The presence of an American at the talks this weekend may help quiet the mounting calls in both the United States and Israel for military strikes against Iran because of its recent expansion of its uranium enrichment program and its unwillingness to fully explain its suspicious past nuclear activities.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLes faucons sont, selon cette logique, tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9occup\u00e9s par la d\u00e9cision de l’administration. Nous avons donc un commentaire venimeux et persifleur de John Bolton:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abJust when you think the administration is out of U-turns, they make another one, said John R. Bolton, a former ambassador to the United Nations, who was highly critical of the administration’s decision to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism last month. This is further evidence of the administration’s complete intellectual collapse.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tAutre \u00e9l\u00e9ment peu favorable pour cette d\u00e9cision de l’administration (qui a, signalons-le, mis les n\u00e9gociateurs europ\u00e9ens dans un \u00e9tat d’extase), le rappel des pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes initiatives dans ce sens, d’une reprise au moins momentan\u00e9e des contacts avec l’Iran depuis la grande rupture de 1979; dans tous les cas, on y distingue le cas d’une concession majeure des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbBut there have been very few other direct encounters between American and Iranian officials since relations between the countries were severed after Iran seized the American Embassy in late 1979.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbDuring the hostage crisis, President Carter once secretly sent Hamilton Jordan, his chief of staff, dressed in disguise as a potential negotiator.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn 1986, in an effort to free several American hostages in Lebanon, President Reagan sent his national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, on a secret arms-for-hostages mission to Iran. He went bearing a key-shaped chocolate cake and a Bible that Mr. Reagan had inscribed with a New Testament passage.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLes relations, ou plut\u00f4t les non-relations devenant relations entre les USA et l’Iran prennent une \u00e9trange voie. Pour l’instant, ce qui domine \u00e0 Washington, ce sont les quelques faits suivants: l’opposition r\u00e9solue de la direction du Pentagone \u00e0 tout conflit, y compris \u00e0 tout risque<\/strong> de conflit venu d’Isra\u00ebl; la tr\u00e8s grande difficult\u00e9 mat\u00e9rielle et politique des USA de conduire une attaque de grande envergure et d’en assumer les cons\u00e9quences, avec notamment l’affaiblissement de l’USAF qui serait le seul service qui aurait \u00e9ventuellement accept\u00e9 avec un certain allant d’attaquer l’Iran; l’aggravation de la crise \u00e9conomique qui monopolise de plus en plus l’attention du pouvoir \u00e0 Washington et conduit \u00e0 mettre une sourdine sur les autres foyers de tension. Ces divers points sont avanc\u00e9s comme explication de l’\u00e9volution US selon laquelle celle-ci \u00e9carte la voie de la tension et du risque de conflit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 17 juillet 2008 \u00e0 21H59<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L’interpr\u00e9tation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la d\u00e9cision US d’envoyer un important fonctionnaire du d\u00e9partement d’Etat \u00e0 T\u00e9h\u00e9ran, William J. Burns, sous-secr\u00e9taire d’Etat pour les affaires politiques, et d’\u00e9tablir une liaison diplomatique limit\u00e9e, est qu’il s’agit d’une concession d’importance des USA. Le commentaire va jusqu’\u00e0 voir dans cette d\u00e9cision une volont\u00e9 d’\u00e9viter un conflit, ce qui peut \u00eatre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7685,3198,2773,7686],"class_list":["post-70052","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-burs","tag-gw","tag-iran","tag-negociation"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70052","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70052"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70052\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70052"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70052"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70052"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}