enormous amount of frustration with the reckless behaviour of the Georgian president at this moment<\/em>. Qu’est-ce que c’est qu’une politique qui semble se d\u00e9terminer entre entre sympathie et frustration, tout cela pour une direction politique g\u00e9orgienne dont la qualit\u00e9 est bien connue comme du niveau des bas-fond, dont la politique manipulatrice est observ\u00e9e de jour en jour et ainsi de suite? Une politique se fonde sur une analyse strat\u00e9gique d’une situation, sur l’\u00e9valuation des int\u00e9r\u00eats en pr\u00e9sence et sur un but g\u00e9n\u00e9ral bien affirm\u00e9 (suggestion pour ce but: recherche d’un \u00e9quilibre harmonieux, mais cette recette ne semble pas convenir \u00e0 nos strat\u00e8ges). Les constats de Jonathan Eyal sont par cons\u00e9quent \u00e0 l’aune de cette politique r\u00e9duite aux sentiments de midinette dict\u00e9s par la classe m\u00e9diatique et les humeurs de salon.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tSelon Eyal, si Saakachvili l’avait emport\u00e9 dans les 48 heures avec son coup de poker, l’Ouest aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 entra\u00een\u00e9 dans a diplomatic involvement on the ground<\/em>; si la guerre \u00e9volue en un conflit majeur, the predicament for the west is acute and the crisis would be the worst crisis in Europe since the end of communism<\/em>. Alors, il faut tr\u00e8s vite parvenir \u00e0 un cessez-le-feu? Comment? Qui va y parvenir? Et qui envisage quelque cgose qui ressemblerait \u00e0 une victoire russe, laquelle obligerait les Occidentaux \u00e0 reconsid\u00e9rer toute leur strat\u00e9gie (?) vis-\u00e0-vis de la Russie, notamment en r\u00e9visant leurs diverses ambitions de contraintes et de pression?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLa description de Jonathan Eyal est d\u00e9senchant\u00e9e. L’expert ne parvient pas vraiment \u00e0 pr\u00e9senter un argument strat\u00e9gique convaincant simplement parce qu’il n’y en a pas. Il ne fait que d\u00e9crire une situation inextricable o\u00f9 l’issue, n’importe quelle issue, semble comporter pour l’Ouest bien plus d’inconv\u00e9nients que d’avantages. En laissant aller la politique selon les pr\u00e9ceptes am\u00e9ricanistes de puissance, d’absence de contr\u00f4le r\u00e9el, de certitude arrogante, l’Ouest s’est li\u00e9 \u00e0 des personnages douteux, dont Saakachvili est un exemplaire de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence. Il va falloir assumer, et la perspective n’est pas exaltante.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abIt is clearly a calculated gamble by the Georgians. If they manage to overrun South Ossetia, where there are probably only around 1,000 Russian troops at the moment, they will have humiliated Russia and would have created a triumph for themselves. They will also have propelled the west into a diplomatic involvement on the ground.<\/em> ()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tRussia could not afford to stand quietly by while Georgia made such a public assault on its troops stationed in the region. There is an element of trying to call the Russians’ bluff by assuming that the Russians will not be able to afford all-out war in Georgia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbI personally don’t buy that Putin cannot afford to be seen to be humiliated in such a brazen, public way. It’s inconceivable that the Russians will sit quietly by. The only possible outcome is that either a ceasefire is negotiated and a mediation effort begins, or it goes out into an all-out war.<\/em> ()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIf it goes into an all out war, the predicament for the west is acute and the crisis would be the worst crisis in Europe since the end of communism. It would be much worse than the Yugoslav wars, mainly because it has the old traditional element of an east-west confrontation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThere is considerable sympathy for Georgia among western governments such as the US and London. It is clear that the Russians have fermented the separatist movement for a particular strategic purpose. There is also, however, an enormous amount of frustration with the reckless behaviour of the Georgian president at this moment.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 9 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 12H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Parmi les experts consult\u00e9s, l’avis de Jonathan Eyal, directeur des \u00e9tudes au Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), est int\u00e9ressant dans la mesure o\u00f9 il r\u00e9sume bien la position dominante \u00e0 l’Ouest, fortement influenc\u00e9e par les Anglo-Saxons. Il s’agit de la position dominante simplement par absence d’alternative, parce qu’aucune alternative ne s’est r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9e \u00e0 l’Ouest. La… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3877,398,7164,5519,2897,2730],"class_list":["post-70107","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anglo-saxons","tag-europe","tag-eyal","tag-georgie","tag-rusi","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70107","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70107"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70107\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70107"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70107"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70107"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}