Deux textes int\u00e9ressants ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mis en ligne sur le site YNetNews.com<\/em>, concernant l’engagement d’Isra\u00ebl en G\u00e9orgie, essentiellement comme suppl\u00e9tif des USA pour l’armement, l’\u00e9quipement et l’entra\u00eenement des forces arm\u00e9es g\u00e9orgiennes ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es en vue d’une attaque des territoires contest\u00e9s de l’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud et l’Abkhazie. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUn texte du 16 ao\u00fbt<\/a> rapporte le t\u00e9moignage d’anciens soldats isra\u00e9liens, de retour de G\u00e9orgie o\u00f9 ils avaient ex\u00e9cut\u00e9 un contrat pour Defensive Shield<\/em>, soci\u00e9t\u00e9 priv\u00e9e fournissant des services dans le domaine militaire mise sur pied par le brigadier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Hirsch. (Hirsch avait command\u00e9 une division isra\u00e9lienne lors de la guerre de juillet-ao\u00fbt 2006 contre le Hezbollah; il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 un des officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux mis en cause pour les difficult\u00e9s rencontr\u00e9es par l’IDF [Israel Defense Force] durant ce conflit.) Le deuxi\u00e8me texte, chronologiquement ant\u00e9rieur puisqu’il est du 14 ao\u00fbt<\/a>, rapporte un discours du chef du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, \u00e0 l’occasion du deuxi\u00e8me anniversaire de cette guerre de juillet-ao\u00fbt 2006, mettant justement en cause cet officier pour son r\u00f4le en G\u00e9orgie (\u00abIn speech marking two-year anniversary of Second Lebanon War, Hizbullah secretary-general mocks Israeli political, military leadership: []The entire front line of the army’s brass stepped down because of the war. Gal Hirsch, who was defeated in Lebanon, went to Georgia and they too lost because of him, laughed Nasrallah.<\/em>\u00bb) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici quelques pr\u00e9cisions du texte du 16 ao\u00fbt, qui montrent \u00e9galement que la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 privi\u00e9e Defensive Shield<\/em> agissait avec du mat\u00e9riel officiel d’une fa\u00e7on routini\u00e8re et tr\u00e8s ouverte. On comprend que les autorit\u00e9s isra\u00e9liennes, dans tous les cas l’IDF, soutenaient compl\u00e8tement l’initiative:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abTomer (alias), formerly a soldier of an elite IDF unit, returned from Georgia a short while ago. He was enlisted by Defensive Shield, a company owned and operated by Brigadier General (Res.) Gal Hirsch, to help train Georgian soldiers for battle, but returned disappointed in the manner in which the company handles secret army material.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHirsch’s company was responsible for training an elite search and rescue unit, and training was handled by the companies of two other reserve officers, all of which hired ex-soldiers like Tomer. This resulted in hundreds of former IDF soldiers working as trainers in Georgia over the past few months.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Tomer said he and his friends had at first received guidelines for the handling of covert material, listing what they could and couldn’t tell Georgian soldiers about IDF activities. But in actuality, he said, the Georgians were told top secret information.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhen I arrived in the operations room I saw a book of IDF safety instructions that shouldn’t have been there, he said. There were IDF CDs that explicitly said, ‘Confidential’ documenting army activities, charts from special units’ operations, and officers’ names.\u00a0\u00bb He added that the room was not guarded, making this information easily obtainable to everyone.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbTomer said the main reason for the infidelity was mercenary. The training companies wanted to finish the projects as quickly as possible in order to create more projects and make more money,\u00a0\u00bb he said. We knew the training had to be completed quickly because the soldiers would soon have to get into real military activity. He added that the Georgian officers told their soldiers they would be going to help NATO forces in Iraq, while the real objective was Ossetia and Abkhazia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb According to Tomer, Gal Hirsch came to visit the trainers now and then, but was mostly absent. And when the training was officially over, Tomer did not feel that his soldiers were ready for war. By Israeli standards, the soldiers had almost zero capability and the officers were mediocre, he said. It was clear that taking that army to war was illogical.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLes d\u00e9tails sont nombreux et r\u00e9v\u00e9lateurs. La forme de l’entreprise est elle aussi r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice et confirme tous les soup\u00e7ons et toutes les analyses sur l’implication occidentale (US et suppl\u00e9tifs) en G\u00e9orgie. On comprend que l’implication en G\u00e9orgie est une affaire clairement isra\u00e9lo-am\u00e9ricaniste, o\u00f9 Isra\u00ebl agit comme suppl\u00e9tif des USA; que les relais habituels vers le business<\/em> priv\u00e9 des activit\u00e9s de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 qui s’est formidablement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 depuis 9\/11 fonctionnent \u00e0 plein r\u00e9gime; que le but du renforcement militaire de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e9tait l’attaque contre les territoires contest\u00e9s; que la politique US et assimil\u00e9s \u00e9tait en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l’affaire quasi-exclusive du complexe militaro-industriel US et de son appendice isra\u00e9lien, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn retrouve \u00e9galement tous les caract\u00e8res du syst\u00e8me en pleine d\u00e9cadence. Les int\u00e9r\u00eats priv\u00e9s et personnels dominent tout; le corps des officiers reconvertis dans le priv\u00e9 (isra\u00e9liens dans ce cas, mais sans doute \u00e0 g\u00e9n\u00e9raliser aux USA) est tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9sent dans le domaine de la gestion commerciale (mais certes pas dans celui de l’engagements physiques); les m\u00e9thodes sont celles du secteur priv\u00e9 \u00e0 l’heure de la globalisation: on rogne sur les services, sur le mat\u00e9riel, toutes les proc\u00e9dures de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 vont \u00e0 vau l’eau et ainsi de suite. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPas de surprise. L’aventure de la crise g\u00e9orgienne r\u00e9pond aux crit\u00e8res de l’\u00e9poque et aux crit\u00e8res du syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste. Tout est concentr\u00e9 autour de l’activit\u00e9 du militaire et le Prentagone (le CMI) est le ma\u00eetre d’uvre. Il appara\u00eet tr\u00e8s probable que les pires hypoth\u00e8ses sur les conditions menant \u00e0 cette crise seront confirm\u00e9es. Il ne s’agit pas d’une politique, pas plus que la G\u00e9orgie de Saakachvili n’est une d\u00e9mocratie<\/a> bien s\u00fbr.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPas de surprise puisque le pire est toujours probable, et m\u00eame confirm\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 19 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 12H39<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Deux textes int\u00e9ressants ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mis en ligne sur le site YNetNews.com, concernant l’engagement d’Isra\u00ebl en G\u00e9orgie, essentiellement comme suppl\u00e9tif des USA pour l’armement, l’\u00e9quipement et l’entra\u00eenement des forces arm\u00e9es g\u00e9orgiennes ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es en vue d’une attaque des territoires contest\u00e9s de l’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud et l’Abkhazie. Un texte du 16 ao\u00fbt rapporte le t\u00e9moignage… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-70123","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70123","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70123"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70123\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70123"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70123"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70123"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}