{"id":70082,"date":"2008-07-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-07-30T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/07\/30\/le-complexe-les-panique\/"},"modified":"2008-07-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-07-30T00:00:00","slug":"le-complexe-les-panique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/07\/30\/le-complexe-les-panique\/","title":{"rendered":"Le Complexe les panique"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Le Complexe les panique<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t30 juillet 2008  M\u00eame si l&rsquo;intention est pu\u00e9rile (path\u00e9tique, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5299 \" class=\"gen\">\u00e9crivions-nous<\/a>), elle doit \u00eatre mise en \u00e9vidence. Lorsque Obama, au cours de son voyage \u00e0 Paris, pr\u00e9cise \u00e0 propos de ses projets sur l&rsquo;Afghanistan:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em> If we have more NATO troops in Afghanistan, then that&rsquo;s potentially fewer American troops over the long term, which means we&rsquo;re spending fewer billions of dollars, which means we can invest those billions of dollars in making sure we&rsquo;re providing tax cuts to middle class families who are struggling with higher gas prices that will have an impact on our economy.\u00bb<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un autre rappel \u00e0 l&rsquo;ordre de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 (de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste, celle des \u00e9lecteurs). Obama a (avait? C&rsquo;est \u00e0 voir) dans ses cartons des projets de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5138\" class=\"gen\">r\u00e9duction<\/a> du budget du Pentagone. Comment concilier une r\u00e9duction des forces pour renforcer les programmes sociaux avec un engagement plus important en Afghanistan? C&rsquo;est une question parmi d&rsquo;autres d&rsquo;un vaste probl\u00e8me qui envahit la sc\u00e8ne politique washingtonienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Une autre r\u00e9cente indication du probl\u00e8me que nous voulons traiter ici se trouve dans plusieurs interventions du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Gates, dont celle du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defenselink.mil\/speeches\/speech.aspx?speechid=1262\" class=\"gen\">15 juillet<\/a>, qui est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e sous cette forme dans le Los Angeles <em>Times<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/articles.latimes.com\/2008\/07\/16\/news\/na-gates16\" class=\"gen\">16 juillet<\/a><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates renewed his call Tuesday for more spending on U.S. diplomacy and international aid, saying the U.S. government risks creeping militarization of its foreign policy by focusing its resources on the Pentagon.<\/em> ()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Gates has made the argument before, most notably in November in an address at Kansas State University. But his speech Tuesday, before a group of business and nongovernmental groups in Washington, included some of his most pointed language yet, including a call for the U.S. to repair its standing in Muslim countries. But he said efforts to buff America&rsquo;s image were unlikely to help.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out-propagandize Al Qaeda, but through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time, Gates said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The remark seemed directed toward some of the Bush administration&rsquo;s public diplomacy efforts in the years after the Sept. 11 attacks. Attempts by former White House aide Karen Hughes and others to reinvigorate administration outreach efforts failed to reverse the U.S. image, especially among Muslim populations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Gates said that because of the Pentagon&rsquo;s outsized budget, it frequently handled activities that traditionally had been the responsibility of civilian agencies. The trend has led critics to charge that U.S. foreign policy is dominated by the military, a view Gates said was not an entirely unreasonable sentiment.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t L&rsquo;historien Chalmers Johnson, au terme d&rsquo;une analyse sur la situation des services de renseignement US (sur <em>Tomdispatch.com<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.tomdispatch.com\/post\/174959\/chalmers_johnson_warning_mercenaries_at_work<D\" class=\"gen\">27 juillet<\/a>), cite les interventions de Rober Gates en les assimilant au fameux discours d&rsquo;Eisenhower du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1829\" class=\"gen\">17 janvier 1961<\/a> sur (ou plut\u00f4t : contre) le complexe militaro-industriel,  premi\u00e8re occasion historique o\u00f9 ce terme devenu depuis fameux est offert au public.