Il est bon de pouvoir signaler de la part d’un homme qui est manifestement Am\u00e9ricain et am\u00e9ricaniste, une si forte et belle compr\u00e9hension, voire une si r\u00e9elle bienveillance teint\u00e9e de nostalgie (nostalgie, peut-\u00eatre, que l’am\u00e9ricanisme ne soit pas de la m\u00eame sorte?), de ce que repr\u00e9sente Soljenitsyne<\/a> en fait d'\u00a0\u00bb\u00e2me russe\u00a0\u00bb. C’est le cas de Friedman, George pas Thomas, le directeur de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d’analyse Stratfor. Son texte du 5 août<\/a>, sur «Solzhenitsyn and the Struggle for Russia’s Soul<\/em>», est un mod\u00e8le du genre, de compr\u00e9hension, – une compr\u00e9hension paradoxale de la part d’un sp\u00e9cialiste de la g\u00e9opolitique r\u00e9aliste, – du r\u00f4le et de la dimension spirituelle d’Alexandre Soljenitsyne dans la trag\u00e9die incroyable qu’a connue la Russie au XX\u00e8me si\u00e8cle, et dans la r\u00e9surrection possible de \u00ab\u00a0Mother Russia<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Friedman situe parfaitement l’importance de Soljenitsyne, qui est li\u00e9e \u00e0 une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 qui est celle de la nation russe. Il indique bien comment Soljenitsyne a fait un travail de d\u00e9structuration (celui de l’imposture communiste, en exposant par ses \u00e9crits les souffrances dont cette imposture est la cause) et un travail de restructuration parall\u00e8le (celui de l'\u00a0\u00bb\u00e2me russe\u00a0\u00bb, en exposant par ses \u00e9crits l’aspect commun et collectif de cette souffrance commune engendr\u00e9e par l’imposture); ce travail de restructuration ne peut s’accomplir en tant que tel qu’en identifiant et en d\u00e9non\u00e7ant l’autre adversaire d\u00e9structurant, – l’imposture lib\u00e9rale et individualiste, qui prosp\u00e8re sur les ruines du communisme, en s’affirmant comme une imposture peut-\u00eatre plus perverse encore dans son universalit\u00e9 accomplie que celle qu’elle remplace.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «There are many people who write history. There are very few who make history through their writings. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who died this week at the age of 89, was one of them. In many ways, Solzhenitsyn laid the intellectual foundations for the fall of Soviet communism. That is well known. But Solzhenitsyn also laid the intellectual foundation for the Russia that is now emerging. That is less well known, and in some ways more important.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ce qui est remarquable dans le texte de Friedman, c’est qu’un homme qui s’est manifest\u00e9 souvent comme profond\u00e9ment am\u00e9ricaniste puisse si bien exposer la puissance du concept spirituel de nation (l’\u00e2me russe) en marquant pourtant combien ce concept est \u00e9tranger \u00e0 l’am\u00e9ricanisme. (C’est pourquoi nous parlerions de nostalgie \u00e0 propos de son commentaire: on a bien plus d’une fois la sensation, \u00e0 la lecture de ce texte, que Friedman regrette que les conceptions et la psychologie am\u00e9ricanistes, si \u00e9trang\u00e8res \u00e0 la vision de Soljenitsyne, n’en soient pas au contraire impr\u00e9gn\u00e9es.) Son analyse de l’action de Soljenitsyne, action involontaire autant que volontaire, est remarquable pour un sp\u00e9cialiste de la g\u00e9opolitique, en ridiculisant in fine<\/em> l’importance accord\u00e9e aux notions de force et de pression brutale qui caract\u00e9risent si grandement la politique am\u00e9ricaniste. La description que fait Friedman de la convergence entre les conceptions de Soljenitsyne et l’\u00e9volution actuelle de la Russie marque effectivement sa compr\u00e9hension de l’importance du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qu’il d\u00e9crit, notamment en avan\u00e7ant l’id\u00e9e que Soljenitsyne n’a fait que d\u00e9crire et repr\u00e9senter une force puissante, promise \u00e0 rejaillir, qui est la r\u00e9surgence de \u00ab\u00a0la Russie traditionnelle\u00a0\u00bb par sa propre dynamique de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 («[T]he traditional Russia that Solzhenitsyn celebrated is emerging, more from its own force than by political d\u00e9cisions<\/em>»). C’est, indirectement, une formidable critique de la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste et une critique aussi forte de la modernit\u00e9 dans sa phase grim\u00e9e en postmoderne (Friedman serait-il un \u00ab\u00a0anti-moderne\u00a0\u00bb?).