails par Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> le 30 juin<\/a> (acc\u00e8s payant). Le m\u00eame article rel\u00e8ve que l’USAF a plus ou moins admis qu’il y avait eu de sa part une certaine intentionnalit\u00e9 d’\u00e9carter de la logique de sa d\u00e9cision au moins un point important qui d\u00e9favorisait EADS\/Northrop Grumman.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici les extraits de cet article d’AW&ST qui concernent pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment cet aspect de la pol\u00e9mique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe findings and recommendations, released June 25 by the GAO, Congress’s auditing arm, are an expanded version of a three-page summary issued June 18 and they shed light on some of the complicated technical issues that were weighed by the Air Force during the source selection.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe GAO says that if the Air Force had properly assessed the technical and operational requirements of the 767 and A330 designs, as well as the cost of both proposals, Boeing would have had a substantial chance of being selected for award. Furthermore, in one area, the auditors found that the winner’s inability to meet a key maintenance requirement essentially nullifies its win and extra credit was unfairly awarded to Northrop Grumman and not to Boeing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOne of the thorniest issues for the service is a requirement to provide a plan to begin an Air Force-run depot maintenance facility for the KC-45A within two years of delivery of the first production aircraft. During the competition, the Air Force raised as a problem Northrop Grumman’s multiple failures to provide documentation to support this requirement. However, the Air Force source selection committee concluded this was an administrative oversight’ because Northrop Grumman had promised to provide the required services.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDuring a hearing conducted by the GAO as part of the audit, the Air Force admitted for the first time that Northrop Grumman’s omission’ appeared to be a conscious decision. This was later bolstered when the company admitted during a rebuttal period that its omission was intentional, the GAO audit finds.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tC’est \u00e9videmment dans ce contexte qu’il faut interpr\u00e9ter la d\u00e9cision de Robert Gates de confier le dossier du KC-45 et son processus de s\u00e9lection nouvelle mani\u00e8re \u00e0 une autorit\u00e9 ext\u00e9rieure de l’USAF (au sous-secr\u00e9taire aux acquisitions, \u00e0 la technologie et \u00e0 la logistique, John Young). Cette d\u00e9cision est absolument normale, sinon \u00e9vidente. Dans tous les cas, Gates prend une attention toute particuli\u00e8re \u00e0 ne pas mettre en cause l’USAF. Les explications de Gates, rapport\u00e9es par Defense News<\/em> (9 juillet<\/a>, acc\u00e8s payant), sont coh\u00e9rentes et essentiellement de forme. Il est manifeste que, devant la gravit\u00e9 de l’affaire o\u00f9 tout le monde, l’USAF mais aussi le Pentagone en tant que tel, est confront\u00e9 \u00e0 des risques consid\u00e9rables, il s’est \u00e9tabli une sorte de paix arm\u00e9e entre le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense et l’USAF. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abBut Gates and Young denied that GAO’s conclusions – coming 1 1\/2 years after it canceled the Air Force’s November 2006 contract award to Boeing for a combat search-and-rescue helicopter mean that the Air Force’s acquisition process is broken.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb I have confidence in the acquisitions team,\u00a0\u00bb Gates said. I think that Secretary Donley has indicated that there are some areas where there needs to be improvement, but I think we will go forward with that.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThat confidence extends to Sue Payton, the Air Force assistant secretary in charge of acquisition, Gates said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut he added that placing his top acquisitions chief in charge of the selection process is an appropriate and necessary step to ensure congressional and public confidence that DoD can and will successfully manage to completion a large, complex procurement such as the KC-X. It is essential for the department, working with Congress, to maintain both internal and public confidence in our acquisition process.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb This is the third time we’ve gone at this, Gates said. And under those circumstances, it seemed to me that we were most likely most quickly to gain the confidence of Congress in the way forward by having the undersecretary oversee this particular contract.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tQuoi qu’il en soit, cette prise en charge in\u00e9vitable de la d\u00e9cision par OSD (Office of Secretary of Defense) doit encore plus favoriser la politisation de l’affaire, notamment comme elle a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e par les atlantistes europ\u00e9ens. D\u00e9sormais, c’est Robert Gates qui, par l’interm\u00e9diaire de Young, est en premi\u00e8re ligne. Il est probable qu’il pr\u00eatera plus d’attention aux observations du Congr\u00e8s qu’\u00e0 la fureur des atlantistes europ\u00e9ens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 10 juillet 2008 \u00e0 15H24<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Il est vrai que la th\u00e8se du protectionnisme pour expliquer l’action du GAO et tout ce qui s’ensuit dans l’affaire du programme KC-45 ne fait pas un pli en Europe. Les milieux atlantistes et pro-US sont les plus acharn\u00e9s \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, ce que nous observons d’un il int\u00e9ress\u00e9 et assez vif, avec une ombre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4248,3984,4581,3194,41,7670],"class_list":["post-70033","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-gao","tag-gates","tag-kc-45","tag-pentagone","tag-usaf","tag-young"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70033","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70033"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70033\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70033"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70033"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70033"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}