L’hypoth\u00e8se d’une attaque US contre l’Iran est de plus en plus en d\u00e9faveur dans l’opinion des experts US, alors que l’autorit\u00e9 de l’administration GW Bush (o\u00f9 l’on trouve encore quelques partisans de cette attaque, dont Cheney) est aujourd’hui quasi inexistante. Un nouvel \u00e9l\u00e9ment, signal\u00e9 aujourd’hui<\/a> par Jim Lobe sur Antiwar.com<\/em>, renforce cette \u00e9volution. Lobe commente une r\u00e9cente \u00e9tude de la RAND Corporation (division Project AIR FORCE, sur les questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale), publi\u00e9 le 10 juillet<\/a>, qui \u00e9tudie le cas iranien et prend tr\u00e8s nettement position contre l’\u00e9ventualit\u00e9 d’une attaque militaire contre l’Iran. (Il s’agit de Iran’s Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities<\/em>, 156 pages, sous la direction de l’\u00e9conomiste Keith Crane, chercheur \u00e0 la RAND.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abthe RAND study bolsters those who favor engagement with Iran, even as it also supports the maintenance of certain kinds of sanctions, notably the embargo on certain high-tech gas liquefaction technologies, as a bargaining chip for future negotiations with Tehran. To increase pressure on the regime, the report also recommends expanding contingency plans to seize Iranian foreign bank and commercial accounts and encouraging US allies to bar certain Iranian officials associated with the nuclear program from obtaining visas for foreign travel.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAs for the possibility of an attack, however, the report is clear that such an option will almost certainly be counterproductive., particularly with respect to Washington’s hopes that it could result in diminished support for the regime or even its overthrow.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA large majority of Iranians strongly believe that Iran has the same right as other nations to develop nuclear energy, including the construction and operation of nuclear enrichment facilities, it said. If Iran’s facilities were to be bombed, public support for any retaliation its government took would likely be widespread. The most likely response, indeed, would be a strong push to retaliate (as) [c]ritics of such a policy would likely choose to keep sillent in the nationalist backlash that would ensue.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMoreover, such an attack would be unlikely to stop the Iranian nuclear program, according to the authors. While it might set back the economy in certain ways, the resulting increase in oil prices would enable the government to finance the reconstruction of the facility and continue the current program without major budgetary consequences.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAnother option, a blockade of Kharg Island, Iran’s main loading terminal, or the Straits of Hormuz to prevent Iranian oil from being exported, would indeed have a devastating effect\u00a0\u00bb on Iran’s economy, but it would also probably do more to solidify public support for the regime than weaken it, according to the report, which also noted the likelihood that such a step would ensure a sharp rise in global oil prices and probably result in Iranian attacks on tanker traffic in the Gulf.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe report also warned against covert action programs designed to aid minority opposition groups, as Iranian security forces have convincingly shown that they can handle restive ethnic groups, and violent opposition to Iranian rule is more likely to entrench the current security and political forces than to elicit a positive change in regime policies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbInstead, Washington should concentrate its efforts on fostering conditions for a more pluralistic Iran in favor of a more patient approach toward a regime that the report said \u00a0\u00bbmost Iranians perceive …as legitimate.\u00a0\u00bb It called for greater funding for programs that facilitate contacts between Iranians and US citizens and to encourage US officials and citizens to provide interviews and commentary for Iranian media… At the same time, it should mute US policy statements advocating regime change as the government often uses these as an excuse for detaining individuals seeking more freedom.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl s’agit d’une publication int\u00e9ressante et extr\u00eamement significative du point de vue politique. Les arguments donn\u00e9s dans le rapport sont int\u00e9ressants mais n’ont rien de r\u00e9volutionnaire. Ils d\u00e9veloppent la position habituelle des mod\u00e9r\u00e9s washingtoniens, ou r\u00e9alistes, adversaires du syst\u00e9matisme de la politique belliciste des \u00e9l\u00e9ments extr\u00e9mistes de l’administration Bush. L’important, dans ce cas, est \u00e9videmment qu’il s’agisse de la RAND Corporation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCet institut, fond\u00e9e en 1946 est une \u00e9manation directe de l’U.S. Air Force, alors sur le point de devenir une arme ind\u00e9pendante, l’USAAF (pour United States Army Air Force) se transformant en USAF (United States Air Force). (RAND est une abr\u00e9viation acronymique de Research ANd Development, indiquant l’orientation du d\u00e9veloppement technologique maximal qui est l’axe central de d\u00e9veloppement de l’USAF.) Le fondateur de la RAND est le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Henry Hap Arnold, chef d’\u00e9tat-major de l’USAAF \u00e0 cette \u00e9poque, et son financier de d\u00e9part la Douglas Aircraft Corporation. La RAND est le produit type du complexe militaro-industriel, dont l’USAAF\/USAF fut le moteur initial pour sa structuration d\u00e9finitive de l’apr\u00e8s-guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa RAND est rest\u00e9e tr\u00e8s proche de l’USAF et ses prises de position sur les questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale refl\u00e8tent le plus souvent les opinions de l’USAF, dans tous les cas, sur les sujets essentiels, elles ne les contredisent jamais. Ce rapport signifie donc que l’USAF est plut\u00f4t favorable \u00e0 une approche diplomatique et mod\u00e9r\u00e9e de la question iranienne, et d\u00e9favorable \u00e0 l’option de l’attaque militaire. C’est une indication int\u00e9ressante dans la mesure o\u00f9, l’ann\u00e9e derni\u00e8re<\/a> encore, on estimait l’USAF favorable \u00e0 une telle attaque. Le rapport de la RAND indique bien qu’il y a eu \u00e9volution de l’USAF, qui \u00e9pouse l’\u00e9volution g\u00e9n\u00e9rale surtout marqu\u00e9e ces deux derniers mois, avec l’affaiblissement acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e de l’option militaire contre l’Iran. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 31juillet 2008 \u00e0 08H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" L’hypoth\u00e8se d’une attaque US contre l’Iran est de plus en plus en d\u00e9faveur dans l’opinion des experts US, alors que l’autorit\u00e9 de l’administration GW Bush (o\u00f9 l’on trouve encore quelques partisans de cette attaque, dont Cheney) est aujourd’hui quasi inexistante. Un nouvel \u00e9l\u00e9ment, signal\u00e9 aujourd’hui par Jim Lobe sur Antiwar.com, renforce cette \u00e9volution. Lobe commente… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2773,2895,41],"class_list":["post-70086","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-iran","tag-rand","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70086","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70086"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70086\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70086"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70086"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70086"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}