internal Stratfor document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts<\/em>\u00bb. Il s’agit donc des lignes g\u00e9n\u00e9rales d’analyse de la situation de ce groupe, des fondements de son appr\u00e9ciation pour la crise qui s’est ouverte entre la G\u00e9orgie, l’Oss\u00e9tie et la Russie. Pour Stratfor, l’important dans ce qui se passe dans le conflit d’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud, c’est la r\u00e9action de la Russie. En accord avec la ligne g\u00e9n\u00e9rale expos\u00e9e plus haut, Stratfor affirme depuis que le Kosovo est ind\u00e9pendant que Moscou doit r\u00e9agir et va r\u00e9agir. L’intervention rapide de la Russie face \u00e0 l’attaque g\u00e9orgienne est, pour Stratfor, la r\u00e9action russe \u00e0 l’action unilat\u00e9rale de l’Occident dans l’affaire du Kosovo. D’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, c’est l’affirmation russe que les pressions (\u00e9largissement de l’OTAN, anti-missiles, en plus du Kosovo) contre la Russie doivent cesser.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tNous pensons que cette sorte d’analyse, appuy\u00e9e sur une r\u00e9elle compr\u00e9hension du contexte historique du point de vue de la psychologie plus que des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, donne une vision plus int\u00e9ressante, voire clairement rafra\u00eechissante, que les innombrables querelles d’historiens sur la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 des uns et des autres, et, encore plus, que les analyses contraintes par une propagande anti-russe massive de la plupart des sp\u00e9cialistes occidentaux. Nous donnons ci-dessous l’essentiel de cette analyse interne de Stratfor:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abGiven the speed with which the Russians reacted to Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, Moscow was clearly ready to intervene. We suspect the Georgians were set up for this in some way, but at this point the buildup to the conflict no longer matters. What matters is the message that Russia is sending to the West.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbRussian President Dmitri Medvedev summed this message up best: Historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbStrategically, we said Russia would respond to Kosovo’s independence, and they have. Russia is now declaring the Caucasus to be part of its sphere of influence. We have spoken for months of how Russia would find a window of opportunity to redefine the region. This is happening now.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAll too familiar with the sight of Russian tanks, the Baltic countries are terrified of what they face in the long run, and they should be. This is the first major Russian intervention since the fall of the Soviet Union. Yes, Russia has been involved elsewhere. Yes, Russia has fought. But this is on a new order of confidence and indifference to general opinion. We will look at this as a defining moment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe most important reaction will not be in the United States or Western Europe. It is the reaction in the former Soviet states that matters most right now. That is the real audience for this. Watch the reaction of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Balts. How will Russia’s moves affect them psychologically?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe Russians hold a trump card with the Americans: Iran. They can flood Iran with weapons at will. The main U.S. counter is in Ukraine and Central Asia, but is not nearly as painful.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 9 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 05H53<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d’analyse US Stratfor est int\u00e9ressante \u00e0 suivre dans la question du conflit d’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud. Alors que son orientation est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral clairement am\u00e9ricaniste, que son outil d’analyse est essentiellement g\u00e9opolitique, Stratfor a aussi une appr\u00e9ciation originale par rapport au courant de la pens\u00e9e US de l’importance de l’esprit national. On a lu… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5519,3085,7721,2730,3160],"class_list":["post-70105","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-georgie","tag-kosovo","tag-ossetie","tag-russie","tag-stratfor"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70105","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70105"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70105\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70105"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70105"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70105"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}