Un \u00e9ditorial assez court d’Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> du 1er septembre 2008 (acc\u00e8s payant<\/a>) nous donne la vision la plus claire et la plus succincte, pens\u00e9es r\u00e9duite \u00e0 l’essentiel, de la perception de l’hebdomadaire de la crise g\u00e9orgienne. Si l’on s’en tenait l\u00e0, l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement ne serait que mineur. Mais, en raison de la notori\u00e9t\u00e9 de AW&ST<\/em>, des liens qu’il entretient avec le complexe militaro-industriel (CMI), des circonstances pressantes qui justifient ce texte autant que des arguments qu’il d\u00e9ploie et que la conclusion qu’il propose, on peut le prendre pour une fiche-programme, une feuille de route du CMI face \u00e0 la crise g\u00e9orgienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t La narrative<\/em> de la crise est parfaitement conforme \u00e0 la pens\u00e9e des milieux bellicistes et n\u00e9o-conservateurs am\u00e9ricaniste, dont le CMI est le principal pourvoyeur de fond pour leurs activit\u00e9s d’influence. La description et l’interpr\u00e9tation de l’action russe sont conduites selon les consignes, sans originalit\u00e9 particuli\u00e8re mais avec professionnalisme: <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe cold reality is that Moscow’s blunt-force response to Georgia’s ill-advised move against Russian loyalists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia was the clearest signal yet that Russia apparently feels ready to reassert itself militarily, up to and including violating the territorial integrity of a sovereign, democratic country with ties to the West. In the same vein, let’s not forget the not-so-veiled threats Russia has made against Poland, which recently agreed to allow the U.S. to put a PAC-3 missile defense battery in that country.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbGeorgia was no isolated event, but a direct challenge by a resurgent, stridently nationalistic Russia. By now every political leader and military planner throughout NATO should be reassessing how they view Russianot just currently, but five years from now. This is no friend; it is a potential adversary, never to be underestimated.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t L’avenir est clairement d\u00e9fini, on dirait qu’il est \u00e9crit sur le mur qui serait sans doute celui de Berlin, abattu mais toujours bien dress\u00e9, m\u00eame si un peu plus \u00e0 l’Est tout de m\u00eame, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la vigilance de l’OTAN. La description de cet avenir s’appuie sur l’avertissement que la Russie reste plus que jamais (redevient) cette puissance pr\u00e9datrice en mal d’empire, pr\u00eate \u00e0 fondre sur les freedom-loving people<\/em>, que nous avons imprudemment laiss\u00e9e survivre, puis revivre pour redevenir cette menace qui emp\u00eacha pendant un demi-si\u00e8cle l’Occident made in USA<\/em> de faire son uvre philanthropique de transformation du monde en meilleur des mondes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abNext year will mark the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. For much of that time, the U.S. and Europe in particular have pursued a policy of appeasement toward Russiaand look where we are. Its true nature was recently revealed: a country that continues to harbor visions of a larger empire and a readiness to intimidate and use brute military force against freedom-loving people.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRussia isn’t the powerful foe it was during the Cold War. Nonetheless, the message could not be any clearer: continuous vigilance is a must, as is uncompromising support for countries like the Ukraine who need to be able to defend themselves. Finally, Russia’s military romp should leave no doubt about the need for weapons modernization. The next time someone questions the rationale for weapons systems that may have no equal currently such as, say, the F-22 or F-35weapons designed as much to fight the next war as for today’s threatspoint to the country just east of the Ukraine.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl s’agit de sortir l’essentiel de ce bla-bla si engageant. Il suffit de lier une phrase (\u00ab By now every political leader and military planner throughout NATO should be reassessing how they view Russianot just currently, but five years from now.<\/em>\u00bb) \u00e0 l’autre (\u00abThe next time someone questions the rationale for weapons systems that may have no equal currently such as, say, the F-22 or F-35weapons designed as much to fight the next war as for today’s threatspoint to the country just east of the Ukraine<\/em>\u00bb). Nous comprenons alors que la Russie est devenue le principal argument pour lancer un vaste plan de r\u00e9armement \u00e0 long terme, 5 ans pour commencer, cela irait bien, permettant de verrouiller un certain nombre de programmes qui paraissaient si obsol\u00e8tes selon leur r\u00e9f\u00e9rence faite \u00e0 la Guerre froide (premi\u00e8re du nom) et qui sont d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 la pointe du dernier cri des n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s selon leur r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 la nouvelle Guerre froide. Les $750 milliards annuels actuels pour le Pentagone devraient donc d\u00e9sormais \u00eatre d\u00e9sign\u00e9s comme une maigre pitance, simple r\u00e9f\u00e9rence de base pour le r\u00e9armement n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 notre survie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn retrouve dans cet \u00e9ditorial la logique qu’on a d\u00e9j\u00e0<\/a> consid\u00e9r\u00e9e (y compris \u00e0 propos du F-22<\/a>, mentionn\u00e9 dans le texte). Il est ainsi de plus en plus confirm\u00e9 que la nouvelle administration, quelle qu’elle soit, sera soumise \u00e0 une pression consid\u00e9rable pour lancer une nouvelle phase de d\u00e9penses militaires, selon la logique de la Guerre froide retrouv\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 30 ao\u00fbt 2008 \u00e0 16H53<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Un \u00e9ditorial assez court d’Aviation Week & Space Technology du 1er septembre 2008 (acc\u00e8s payant) nous donne la vision la plus claire et la plus succincte, pens\u00e9es r\u00e9duite \u00e0 l’essentiel, de la perception de l’hebdomadaire de la crise g\u00e9orgienne. Si l’on s’en tenait l\u00e0, l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement ne serait que mineur. Mais, en raison de la notori\u00e9t\u00e9… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4195,3806,249,3106,5519,2645,7747,4247],"class_list":["post-70151","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aviation","tag-cmi","tag-f-22","tag-froide","tag-georgie","tag-guerre","tag-rearmement","tag-week"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70151","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70151"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70151\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70151"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70151"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70151"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}