1er septembre<\/a> donne des indications sur une situation qui serait loin d’\u00eatre claire \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. Bri\u00e8vement dit, il appara\u00eetrait possible que l’arm\u00e9e russe ait sa propre politique, plus dure que les consignes du pouvoir politique, ou, dans tous les cas, l’ait eu par instant, notamment au moment de l’annonce du cessez-le-feu (le 12 ao\u00fbt). Cette circonstance expliquerait \u00e9videmment, au moins en partie, la confusion sur le terrain et la pr\u00e9sence persistante des Russes, souvent en contradiction avec des affirmations de la direction politique. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tD’autre part, il n’est pas assur\u00e9 non plus que cette direction politique ne soit pas \u00e9ventuellement bic\u00e9phale, avec Medvedev et Poutine ayant des lignes parfois un peu divergentes (et non pas Medvedev \u00e9tant simplement l’homme de Poutine et rien d’autre), d’ailleurs sans intention affirm\u00e9e de politiques divergentes, mais avec l’effet de rendre l’attitude de la direction politique moins homog\u00e8ne \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard de l’arm\u00e9e. Dmitri Simes, du Nixon Center, qui \u00e9tait \u00e0 Moscou la semaine derni\u00e8re, remarque : \u00abYou have two people who are in charge, one who has full constitutional legitimacy, another has a lot of practical authority, and it would be strange indeed if it did not create an area of ambiguity about who tells who what village to occupy, and how far their patrols are supposed to go. The military is using this area of uncertainty to push their own agenda. They feel proud and a little too euphoric for Russia’s own good,<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’article du Financial Times<\/em> semblerait plut\u00f4t d\u00e9crire une situation pass\u00e9e que d’affirmer que cette situation continue, mais l\u00e0 non plus aucune certitude ne peut \u00eatre avanc\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abAs Russian troops advanced further and further into Georgia last month, some officials within the Kremlin became concerned that frontline officers, or even the military high command of the general staff, were overstepping the limits of their authority.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAt the same time, however, these Russian generals were grumbling to their colleagues that Moscow had undercut them, and they wanted to finish the operation they had started the destruction of the aggressor Georgian army, a mission which a ceasefire signed by Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, on August 12 prevented them from carrying out.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe differences have since been smoothed over, and both sides in the debate are keen to stress that the military men are very comfortable with the political leadership, and vice versa. There won’t be tanks heading for the Kremlin any time soon, joked Aleksander Prokhanov, a rightwing writer known for his close links with the top generals, who almost never speak publicly.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut in a few tense days last month, Russia’s massive military machine roamed across Georgia, seemingly oblivious to orders to the country from the Kremlin. The result is an almost intractable situation on the ground in Georgia, with Russian troops ensconced in a huge swathe of the country’s territory, outside the disputed enclaves which they ostensibly entered to save from Georgian attack.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWhile Russia’s political leadership does not publicly disown these actions, it is not a subject Kremlin officials are eager to discuss.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 2 septembre 2008 \u00e0 12H46<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La situation en G\u00e9orgie, du point de vue militaire russe, d\u00e9pend \u00e9galement d’un facteur extr\u00eamement important et qui appara\u00eet selon diverses informations plut\u00f4t incertain: les relations entre l’arm\u00e9e russe et la direction politique \u00e0 Moscou. Un article du Financial Times du 1er septembre donne des indications sur une situation qui serait loin d’\u00eatre claire \u00e0… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2894,5519,2707,7754,2884,2730],"class_list":["post-70157","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-armee","tag-georgie","tag-moscou","tag-obeissance","tag-russe","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70157","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70157"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70157\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70157"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70157"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70157"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}