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «Think now of the Russia that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev are shaping. The Russian Orthodox Church is undergoing a massive resurgence, the market is submitting to the state, free expression is being tempered and so on. We doubt Putin was reading Solzhenitsyn when reshaping Russia. But we do believe that Solzhenitsyn had an understanding of Russia that towered over most of his contemporaries. And we believe that the traditional Russia that Solzhenitsyn celebrated is emerging, more from its own force than by political decisions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Solzhenitsyn served Western purposes when he undermined the Soviet state. But that was not his purpose. His purpose was to destroy the Soviet state so that his vision of Russia could re-emerge. When his interests and the West’s coincided, he won the Nobel Prize. When they diverged, he became a joke. But Solzhenitsyn never really cared what Americans or the French thought of him and his ideas. He wasn’t speaking to them and had no interest or hope of remaking them. Solzhenitsyn was totally alien to American culture. He was speaking to Russia and the vision he had was a resurrection of Mother Russia, if not with the czar, then certainly with the church and state. That did not mean liberalism; Mother Russia was dramatically oppressive. But it was neither a country of mass murder nor of vulgar materialism.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »It must also be remembered that when Solzhenitsyn spoke of Russia, he meant imperial Russia at its height, and imperial Russia’s borders at its height looked more like the Soviet Union than they looked like Russia today. \u00ab\u00a0August 1914\u00a0\u00bb is a book that addresses geopolitics. Russian greatness did not have to express itself via empire, but logically it should — something to which Solzhenitsyn would not have objected.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Solzhenitsyn could not teach Americans, whose intellectual genes were incompatible with his. But it is hard to think of anyone who spoke to the Russian soul as deeply as he did. He first ripped Russia apart with his indictment. He was later ignored by a Russia out of control under former President Boris Yeltsin. But today’s Russia is very slowly moving in the direction that Solzhenitsyn wanted. And that could make Russia extraordinarily powerful. Imagine a Soviet Union not ruled by thugs and incompetents. Imagine Russia ruled by people resembling Solzhenitsyn’s vision of a decent man.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Solzhenitsyn was far more prophetic about the future of the Soviet Union than almost all of the Ph.D.s in Russian studies. Entertain the possibility that the rest of Solzhenitsyn’s vision will come to pass. It is an idea that ought to cause the world to be very thoughtful.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mis en ligne le 6 août 2008 \u00e0 18H11<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Bravo Friedman (George, pas Thomas) Il est bon de pouvoir signaler de la part d’un homme qui est manifestement Am\u00e9ricain et am\u00e9ricaniste, une si forte et belle compr\u00e9hension, voire une si r\u00e9elle bienveillance teint\u00e9e de nostalgie (nostalgie, peut-\u00eatre, que l’am\u00e9ricanisme ne soit pas de la m\u00eame sorte?), de ce que repr\u00e9sente Soljenitsyne en fait d’\u00a0\u00bb\u00e2me… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7715,1268,4194,2884,4033,3160],"class_list":["post-70099","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-ame","tag-friedman","tag-nation","tag-russe","tag-soljenitsyne","tag-stratfor"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70099","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70099"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70099\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70099"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70099"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70099"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}