Lors de l’audition sur le cas du programme KC-45, le 10 juillet devant la sous-commission des forces a\u00e9riennes et terrestres, \u00e0 la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants, le GAO a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 son jugement sur la conduite de l’USAF durant le processus de s\u00e9lection ayant abouti au choix de EADS\/Northrop Grumman (KC-30). Le GAO a confirm\u00e9 l’analyse selon laquelle les fautes de l’USAF n’\u00e9taient pas intentionnelles et n’\u00e9taient pas sp\u00e9cifiques \u00e0 l’USAF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe Daily Report<\/em> de l’Air Force Association donne un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 de cette intervention, le GAO \u00e9tant repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par son mandataire Daniel Gordon.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe Government Accountability Office found no reason to think that anyone in the Air Force intentionally broke the law in awarding the KC-X contract to Northrop Grumman during its review of the process, which resulted in a recommendation to reopen bidding. Speaking before the AirLand panel of the House Armed Services Committee Thursday afternoon during an open hearing on the GAO decision and USAF acquisition in general, GAO attorney Daniel Gordon said that GAO found no evidence of criminal misconduct and not one iota of evidence of intentional wrongdoing by anyone in the Air Force in selecting the Northrop\/EADS team over Boeing. Rather, some of the Air Force’s processes were flawed, and the service made too many assumptions on Northrop’s behalf that skewed what was a close contest, Gordon said. And, he asserted that the Air Force has one particular problem that comes up with some frequency during GAO reviews of protests: The Air Force either fails to disclose some of the criteria on which bidders will be judged, or fails to take its own judgment criteria into account when making an award. Despite that, Gordon noted that USAF’s track record is about the same as that of the other services when it comes to sustainable protests.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCette intervention est particuli\u00e8rement bienvenue en ce qu’elle \u00e9claire combien l’affaire du KC-45 n’est ni une exception, ni un accident, ni un cas sp\u00e9cifique \u00e0 l’USAF. Au contraire, il s’agit d’un exemple, spectaculaire certes en raison de l’importance du contrat et des circonstances ext\u00e9rieures, d’un comportement propre \u00e0 l’USAF en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et \u00e0 tous les autres services au Pentagone, et un comportement routinier, nullement entach\u00e9 de quelque intention critiquable que ce soit. Le cas du programme KC-45 est une illustration parfaite de la fa\u00e7on dont le Pentagone fonctionne aujourd’hui; une illustration convaincante de la crise syst\u00e9mique du Pentagone, et du blocage o\u00f9 cette crise conduit le Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 12 juillet 2008 \u00e0 09H59<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Lors de l’audition sur le cas du programme KC-45, le 10 juillet devant la sous-commission des forces a\u00e9riennes et terrestres, \u00e0 la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants, le GAO a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 son jugement sur la conduite de l’USAF durant le processus de s\u00e9lection ayant abouti au choix de EADS\/Northrop Grumman (KC-30). Le GAO a confirm\u00e9 l’analyse selon… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3228,4248,4581,3194,6277,41],"class_list":["post-70037","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-crise","tag-gao","tag-kc-45","tag-pentagone","tag-systemique","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70037","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70037"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70037\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70037"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70037"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70037"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}