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>As numerous studies have, by now, made clear, the abject failure of the American occupation of Iraq came about in significant measure because the Department of Defense sent a remarkably privatized military filled with incompetent amateurs to Baghdad to administer the running of a defeated country. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates (a former director of the CIA) has repeatedly warned that the United States is turning over far too many functions to the military because of its hollowing out of the Department of State and the Agency for International Development since the end of the Cold War. Gates believes that we are witnessing a creeping militarization of foreign policy  and, though this generally goes unsaid, both the military and the intelligence services have turned over far too many of their tasks to private companies and mercenaries.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>When even Robert Gates begins to sound like President Eisenhower, it is time for ordinary citizens to pay attention. In my 2006 book Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic, with an eye to bringing the imperial presidency under some modest control, I advocated that we Americans abolish the CIA altogether, along with other dangerous and redundant agencies in our alphabet soup of sixteen secret intelligence agencies, and replace them with the State Department&rsquo;s professional staff devoted to collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence. I still hold that position.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Nonetheless, the current situation represents the worst of all possible worlds. Successive administrations and Congresses have made no effort to alter the CIA&rsquo;s role as the president&rsquo;s private army, even as we have increased its incompetence by turning over many of its functions to the private sector. We have thereby heightened the risks of war by accident, or by presidential whim, as well as of surprise attack because our government is no longer capable of accurately assessing what is going on in the world and because its intelligence agencies are so open to pressure, penetration, and manipulation of every kind.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t On citera \u00e9galement, selon cette m\u00eame orientation critique des activit\u00e9s du CMI, les analyses de Winslow T. Wheeler, aussi bien sur le site du Center of Defense Information, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cdi.org\/program\/document.cfm?DocumentID=4347&#038;StartRow=1&#038;ListRows=10&#038;appendURL=&#038;Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&#038;ProgramID=37&#038;from_page=index.cfm\" class=\"gen\">25 juillet<\/a>, que sur UPI (<em>Specewar.com<\/em>) le m\u00eame <a href=\"http:\/\/www.spacewar.com\/reports\/Air_Force_Procurement_Woes_Continues_Part_One_999.html\" class=\"gen\">25 juillet<\/a>, sur la crise de l&rsquo;U.S. Air Force. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un excellent exemple sp\u00e9cifique, d\u00e9taill\u00e9 dans les chiffres, des effets de la crise du CMI sur un de ses composants.(On voit par ailleurs, sur notre <em>Forum<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5311\" class=\"gen\">jour<\/a>, les d\u00e9tails de l&rsquo;\u00e9valuation de Wheeler.)<\/p>\n<h3>Gates, super-d\u00e9l\u00e9gu\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me pour op\u00e9rer le monstre \u00e0 vif?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuelle est la signification g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de ces divers signes, d\u00e9clarations, \u00e9valuations, etc.? On la trouve dans le constat que la crise du complexe militaro-industriel, ou du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5175\" class=\"gen\">Pentagone<\/a> si l&rsquo;on veut, appara\u00eet de plus en plus visiblement, avec des effets \u00e0 mesure, et inqui\u00e8te de plus en plus gravement les commentateurs et les responsables. Les d\u00e9clarations de Robert Gates, notamment, sont particuli\u00e8rement importantes, parce qu&rsquo;elles ne sont nullement accidentelles, parce qu&rsquo;elles font partie d&rsquo;une campagne de plus en plus affirm\u00e9e du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense en faveur d&rsquo;une r\u00e9forme radicale et profonde du Pentagone et du CMI, avant d&rsquo;atteindre le stade d&rsquo;une situation irr\u00e9formable et hors de contr\u00f4le.