{"id":70133,"date":"2008-08-23T18:29:23","date_gmt":"2008-08-23T18:29:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/08\/23\/le-systeme-bmde-mis-en-perspective-dans-la-crise\/"},"modified":"2008-08-23T18:29:23","modified_gmt":"2008-08-23T18:29:23","slug":"le-systeme-bmde-mis-en-perspective-dans-la-crise","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/08\/23\/le-systeme-bmde-mis-en-perspective-dans-la-crise\/","title":{"rendered":"Le syst\u00e8me BMDE mis en perspective dans la crise"},"content":{"rendered":"

Il faut noter la publication, aux USA, de divers commentaires qui s’attachent d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 ce qui pourrait appara\u00eetre, en perspective, comme le facteur central de la crise g\u00e9orgienne, ou un facteur central de la crise europ\u00e9enne d\u00e9clench\u00e9e par la crise g\u00e9orgienne. La d\u00e9cision de mettre en place le syst\u00e8me anti-missiles US BMDE en Pologne est d\u00e9sormais per\u00e7u comme un \u00e9l\u00e9ment directement antagoniste de la Russie, et dont la dimension strat\u00e9gique est av\u00e9r\u00e9e. Ainsi, les commentaires s’attachent-ils \u00e0 nous d\u00e9crire la logique de l’\u00e9quilibre strat\u00e9gique de la Guerre froide, et la fa\u00e7on dont le d\u00e9ploiement de la BMDE rompt cet \u00e9quilibre. Ce n’est pas une nouvelle Guerre froide qui se met en place mais une Guerre froide d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9e \u00e0 son plus haut niveau (le domaine strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous signalons trois articles mis tous trois en ligne sue Antiwar.om<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Randal Mark<\/a> explique de quelle fa\u00e7on l’introduction des anti-missiles du syst\u00e8me BMDE introduit un facteur paradoxalement (puisqu’il s’agit d’un syst\u00e8me d\u00e9fensif) extr\u00eamement agressif, qui met en cause l’\u00e9quilibre strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire, avec la possibilit\u00e9 ainsi donn\u00e9e aux USA de disposer d’une capacit\u00e9 de premi\u00e8re frappe. (Voir aussi notre F&C<\/em> du 22 ao\u00fbt<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWith this return to the Cold War situation of a direct confrontation between two states with substantial nuclear arsenals, the old unassailable logic of mutually assured destruction and missile defense reasserts itself. In this context, the introduction of US missile defenses to Poland and possibly even Ukraine can be seen for the foolishly provocative acts of aggression they really are. As outlined above, these developments create the potential for a US first strike that Russia simply cannot afford to ignore, in the hands of a state that has launched wars of aggression in Yugoslavia and Iraq, threatens one against Iran, has interfered in the politics of numerous countries through color revolutions, and propagandizes against the Russian threat. In order to deter a US preemptive strike, Russia will feel the need to reinvigorate its military generally, but in response to the installation of US missile defenses, technological enhancement and numerical increases to Russia’s nuclear weapons manifest will be vital.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbGiven the nature of the US regime (and of the hierarchies of both US political parties of power), there is little prospect now of avoiding a drawn out (if we are lucky!) confrontation. Anyone who wishes to understand the underlying truths of the situation, though, must begin with a proper understanding of the strategic missile defense issue, and not the kind of superficial or even outright mendacious propaganda nonsense that passes for analysis in our complicit media.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Ivan Eland<\/a> d\u00e9crit plut\u00f4t l’aspect politique du syst\u00e8me BMDE qui sera install\u00e9 en Pologne, la fa\u00e7on dont il prend sa place dans la politique russe des USA, pour poursuivre le but exactement contrairer \u00e0 celui qui fut proclam\u00e9 d’int\u00e9grer la Russie dans le syst\u00e8me occidental. Au contraire, le BMDE constitue un effort de plus qui tend \u00e0 s’ali\u00e9ner la Russie, \u00e0 \u00e9tablir des rapports structurels d’antagonisme et d’hostilit\u00e9 avec elle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abOf course, the long-standing Republican obsession with missile defense the Bush administration’s preoccupation prior to 9\/11 and after is only the most recent installment is more political than strategic. Missile defenses are very technologically challenging and expensive and can be countered relatively cheaply by building more nuclear-tipped missiles, putting more than one warhead on each missile, or using decoys to fool the system. Besides, the combination of U.S. detection systems that can pinpoint the origin of a nuclear missile launch and the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the most powerful on earth, can deter any new nuclear-armed powers, such as Iran and North Korea, without the need to build an exorbitantly-priced missile defense system. Even the current U.S. missile defense system, a vastly scaled down version of the pie-in-the-sky Star Wars system proposed decades ago during the Reagan administration, was deployed in California and Alaska and is now likely to be deployed in Europe before it has been sufficiently proved technologically a potential nightmare for taxpayers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThat’s where the politics comes in. Republicans, allegedly the party of small government, haven’t minded wasting buckets of money over the years to bring to fruition the vision of their conservative hero Ronald Reagan. The vision thing seems to be especially important after George W. Bush has wrecked the conservative brand name perhaps for decades.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn sum, instead of trying to integrate Russia into the West after the Cold War, the United States alienated it. U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty played a part in bringing about this estrangement. Now in the wake of U.S.-Russian tensions over Georgia, the unnecessary U.S. deployment of missile defense in Europe risks a downward spiral in U.S.-Russian relations into active hostility.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Gordon Prather<\/a> examine un aspect particulier de l’accord entre la Pologne et les USA: le d\u00e9ploiement de missiles Patriot<\/em> PAC-3, qui vont \u00eatre donn\u00e9s \u00e0 la Pologne. Pour Prather, ces Patriot<\/em> sont destin\u00e9s \u00e0 emp\u00eacher une attaque russe contre le site BMDE, attaque qui se ferait probablement avec des SS-26 Iskander<\/em>. Mais les Patriot<\/em>, m\u00eame dans leur version PAC-3, sont loin de pouvoir assurer une telle interception.