.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe trouble is that while the old Europeans left past enmities at the door when they joined the EU that was the whole point of joining too many of the new Europeans saw the EU, like Nato, as a means of pursuing old quarrels from a new position of strength. Recent recriminations in new Europe about who did what under communism demonstrate how much is still not resolved. For these countries, the prospect of a new Cold War is ever-present quite simply because, for them, the old Cold War is not yet at an end.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn 2000, Jacques Chirac’s fears about EU enlargement drew reproaches of condescension and worse. The official US and British view was preferred; that these countries would form a bridge to Russia. Over time, though, M. Chirac looks more right than wrong. Popular European opposition to the Iraq war was less effective than it could have been because of divisions between old and new Europe that were well exploited by the US. As Iraq faded as an issue, EU efforts to reach a realistic and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia were repeatedly thwarted by a chorus of \u00ab\u00a0new\u00a0\u00bb Europeans warning of the worst.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThere are many reasons why the EU should review relations with Russia, most of which predate the recent conflict over South Ossetia. A mutual yes, mutual interest in reliable energy sales and supplies is one. Moscow’s relations with the ethnic Russian populations living within the EU is another; and the permanent demarcation of post-Soviet borders, which requires a resolution of the so-called frozen conflicts such as South Ossetia, is a third.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThat discussions on all these issues are coloured by the very particular experience of the new Europeans is a good part of the explanation why no solutions are being reached. Alas, that failure is now water under a premature enlargement that has proved more of a block than a bridge.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCette vision, qui est implicite dans nombre d’esprit mais qui s’\u00e9claire lorsqu’elle est transcrite dans un texte \u00e9crit, repr\u00e9sente un point tr\u00e8s important, qui rel\u00e8ve de l’Histoire elle-m\u00eame. Elle implique que l’\u00e9largissement \u00e0 l’Est doit \u00eatre per\u00e7u, dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9<\/strong> des choses de pr\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 la sentimentalit\u00e9, comme une trahison de l’esprit des P\u00e8res Fondateurs de l’Europe auxquels nos \u00e9minences aiment tant se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCertes, l’id\u00e9e de l’Europe \u00e9tait fondamentalement une id\u00e9e pacificatrice, par l\u00e0 entendant que la r\u00e9union au sein d’une m\u00eame organisation de ses membres emp\u00eacherait d\u00e9sormais des conflits entre eux. C’\u00e9tait l’essence m\u00eame de la pacification de l’Europe apr\u00e8s un si\u00e8cle et demi d’horribles conflits. Comment ce principe pouvait-il s’appliquer aux pays de l’Est puisqu’on les faisait entrer dans une organisation dont leur principal adversaire, pass\u00e9 et oppresseur, potentiel pour le pr\u00e9sent ou per\u00e7u comme tel et ainsi de suite, s’en trouvait \u00e9cart\u00e9? De quelle logique politique s’agit-il l\u00e0, de la part de tous nos dipl\u00f4m\u00e9s des universit\u00e9s et instituts de sciences politiques? C’est \u00e9videmment le contraire qui arriva: en entrant dans l’UE sans la Russie, tous ces pays apportaient avec eux une agressivit\u00e9 anti-russe qu’ils ne se tenaient absolument plus tenus de brider puisqu’ils faisaient d\u00e9sormais partie d’un ensemble aussi majestueux et respectable que l’UE, que personne n’oserait affronter jugeaient-ils, y compris et surtout la Russie. (Pour l’OTAN, bien s\u00fbr, ce fut la m\u00eame chose, faut-il le dire, car les intentions initiales des partisans occidentaux de l’\u00e9largissement ne furent nullement anti-russes et l’on aboutit \u00e0 l’exacerbation du sentiment anti-russe.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tDit autrement, la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 apr\u00e8s leur lib\u00e9ration du communisme des anciens pays de l’Europe communiste, et la n\u00f4tre par cons\u00e9quent comme le montre la crise g\u00e9orgienne, d\u00e9pendaient de leur maintien hors des blocs occidentaux, ou de leur int\u00e9gration dans ces blocs en m\u00eame temps<\/strong> que la Russie. Mais cette formule ne permettait certainement pas, mon Dieu non, tous les beaux discours que nous \u00e9cout\u00e2mes sans les entendre et tous les superbes communiqu\u00e9s que nous l\u00fbmes les yeux ferm\u00e9s. On comprend qu’elle n’ait jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9e s\u00e9rieusement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 2 septembre 2008 \u00e0 13H11<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L’Union europ\u00e9enne, ou l’Europe si l’on veut, \u00e9volue avec la crise g\u00e9orgienne de plus en plus vite vers une position o\u00f9 elle se trouve confront\u00e9e \u00e0 ses probl\u00e8mes les plus fondamentaux. Il est important de garder \u00e0 l’esprit tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments historiques pour comprendre cette \u00e9volution. Un point important est mis en \u00e9vidence par Mary… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-70158","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70158","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70158"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70158\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70158"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70158"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70158"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}