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOu bien nous y sommes d\u00e9j\u00e0, dans l&rsquo;irr\u00e9formable et dans la perte de contr\u00f4le? Cela serait plut\u00f4t notre avis; disons alors qu&rsquo;on se trouverait dans l&rsquo;irr\u00e9formable et dans l&rsquo;absence de contr\u00f4le qui deviendraient insupportables. Les avatars de l&rsquo;USAF, y compris son incapacit\u00e9 \u00e0 assurer un processus d\u00e9cent (c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire sans erreurs grossi\u00e8res) de s\u00e9lection d&rsquo;un nouveau ravitailleur en vol (<em>dito<\/em>, l&rsquo;affaire du KC-45), serait une manifestation de cette situation devenant insupportable. Effectivement si la crise du CMI\/Pentagone,  la chose irr\u00e9formable et incontr\u00f4lable,  interf\u00e8re de fa\u00e7on aussi massive et aussi grossi\u00e8re dans les grandes affaires politiques, en provoquant une crise <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5260\" class=\"gen\">transatlantique<\/a> notamment, elle devient insupportable. Et alors? dirions-nous,  qu&rsquo;est-ce que cela change? Rien. Cela rend-il le Pentagone r\u00e9formable? Non. La seule hypoth\u00e8se qu&rsquo;on peut avancer est que cela exacerbe la gravit\u00e9 de la situation, d\u00e9sormais dans le champ <strong>politique<\/strong>. Du coup, il faut effectivement envisager qu&rsquo;un effort fondamental de r\u00e9forme soit tent\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de janvier 2009.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est ici qu&rsquo;entre en jeu le destin de Robert Gates. Le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense est en train d&rsquo;acqu\u00e9rir une formidable r\u00e9putation \u00e0 Washington, par contraste avec son pr\u00e9d\u00e9cesseur, par contraste avec les principaux ministres de l&rsquo;administration GW Bush. C&rsquo;en est au point que l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se du maintien de Gates \u00e0 son poste en janvier 2009 est d\u00e9sormais tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse. En cas de victoire d&rsquo;Obama? Effectivement, l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se est surtout exprim\u00e9e \u00e0 cette lumi\u00e8re.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLors d&rsquo;une r\u00e9cente interview d&rsquo;Obama \u00e0 la publication <em>Army Times<\/em>, reprise par <em>Defense News<\/em> du m\u00eame groupe d&rsquo;\u00e9dition, on pouvait lire diverses supputations sur la position de Gates dans la p\u00e9riode de transition. (Dans <em>Defense News<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/defensenews.va.newsmemory.com\/default.php?type=&#038;token=528bfbc690487ae8d374df84e85a0e2d&#038;pSetup=defensenews_intl&#038;goTo=001&#038;date=20080707\" class=\"gen\">7 juillet<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Obama stopped short of saying he would ask some members of the Pentagon&rsquo;s current civilian leadership to stay on past his in auguration if he wins the election in November. But without prompting, he went on to praise Gates in a way that suggested he could ask him to stick around.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>I do think that Secretary Gates has brought a level of realism and professionalism and planning to the job that is worthy of praise, he said. I think that the Pentagon is operating more effectively. I think he has improved greatly the relationships with the Joint Chiefs and the military generally.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But whether that means that he would continue in that position, or would even want to, I think that&rsquo;s something that will be determined later. I don&rsquo;t want to get too far ahead of myself. I think I have a lit tle more work to do before I have to make those decisions. Obama did appear to back a soft power vision Gates began advocating in a series of speeches last fall: a more modern State Department and civilian national securi ty force that could deploy teams that combine agricultural special ists and engineers and linguists and cultural specialists who are prepared to go into some of the most dangerous areas alongside our military. If we&rsquo;ve got a State Department or personnel that have been trained just to be behind walls, and they have not been equipped to get out there alongside our military and engage, then we don&rsquo;t have the kind of national security apparatus that is needed, he said. That has to be planned for; it has to be paid for. Those personnel have to be trained. And they all have to be integrated.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Gates has wide support from both parties for his leadership since taking over the Pentagon from the controversial and outspoken Donald Rumsfeld. Gates receives high marks for improving the situation in Iraq and for his decisive actions within the Pentagon, including the recent relief of the Air Force&rsquo;s top general and civilian leader. If he could be persuaded to stay even for a short while, they said, Gates could help greatly with the transition.