28 ao\u00fbt<\/a>, nous donne des indications int\u00e9ressantes sur cette activit\u00e9 d’exportation des armes russes vers le Moyen-Orient. Il donne notamment des indications pr\u00e9cises sur les possibilit\u00e9s de coop\u00e9ration strat\u00e9giques et des armements entre la Russie et la Syrie, depuis la visite du pr\u00e9sident Assad \u00e0 Moscou il y a une dizaine de jours. Il donne \u00e9galement des pr\u00e9cisions sur un autre axe, plus surprenant que Moscou-Damas, et beaucoup moins mis en \u00e9vidence: les possibilit\u00e9s de coop\u00e9ration militaire entre la Russie et la Jordanie, avec une rencontre entre le pr\u00e9sident Medvedev et le roi de Jordanie (le roi Abdallah II a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 Moscou pour visiter l’exposition d’armements MVSV-2008 du 20 au 24 ao\u00fbt).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLes pr\u00e9cisions concernant cette coop\u00e9ration entre la Russie et la Jordanie sont int\u00e9ressantes, dans la mesure o\u00f9 la Jordanie est normalement un pays align\u00e9 sur l’Ouest, tr\u00e8s proche des USA. Petrov pr\u00e9cise que les probl\u00e8mes politiques du Moyen-Orient ont \u00e9t\u00e9 laiss\u00e9s de c\u00f4t\u00e9 durant la rencontre, au profit de la coop\u00e9ration technico-militaire. Mais, dans le contexte de la crise g\u00e9orgienne, peut-\u00eatre au contraire du contexte du Moyen-Orient, cette rencontre et le sujet discut\u00e9 ont un grand sens politique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abOur relations are making good headway, this is our third meeting in six months and that points to the intensity of our contacts and good-neighbor relations, the pr\u00e9sident<\/em> [Medvedev] said, opening the discussion. Trade between our countries grows steadily, although both countries would like to see it develop more quickly, Medvedev said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbJordan lives up to these words. In recent years it has bought from Russia two Il-76MF military transport planes worth a combined $100 million, and six light multi-role Ka-226 helicopters (at an estimated cost of $25 million), which will be assembled in Jordan under license. The two countries have even set up a joint venture, Oboronprom Middle East, to assemble 15 to 20 Ka helicopters a year.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbPlans are also under way to set up a joint venture for the production of RPG-32 Hashim multi-caliber grenade launchers. The launcher was developed by the Bazalt Moscow State Research and Production Enterprise at the suggestion of Abdullah himself.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt is designed to engage armored vehicles and defended gun posts from a distance of up to 700 meters with 72mm and 105mm grenades. It will be produced in quantity both in Russia and in Jordan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbTrial specimens have already been sent to Amman and were highly praised. A manufacturing license contract is expected to be signed soon. Jordan has received a special $350 million credit from Russia for this purpose, although the sum is also supposed to cover repairs and upgrading of weapons previously supplied to Amman.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbOther equipment includes armored personnel carriers, fighting infantry vehicles, Kornet anti-tank missile systems, Igla ground-to-air missiles, and weapons for special operations reconnaissance, sabotage and protection of the royal palace.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbKing Abdullah is a former commando. He is an arms expert, and his buying of Russia’s VSS silent sniper rifles and PSS silent pistols is good publicity for Russian arms-makers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt is not impossible that after his visit to Moscow, Amman will take delivery of Pantsyr-S1 ground-to-air missile systems, which are considered today among the most effective close-range air defense systems.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLa dimension politique de ces questions d’armement est encore plus mise en \u00e9vidence par le passage du texte de Petrov concernant la possible livraison de missiles sol-sol SS-26 Iskander<\/em> \u00e0 la Syrie. On voit qu’il s’agit d’un sujet d\u00e9licat pour Isra\u00ebl, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 impliqu\u00e9 dans les pr\u00e9misses de la crise g\u00e9orgienne. Petrov pr\u00e9cise m\u00eame qu’il y eut, in illo tempore<\/em>, avant la crise g\u00e9orgienne, une intervention personnelle d’Olmert pour que la Russie ne livre pas des SS-26 \u00e0 la Syrie. Quant \u00e0 la situation pr\u00e9sente et malgr\u00e9 l’implication des Isra\u00e9liens dans les pr\u00e9misses de la crise g\u00e9orgienne, il semble que les Russes ne riposteront pas en livrant effectivement des SS-26 \u00e0 la Syrie; ils demanderont certainement en retour \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl certaines attitudes et certains actes politiques en leur faveur dans la crise actuelle. L’affaire est ainsi per\u00e7ue comme politique dans plusieurs dimensions, et elle met bien en \u00e9vidence l’importance pour la Russie de la question des armements.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe Iskander missile had been promised to Damascus in 2001, and only a personal request by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to former President Vladimir Putin put a stop to its sale to Syria.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut now that Israel has helped to train Georgian commandos and equip the Georgian armyuthat attacked South Ossetia, Moscow is within its rights to repay the debt and provide Damascus with the system, the media in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbYet Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters during al-Assad’s visit that Moscow is ready to supply Syria only with defensive weapons, ones that do not upset the balance of strength in the region. This means Syria, as Moscow promised to Tel Aviv, will not get the Iskander system.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 28 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 10H36<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Du roi Abdallah de Jordanie au SS-26, l’arme secr\u00e8te des Russes Une caract\u00e9ristique de la politique russe dans la crise actuelle est la diversit\u00e9 de ses axes d’offensive et l’exploitation rapide de ces axes. Cela conduit souvent \u00e0 une situation o\u00f9 les Occidentaux sont pris par surprise, o\u00f9 sont exploit\u00e9s des domaines inattendus pour ces… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3124,4275,6582,7737,2730,6583,3867],"class_list":["post-70144","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-armement","tag-exportations","tag-iskander","tag-jordanie","tag-russie","tag-ss-26","tag-syrie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70144","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70144"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70144\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70144"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70144"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70144"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}