On c\u00e9l\u00e8bre ces jours-ci le premier anniversaire de la crise financi\u00e8re du monde et l’on en est encore tout \u00e9bahi. C’est ce qui caract\u00e9rise effectivement, en plus des d\u00e9tails techniques, le premier texte, publi\u00e9 ce 3 ao\u00fbt<\/a>, d’une s\u00e9rie d’articles que le Financial Times<\/em>(FT) consacre \u00e0 cette c\u00e9l\u00e9bration. Un an d\u00e9j\u00e0 et, plus que jamais, les couleurs de l’incertitude jusqu’\u00e0 l’angoisse irr\u00e9pressible, o\u00f9 tout cela s’arr\u00eatera-t-il? \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re d’une crise que toutes les autorit\u00e9s et sommit\u00e9s authoritative<\/em> ne virent pas un instant venir, m\u00eame si Hiroshi Nakaso se doutait de quelque chose (\u00abJust over a year ago, Hiroshi Nakaso, a senior official at the Bank of Japan, started to fear that the global financial system was heading for a jolt. Back then, most American policymakers assumed that the western banking system was extraordinarily strong. Thus while US mortgage defaults were rising, western officials were convinced that such losses would be easily contained<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tC’est l\u00e0 le premier constat: rien, nous ne v\u00eemes rien venir, se lamentent les dirigeants du syst\u00e8me (sauf Hiroshi Nakaso). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhat has made this upheaval so shocking is not simply its scale and duration but the fact that almost all western policymakers and bankers were caught unawares. If you had said a year ago that America could suffer a banking crisis on the scale of Japan, people would have laughed, one former senior US regulator admits.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOr as the Bank for International Settlements, which groups central banks, observes in its latest annual report: The duration of the turmoil, its scope and the growing evidence of effects on the real economy have come as a great surprise to most commentators, private as well as public.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tQuelle est la cause de la crise, finalement? Pour notre go\u00fbt, l’int\u00e9r\u00eat de l’analyse du FT est effectivement moins dans son aspect technique que dans son aspect psychologique implicite, c’est-\u00e0-dire, pour ce cas, qui va de soi. Les certitudes du syst\u00e8me reposaient, et reposent encore sans nul doute, sur une foi g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui prend en compte le principe progressiste de la vertu de l’innovation; il s’agit bien de la foi dans le Progr\u00e8s. Il y a effectivement dans l’optimisme aveugle des op\u00e9rateurs, pl\u00e9onasme in\u00e9vitable dirions-nous, tant il nous semble que l’optimisme aujourd’hui implique l’aveuglement, quelque chose d’in\u00e9luctable et d’in\u00e9vitable. On ne peut prendre une part significative dans l’activit\u00e9 et l’activisme du syst\u00e8me, et ne pas partager en m\u00eame temps la vision n\u00e9cessairement optimiste (aveugle) qu’il offre. Il s’agit d’une sorte de logique in vitro<\/em> consubstantielle, ou bien une sorte de s\u00e9lection naturelle pour participer \u00e0 l’activit\u00e9 de l’artefact qu’est le syst\u00e8me financier; pour garder sa coh\u00e9rence et sa coh\u00e9sion initiales, ce syst\u00e8me ne peut concevoir comme assise de sa d\u00e9marche que cet optimisme qui se vit finalement comme une foi. Le FT parle effectivement de faith<\/em> et \u00e9nonce les trois articles of faith<\/em> qui ont conduit le syst\u00e8me dans son fonctionnement et dans sa chute. C’est effectivement retrouver l’\u00e9tat de l’esprit des ann\u00e9es 1920, avant la Chute. (Voir notamment notre texte<\/a> sur le soleil noir de la Beat Generation<\/em>: \u00abA l’\u00e9t\u00e9 1929, cet \u00e9tat d’\u00e2me \u00e9tait proche de l’extase. L’astrologue Evangeline Adams, interrog\u00e9e par WJZ Radio sur les perspectives de la bourse, avait pr\u00e9dit aux Am\u00e9ricains : The Dow Jones could climb to Heaven.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAinsi le FT nous \u00e9nonce-t-il les trois articles de foi qui pr\u00e9sidaient aux destin\u00e9es du syst\u00e8me financier:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe first of th\u00e8se<\/em> [articles of faith<\/em>] was a belief that modern capital markets had become so much more advanced than their predecessors that banks would always be able to trade debt securities. This encouraged banks to keep lowering lending standards, since they assumed they could sell the risk on. Abundant market liquidity led some firms to overestimate the market’s capacity to absorb risk, says the Institute of International Finance, a Washington-based lobby group, in a recent report. The same buoyant environment resulted in market pressure for high returns … and high levels of competition among financial firms.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSecond, many investors assumed that the credit rating agencies offered an easy and cost-effective compass with which to navigate this ever more complex world. Thus many continued to purchase complex securities throughout the first half of 2007 even though most investors barely understood these products.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut third, and perhaps most crucially, there was a widespread assumption that the process of slicing and dicing debt had made the financial system more stable. Policymakers thought that because the pain of any potential credit defaults was spread among millions of investors, rather than concentrated in particular banks, it would be much easier for the system to absorb shocks than in the past. People had looked at what had happened to the Japanese banks and said, this simply cannot happen here’, because the banks were no longer holding all the credit risk, one senior European policymaker recalls.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEt nous en sommes un an plus tard. La chute intervenue entre temps ne fut pas pr\u00e9vue parce qu’elle ne pouvait pas l’\u00eatre. Vous ne pouvez demander \u00e0 des croyants d’anticiper la chute de leur foi, cela n’a aucun sens. Cette situation, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la foi comme moteur principal du syst\u00e8me, implique que toutes les critiques contre lui n’ont aucun sens, critiques de l’impr\u00e9vision, de l’immoralit\u00e9, de l’irresponsabilit\u00e9. De m\u00eame, on ne voit pas comment le syst\u00e8me pourrait se raisonner, se r\u00e9former, se restructurer d’une mani\u00e8re durable. La raison, y compris la raison du technicien, n’y a pas une place d\u00e9cisive, elle doit se soumettre n\u00e9cessairement au diktat<\/em> de la foi.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe FT ne p\u00eache pas, lui, par optimisme pour ce qui concerne l’avenir, et la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence d\u00e9sormais obsessionnelle \u00e0 la Grande Crise est bien pr\u00e9sente: \u00abA year later, there is still no sign of an end to these problems. Instead, the sense of pressure on western banks has risen so high that by some measures this is now the worst financial crisis seen in the west for 70 years.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 4 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 13H57<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On c\u00e9l\u00e8bre ces jours-ci le premier anniversaire de la crise financi\u00e8re du monde et l’on en est encore tout \u00e9bahi. C’est ce qui caract\u00e9rise effectivement, en plus des d\u00e9tails techniques, le premier texte, publi\u00e9 ce 3 ao\u00fbt, d’une s\u00e9rie d’articles que le Financial Times(FT) consacre \u00e0 cette c\u00e9l\u00e9bration. Un an d\u00e9j\u00e0 et, plus que jamais,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5463,3228,2851,7709,7224,3014,2852],"class_list":["post-70093","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anniversaire","tag-crise","tag-financial","tag-financier","tag-foi","tag-systeme","tag-times"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70093","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70093"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70093\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70093"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70093"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70093"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}