<\/em> ()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Robert Hastings, the Pentagon&rsquo;s top spokesman, said Gates hasn&rsquo;t been asked and isn&rsquo;t trying to be asked. He then repeated what he said the secretary has said previously: I learned long ago to never say never, but the circumstances under which I would remain in this job longer are inconceivable.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa forme des diverses supputations est telle qu&rsquo;elle pourrait aussi bien convenir \u00e0 McCain, tant elle semble exprimer une sorte de consensus \u00e0 Washington sur les capacit\u00e9s de Gates, et sur l&rsquo;id\u00e9e qu&rsquo;il pourrait rester au Pentagone. D&rsquo;autre part, les r\u00e9f\u00e9rences donn\u00e9es pour une telle initiative concernent sans aucun doute les id\u00e9es de Gates concernant la r\u00e9forme du Pentagone,  c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire son attaque contre le complexe militaro-industriel dans la forme qu&rsquo;il a acquise aujourd&rsquo;hui, au travers des r\u00e9cents discours qu&rsquo;il a prononc\u00e9s. L&rsquo;id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est encore renforc\u00e9e par la mesure en train d&rsquo;\u00eatre prise des formidables <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5312\" class=\"gen\">difficult\u00e9s<\/a> budg\u00e9taires \u00e0 pr\u00e9voir \u00e0 partir de janvier 2009, impliquant n\u00e9cessairement un effort de r\u00e9forme du Pentagone pour tenter de freiner, sinon r\u00e9duire, les d\u00e9penses du monstre. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une appr\u00e9ciation bipartisane (les deux partis r\u00e9unis), qui d\u00e9passe les centres d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat devant ce qui est per\u00e7u comme un danger grandissant mena\u00e7ant l&rsquo;\u00e9quilibre du tronc central de l&rsquo;appareil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Dans ce cas, on pourrait presque envisager une situation, \u00e9videmment sans <strong>aucun<\/strong> pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent d&rsquo;aucune sorte dans l&rsquo;histoire des USA, d&rsquo;un homme, Gates, choisi par consensus bipartisan, pour \u00eatre, encore plus qu&rsquo;un secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense maintenu \u00e0 son poste, une sorte de super-d\u00e9l\u00e9gu\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me plac\u00e9 \u00e0 la t\u00eate du Pentagone, avec pour mission d&rsquo;op\u00e9rer le monstre \u00e0 vif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn a d\u00e9j\u00e0 vu que la question de la transition inqui\u00e9tait les militaires au point que le pr\u00e9sident du JCS, l&rsquo;amiral Mullen, est <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=5093\" class=\"gen\">intervenu<\/a> publiquement pour recommander un am\u00e9nagement de cette transition. Mullen expliquait cette n\u00e9cessit\u00e9, comme fait Obama, par le fait que les USA sont en guerre. En guerre? Contre qui? Contre la terreur, r\u00e9pond le conformisme habituel. Pour nous, l&rsquo;\u00e9tat de guerre se trouve bien plut\u00f4t au cur du Pentagone. (Clin d&rsquo;il \u00e0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=201\" class=\"gen\">Rumsfeld<\/a>, l&rsquo;infortun\u00e9 proph\u00e8te.) Dans tous les cas, le conseil de Mullen, pour quelque raison que ce soit, \u00e0 l&rsquo;air de rencontrer des \u00e9chos, et m\u00eame au-del\u00e0.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le Complexe les panique 30 juillet 2008 M\u00eame si l&rsquo;intention est pu\u00e9rile (path\u00e9tique, \u00e9crivions-nous), elle doit \u00eatre mise en \u00e9vidence. Lorsque Obama, au cours de son voyage \u00e0 Paris, pr\u00e9cise \u00e0 propos de ses projets sur l&rsquo;Afghanistan: \u00ab If we have more NATO troops in Afghanistan, then that&rsquo;s potentially fewer American troops over the long&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3012,3984,3123,6208,3194,4995],"class_list":["post-70082","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-complexe","tag-gates","tag-militaro-industriel","tag-obama","tag-pentagone","tag-wheeler"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70082","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70082"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70082\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70082"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70082"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70082"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}