{"id":70109,"date":"2008-08-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-08-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/08\/10\/laide-militaire-us-et-les-forces-georgiennes\/"},"modified":"2008-08-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-08-10T00:00:00","slug":"laide-militaire-us-et-les-forces-georgiennes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/08\/10\/laide-militaire-us-et-les-forces-georgiennes\/","title":{"rendered":"L’aide militaire US et les forces g\u00e9orgiennes"},"content":{"rendered":"

La pr\u00e9sence militaire US en G\u00e9orgie est forte et constante depuis quelques ann\u00e9es. Des liens sp\u00e9ciaux ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tablis, sp\u00e9cifiquement avec le Pentagone qui consid\u00e8re la G\u00e9orgie comme un relais particuli\u00e8rement pr\u00e9cieux sur les fronti\u00e8res de la Russie. Comme nous l’avons d\u00e9j\u00e0<\/a> observ\u00e9, la G\u00e9orgie a une place particuli\u00e8re dans le dispositif du Pentagone, qui diff\u00e8re des liens \u00e9tablis avec d’autres pays de la r\u00e9gion autour de la Russie (\u00abla G\u00e9orgie tient une place privil\u00e9gi\u00e9e dans la dynamique du Pentagone; ce n’est certes pas \u00e0 la hauteur de la position d’Isra\u00ebl pour le Moyen-Orient mais c’est le m\u00eame principe: constituer un foyer de puissance d\u00e9stabilisatrice pour entretenir dans une vaste zone strat\u00e9gique une tension permettant, para\u00eet-il, aux int\u00e9r\u00eats du complexe de se placer<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette situation, particuli\u00e8rement importante du point de vue militaire, a \u00e9t\u00e9 clairement per\u00e7ue par les G\u00e9orgiens comme une incitation des USA \u00e0 se pr\u00e9parer pour la reconqu\u00eate des r\u00e9gions de la G\u00e9orgie ayant proclam\u00e9 leur autonomie. Des impressions recueillies par Nathan Hodge, du site Danger Room<\/em>, qui a visit\u00e9 la zone \u00e0 plusieurs reprises, donnent une id\u00e9e de l’implication US en G\u00e9orgie et du sentiment des G\u00e9orgiens \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard de cet engagement. Des extraits de deux textes de Nathan Hodge peuvent \u00eatre cit\u00e9s pour \u00e9clairer ce constat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Dans un premier texte du 8 ao\u00fbt<\/a> : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abSince early 2002, the U.S. government has given a healthy amount of military aid to Georgia. When I last visited South Ossetia, Georgian troops manned a checkpoint outside Tskhinvali decked out in surplus U.S. Army uniforms and new body armor.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe first U.S. aid came under the rubric of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (ostensibly to counter alleged Al Qaeda influence in the Pankisi Gorge); then, under the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program. Georgia returned the favor, committing thousands of troops to the multi-national coalition in Iraq. Last fall, the Georgians doubled their contingent, making them the third-largest contributor to the coalition. Not bad for a nation of 4.6 million people.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLeaving aside the question of Russian interference, the larger concern has been that Georgia might be tempted to use its newfound military prowess to resolve domestic conflicts by force. As Sergei Shamba, the foreign affairs minister of Abkhazia, told me in 2006: The Georgians are euphoric because they have been equipped, trained, that they have gained military experience in Iraq. It feeds this revanchist mood How can South Ossetia be demilitarized, when all of Georgia is bristling with weaponry, and it’s only an hour’s ride by tank from Tbilisi to Tskhinvali?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOne of the U.S. military trainers put it to me a bit more bluntly. We’re giving them the knife, he said. Will they use it?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Dans un second texte, \u00e9galement du 8 ao\u00fbt<\/a>, on trouve des \u00e9chos encore plus pr\u00e9cis sur la perception des G\u00e9orgiens du soutien que leur apportent les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abSince 2002, the U.S. military has been providing Georgia with a serious amount of military assistance, beginning with the Georgia Train and Equip Program in 2002. I first visited Georgia’s Krtsanisi training range in fall of 2002, when the Georgian military was still little more of a militia, with some of the troops wearing sneakers and surplus Soviet uniforms. The U.S. trainers carried sidearms mostly, as I was told later, to deal with the threat of wild dogs roaming the training ground.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhen I returned to Krtsanisi in early 2006, the place had been transformed into a model base. It even had a sparkling new KBR-style dining facility. The Georgian troops were smartly decked out in U.S.