Middele East Times<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tArnaud de Borchgrave explique que la coop\u00e9ration des Isra\u00e9liens avec les G\u00e9orgiens, notamment la formation des troupes g\u00e9orgiennes, \u00e9tait pay\u00e9e par la G\u00e9orgie par la mise \u00e0 disposition pour Isra\u00ebl de deux bases a\u00e9riennes en G\u00e9orgie, \u00e0 partir desquelles pourrait, ou aurait pu \u00eatre lanc\u00e9e une attaque contre l’Iran (la proximit\u00e9 de la G\u00e9orgie de l’Iran rendrait en effet tr\u00e8s avantageuse la disposition de ces bases en cas d’attaque isra\u00e9lienne de l’Iran). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe texte de Borchgrave aborde d’abord la question de la coop\u00e9ration en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. C’est dans ce contexte qu’il mentionne la question des deux bases utilisables en cas d’attaque contre l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abIn a secret agreement between Israel and Georgia, two military airfields in southern Georgia had been earmarked for the use of Israeli fighter-bombers in the event of pre-emptive attacks against Iranian nuclear installations. This would sharply reduce the distance Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly to hit targets in Iran. And to reach Georgian airstrips, the Israeli air force would fly over Turkey.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe attack ordered by Saakashvili against South Ossetia the night of Aug. 7 provided the Russians the pretext for Moscow to order Special Forces to raid these Israeli facilities where some Israeli drones were reported captured.<\/em> ()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe Tel Aviv-Tbilisi military axis appears to have been cemented at the highest levels, according to YNet, the Israeli electronic daily. But whether the IAF can still count on those air bases to launch bombing missions against Iran’s nuke facilities is now in doubt.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tBorchgrave donne donc \u00e9galement de tr\u00e8s nombreux d\u00e9tails sur la coop\u00e9ration entre la G\u00e9orgie et Isra\u00ebl, qui a commenc\u00e9 il y a 7 ans. Certains de ces d\u00e9tails ne sont pas in\u00e9dits et cet aspect de ses r\u00e9v\u00e9lations est moins impressionnant, quoique tr\u00e8s utile dans le d\u00e9tail. Les pr\u00e9cisions qu’il donne sur les raisons de l’\u00e9chec de Saakachvili, notamment par des faiblesses US au niveau du renseignement et la p\u00e9n\u00e9tration des G\u00e9orgiens par des agents doubles russes, sont par contre tr\u00e8s r\u00e9v\u00e9latrices. On a la confirmation que Saakachvili se croyait assur\u00e9 d’un soutien total des USA, comme si la G\u00e9orgie \u00e9tait l’Isra\u00ebl du Caucase. (D\u00e9tail amusant que rapporte Borchgrave, citant le Jerusalem Post<\/em>, la r\u00e9ponse isra\u00e9lienne \u00e0 l’ambassadeur g\u00e9orgien demandant, apr\u00e8s l’\u00e9chec de l’attaque g\u00e9orgienne, que Tel Aviv exerce des pressions sur Moscou : \u00abthe Georgian was told the address for that type of pressure is Washington.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThat Russia assessed these Israeli training missions as U.S.-approved is a given. The United States was also handicapped by a shortage of spy-in-the-sky satellite capability, already overextended by the Iraq and Afghan wars. Neither U.S. nor Georgian intelligence knew Russian forces were ready with an immediate and massive response to the Georgian attack Moscow knew was coming. Russian double agents ostensibly working for Georgia most probably egged on the military fantasies of the impetuous Saakashvili’s surprise attack plans.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSaakashvili was convinced that by sending 2,000 of his soldiers to serve in Iraq (who were immediately flown home by the United States when Russia launched a massive counterattack into Georgia), he would be rewarded for his loyalty. He could not believe President Bush, a personal friend, would leave him in the lurch. Georgia, as Saakashvili saw his country’s role, was the Israel of the Caucasus.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tSi les r\u00e9v\u00e9lations de Borchgrave sont confirm\u00e9es, ou si on leur accorde quelque cr\u00e9dit, comme c’est plus probable, la vision r\u00e9aliste de la crise g\u00e9orgienne prend une autre dimension. Elle propose une vision d’une affaire g\u00e9orgienne inextricablement li\u00e9e aux intrigues sans nombre des axes militaro-industriels USA-Isra\u00ebl, avec implication plus ou moins assur\u00e9e dans un possible conflit avec l’Iran. La question de l’adh\u00e9sion de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l’OTAN, et \u00e0 l’UE pendant qu’on y est, prend une allure cocasse et grandguignolesque \u00e0 force d’intrigues et de complications absolument incontr\u00f4lables. La rh\u00e9torique vertueuse de l’Ouest \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard de la G\u00e9orgie va \u00eatre de plus en plus difficile \u00e0 soutenir et la diplomatie europ\u00e9enne de plus en plus confront\u00e9e aux combines d\u00e9structurantes des groupes plus ou moins contr\u00f4l\u00e9s aux USA et en Isra\u00ebl.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tEn attendant, l’usage des bases g\u00e9orgiennes par Isra\u00ebl, si bases il y a effectivement, devient, avec la pr\u00e9sence russe, compl\u00e8tement al\u00e9atoire. Peut-\u00eatre, un jour pas si lointain, certains Europ\u00e9ens ne seront pas m\u00e9contents qu’il y ait des troupes russes maintenues sur les bordures du territoire g\u00e9orgien ; et la rh\u00e9torique russe anti-Saakachvili acquiert dans ce cas d’autant plus de poids. Certaines explications secr\u00e8tes entre la Russie et Isra\u00ebl, Isra\u00ebl ayant beaucoup d’int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e0 ne pas se brouiller avec la Russie, qui pourrait armer efficacement l’Iran et la Syrie, ne doivent pas manquer de piquant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 2 septembre 2008 \u00e0 09H38<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Arnaud de Borchgrave a d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 souvent mentionn\u00e9 sur notre site, notamment pour des vues inhabituelles (par rapport \u00e0 l’establishment m\u00e9diatique US) sur les crises ext\u00e9rieures en cours, et parfois pour des r\u00e9v\u00e9lations de type sensationnel. En g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, Borchgrave est bien renseign\u00e9 et ses interventions, si elles ne s’av\u00e8rent pas toujours \u00e0 100% exactes, mentionnent… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2933,1257,5519,2773,2774],"class_list":["post-70161","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bases","tag-borchgrave","tag-georgie","tag-iran","tag-israel"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70161","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70161"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70161\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70161"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70161"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70161"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}