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abOf course, the Russians are not going to waste an ICBM on Poland. Why should they? The ten GBIs of our GMD system the Poles are allowing to be sited in Poland are less than 150 miles distant from Russia, proper. (And less than that from the Kaliningrad enclave, separated from Russia, proper, by Poland and Lithuania, both now NATO members.)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSo, why was Poland’s key demand that we give them PAC-3 batteries?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWell, during the Iran-Iraq war, each side launched 300 to 400 Soviet-made Scuds at each other’s cities. And, during the first Gulf War, the Iraqis launched another hundred Soviet-made Scuds against Israeli cities and against U.S. staging and support areas in Saudi Arabia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAll the Scuds contained conventional high-explosive warheads. The Scud is a liquid-fueled single-stage ballistic missile that can be somewhat mobile. The warhead remains attached to the missile throughout flight, which frequently results in the missile tumbling’ upon re-entry and breaking apart. It is extremely inaccurate, its trajectory essentially resulting from the point in the trajectory at which the liquid-fueled rocket motor is shut off.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAfter the Gulf War, we instituted a cooperative terminal ABM program with the Israelis. In the process of helping the Israelis develop their Arrow system, we also considerably advanced our Patriot’s capabilities especially the performance of the interceptor. Hence the designation PAC-3.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe PA-3 may or may not be effective against Scuds. But the Russians have since developed and widely deployed a second-generation Scud replacement, the SS-26 Iskander tactical ballistic missile.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abAnd if President McCain was thinking of giving Georgia a few PAC-3 batteries so they could \u00ab\u00a0reclaim\u00a0\u00bb their \u00ab\u00a0lost\u00a0\u00bb provinces from the Russians, maybe he (and the Poles, who might be thinking of \u00ab\u00a0reclaiming\u00a0\u00bb the Kaliningrad enclave) should see a demonstration of the Russian SS-26 Iskander.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes articles illustrent la fa\u00e7on dont le syst\u00e8me BMDE est en train d’\u00e9voluer dans la perception des cercles d’experts et des milieux politiques et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale aux USA. Il est en train de s’inscrire tr\u00e8s rapidement dans une structure strat\u00e9gique dont le potentiel est celui d’un affrontement au plus haut niveau, entre les USA et la Russie, avec des possibilit\u00e9s d’affrontement secondaire, par exemple entre la Russie et la Pologne. Il contribue \u00e0 rendre beaucoup plus dramatique la perception de la situation europ\u00e9enne, avec l’\u00e9volution de la crise g\u00e9orgienne (qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 l’occasion de l’accord BMDE) en une crise strat\u00e9gique centrale europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl est compl\u00e8tement stup\u00e9fiant qu’aucun pays europ\u00e9en n’envisage s\u00e9rieusement cette question, avec l’\u00e9volution du continent europ\u00e9en vers un th\u00e9\u00e2tre d’affrontement potentiel au niveau strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire. M\u00eame du temps de la Guerre froide, une telle situation d\u00e9stabilisatrice, sans que les Europ\u00e9ens aient le moindre mot \u00e0 dire (les Tch\u00e8ques et les Polonais ne jouant strictement aucun r\u00f4le en la mati\u00e8re), n’a jamais exist\u00e9. Les situations d\u00e9stabilisatrices impliquaient des enjeux r\u00e9gionaux, m\u00eame lorsqu’ils \u00e9taient nucl\u00e9aires, et jamais des enjeux strat\u00e9giques nucl\u00e9aires. On pourrait observer ironiquement, ou am\u00e8rement c’est selon, que cette intrusion du potentiel d’affrontement strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire permet d’\u00e9viter le d\u00e9couplage entre l’Europe et les USA, r\u00eave de tout atlantiste bien n\u00e9, non pas pour assurer plus de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e0 l’Europe mais pour lui faire courir plus de risques en l’impliquant dans la politique provocatrice des USA. L’inconscience de pays comme la Pologne et la Tch\u00e9quie qui croit qu’une situation de d\u00e9stabilisation strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire va accoucher miraculeusement d’une stabilit\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 au niveau r\u00e9gional, n’a d’\u00e9gale que celle des pays soi disant responsables (Allemagne, France, UK), qui regardent, se doutent de quelque chose et ne disent strictement rien. Il s’agit d’une pas en avant dans la profonde d\u00e9cadence de la r\u00e9flexion politique et strat\u00e9gique occidentale, qui \u00e9volue selon une philosophie fondamentale de refus de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 23 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 18H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Il faut noter la publication, aux USA, de divers commentaires qui s’attachent d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 ce qui pourrait appara\u00eetre, en perspective, comme le facteur central de la crise g\u00e9orgienne, ou un facteur central de la crise europ\u00e9enne d\u00e9clench\u00e9e par la crise g\u00e9orgienne. La d\u00e9cision de mettre en place le syst\u00e8me anti-missiles US BMDE en Pologne est… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4314,3921,4086,3004,2827,7087,3068,5551,2804],"class_list":["post-70133","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bmde","tag-eland","tag-mark","tag-nucleaire","tag-pologne","tag-prather","tag-strategique","tag-tchequie","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70133","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70133"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70133\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70133"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70133"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70133"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}