-style uniforms; they were preparing for a troop rotation in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOfficially, SSOP was supposed to prepare Georgians for service in Iraq. But Georgian trainees I spoke to in 2006 at the Krtsanisi training range saw things a bit differently. A female sergeant told me: This training is incredibly important for us, because we want to take back Georgia’s lost territories.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tConcernant le volume des forces g\u00e9orgiennes et leur rapport avec les forces d’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud, l’agence Novosti rapportait hier<\/a> ces informations (bien entendu, les effectifs et \u00e9quipements des forces d’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud sont donn\u00e9s \u00e0 titre purement indicatif, l’arm\u00e9e russe ayant pris en charge l’essentiel de la bataille):<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abLes forces arm\u00e9es g\u00e9orgiennes qui comptent 30.000 hommes, dont 20.000 pour l’arm\u00e9e de terre, sont douze fois plus importantes que les forces sud-oss\u00e8tes comptant pr\u00e8s de 2.500 hommes plus 16.000 r\u00e9servistes, \u00e9crit la version \u00e9lectronique du journal Rossi\u00efska\u00efa Gazeta.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbL’arm\u00e9e g\u00e9orgienne poss\u00e8de plus de 200 chars de fabrication sovi\u00e9tique, dont 40 T-55 et 165 T-72, environ 200 v\u00e9hicules blind\u00e9s de transport et de d\u00e9barquement de troupes. Les troupes g\u00e9orgiennes peuvent \u00eatre appuy\u00e9es par 120 pi\u00e8ces d’artillerie de 122 \u00e0 152 mm de calibre, 40 lance-roquettes multiples et 180 lance-grenades.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbTskhinvali ne peut opposer aux forces blind\u00e9es g\u00e9orgiennes que 15 chars T-55 et T-72, \u00e9crit le journal. L’arm\u00e9e sud-oss\u00e8te dispose de 24 pi\u00e8ces d’artillerie autotract\u00e9es Gvozdika et Akatsia, de 12 mortiers D-30, de 6 lance-roquettes multiples Grad, de 4 canons antichars 100 mm Rapir et d’une trentaine de lance-grenades. D’autre part, l’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud poss\u00e8de 54 v\u00e9hicules blind\u00e9s de transport et de d\u00e9barquement de troupes, \u00e9crit Rossi\u00efska\u00efa Gazeta.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbL’arm\u00e9e de l’air g\u00e9orgienne compte sept avions d’assaut en service Su-25 de diff\u00e9rentes versions. Quatre avions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 obtenus de Mac\u00e9doine o\u00f9 ils \u00e9taient arriv\u00e9s d’Ukraine. Deux Su-25 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 modernis\u00e9s par la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 isra\u00e9lienne Elbit en 2001. L’arm\u00e9e est encore \u00e9quip\u00e9e de 30 h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res, dont huit Mi-24 de combat, rappelle le journal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbD’autre part, Prague a remis \u00e0 la disposition de la G\u00e9orgie 15 avions-\u00e9coles L-29 et L-39 qui peuvent \u00eatre utilis\u00e9s comme des avions d’assaut l\u00e9gers, pr\u00e9cise-t-il.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbL’infanterie sud-oss\u00e8te est \u00e9quip\u00e9e d’armes sovi\u00e9tiques et poss\u00e8de plusieurs dizaines de syst\u00e8mes de missiles antichars Fagot et Konkours. L’arm\u00e9e de l’air de la r\u00e9publique autoproclam\u00e9e compte quatre h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res Mi-8. Les forces antia\u00e9riennes sud-oss\u00e8tes poss\u00e8dent 4 \u00e0 6 batteries Osa, trois Toungouska, trois Chilka, six Strela-10, douze mitrailleuses antia\u00e9riennes coupl\u00e9es ZU-23\/2 23 mm. L’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud dispose d’une centaine de missiles sol-air portable Igla et Strela.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis den ligne le 10 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 07H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La pr\u00e9sence militaire US en G\u00e9orgie est forte et constante depuis quelques ann\u00e9es. Des liens sp\u00e9ciaux ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tablis, sp\u00e9cifiquement avec le Pentagone qui consid\u00e8re la G\u00e9orgie comme un relais particuli\u00e8rement pr\u00e9cieux sur les fronti\u00e8res de la Russie. Comme nous l’avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 observ\u00e9, la G\u00e9orgie a une place particuli\u00e8re dans le dispositif du Pentagone, qui… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5110,5519,3164,7721,2804],"class_list":["post-70109","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aide","tag-georgie","tag-militaire","tag-ossetie","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70109","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70109"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70109\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70109"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70109"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70109"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}