{"id":70164,"date":"2008-09-04T14:57:17","date_gmt":"2008-09-04T14:57:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/09\/04\/louest-combien-de-vieux-chars-demodes\/"},"modified":"2008-09-04T14:57:17","modified_gmt":"2008-09-04T14:57:17","slug":"louest-combien-de-vieux-chars-demodes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/09\/04\/louest-combien-de-vieux-chars-demodes\/","title":{"rendered":"L’\u201cOuest\u201d, combien de vieux chars d\u00e9mod\u00e9s?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les le\u00e7ons militaires du conflit de la G\u00e9orgie sont diverses et incertaines, tant il est difficile de parfaitement ajuster le facteur de la qualit\u00e9 et de l’efficacit\u00e9 des forces militaires \u00e0 l’autre facteur des r\u00e9sultats politiques obtenus, tant aussi il appara\u00eet que la crise de G\u00e9orgie, qui a commenc\u00e9 par une guerre avec toutes ses caract\u00e9ristiques, est effectivement d’abord une crise dont l’un des composants est une guerre, chronologiquement le premier de ses composants mais ni le plus important, ni le plus d\u00e9cisif. Par contre, cette guerre a permis de fixer certaines r\u00e9f\u00e9rences nouvelles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe qu’a montr\u00e9 avant toute chose la guerre de G\u00e9orgie, ce n’est pas tant la capacit\u00e9 d’une victoire, bien que celle-ci ait \u00e9t\u00e9 obtenue, que l’existence d’une puissance militaire. (Dans les deux cas, victoire russe et puissance militaire russe.) Et, dans le deuxi\u00e8me cas, l’existence d’une puissance militaire russe effective, face \u00e0 la non-existence sur le th\u00e9\u00e2tre europ\u00e9en d’une puissance militaire occidentale effective, comparaison in\u00e9vitable puisque les Occidentaux, principalement les Anglo-Saxons, ont fait passer le conflit G\u00e9orgie-Russie initial au stade de l’affrontement Ouest (leur Ouest, aux Anglo-Saxons) versus<\/em> Russie. (Voir Mary Dejevsky, cit\u00e9e dans notre F&C<\/em> du 2 septembre<\/a>: \u00abAt which point everything fell apart, and a head of steam built up once again behind the rhetoric except that this time it was not just Russia and Georgia doing the shouting, but their respective cheerleaders, which meant pretty much everyone against the Russians.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe Washington Times<\/em> du 2 septembre<\/a> publie un article UPI de Martin Sieff, sur la performance de la puissance militaire russe en G\u00e9orgie. Les \u00e9quipements, observe Sieff, \u00e9taient souvent vieux, notamment les chars T-72 des ann\u00e9es 1970 (avec quelques am\u00e9liorations), mais leur usage, notamment les capacit\u00e9s de concentration, souvent brillamment fait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe effective use of decades-old Russian T-72 main battle tanks in the brief conflict with Georgia again shows how supposedly obsolete weapons can still play a potent and even decisive role in modern war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Russian army did not rely exclusively on its 30-year-old T-72s. State-of-the-art T-90 main battle tanks also were identified during Russia’s brief but highly effective five-day drive into the former Soviet republic of Georgia last month. But the old T-72s, upgraded with explosive-reactive armor, were there, too.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Russians pushed ahead with overwhelming concentration of force, according to classic Carl von Clausewitz principles, using artillery, tactical air support for ground forces and a mix of older T-72 MBTs and modern ones backed up with overwhelming forces of highly mobile infantry.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSpecial forces were used effectively to pre-emptively seize potential bottleneck positions in the heavily forested Caucasus Mountains to prevent Georgian forces from slowing down the Russian drive. In all, about 10,000 troops, still a very small proportion of the Russian armed forces, were used in the operation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAs we have noted before in these columns, supposedly obsolete weapons systems can find surprisingly long leases of renewed life carrying out missions far different from the ones for which they were originally intended.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa m\u00eame id\u00e9e d’un \u00e9quipement assez vieilli est \u00e9galement pr\u00e9sente dans d’autres analyses, certaines un tantinet m\u00e9prisante comme celle du Times<\/em> du 22 ao\u00fbt<\/a>, avec le titre \u00abRussian fighting machine is showing its age, say military analysts.<\/em>\u00bb Le premier paragraphe de ce texte vaut citation, comme si caract\u00e9ristique de la pens\u00e9e de nos experts en technologisme et en sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 th\u00e9orique: \u00abPictures of triumphant Russian soldiers sitting on armoured personnel carriers as they were driven through towns in Georgia will be among the lasting images of the seven-day war. But the victory did not tell the whole story, analysts said yesterday.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab[T]he victory did not tell the whole story<\/em>\u00bb, vraiment? Qu’est-ce qui compte dans une crise et dans une guerre qui se place au cur d’une crise et nourrit cette crise, c’est de disposer de syst\u00e8mes de tr\u00e8s grand avancement technologique et de n’en rien faire puisqu’ils sont occup\u00e9s ailleurs ou de remporter la victoire? Car le probl\u00e8me, c’est que les arm\u00e9es occidentales si superbement \u00e9quip\u00e9es sont en train de se d\u00e9penser vainement dans des guerres ingagnables, \u00e0 des milliers de kilom\u00e8tres du continent europ\u00e9en o\u00f9, d\u00e9sormais, tout se passe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est ce que dit Martin Sieff dans sa conclusion. Face \u00e0 la puissance militaire russe qu’on juge avec condescendance technologiquement d\u00e9pass\u00e9e, qu’est-ce qu’il y a en Europe pour faire un contrepoids qui permettrait, sinon de faire la guerre, dans tous les cas de mieux affronter la crise? Les Occidentaux, mais, d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment, disons plut\u00f4t les Anglo-Saxons, ont oubli\u00e9 ce que c’est que le rapport de force, estimant que la communication virtualiste fait l’affaire \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, que nul n’osera contester cette sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 virtualiste affirm\u00e9e comme un dogme. Depuis la G\u00e9orgie, nous avons en notre possession bien des signes que cela pourrait fort bien n’\u00eatre pas le cas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe Russian army today still could prove no match for the U.S. Army and its NATO allies at the peak of their power, but it doesn’t have to.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe U.S. Army and Marines have been exhausted by their ongoing commitment in Iraq fighting a relatively small but ongoing low-intensity counterinsurgency war against Sunni Muslim insurgents over the past 5 1\/2 years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd the nations of the European Union in general have allowed their conventional forces to run down to an extreme degree since the collapse of communism.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 4 septembre 2008 \u00e0 14H59<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les le\u00e7ons militaires du conflit de la G\u00e9orgie sont diverses et incertaines, tant il est difficile de parfaitement ajuster le facteur de la qualit\u00e9 et de l’efficacit\u00e9 des forces militaires \u00e0 l’autre facteur des r\u00e9sultats politiques obtenus, tant aussi il appara\u00eet que la crise de G\u00e9orgie, qui a commenc\u00e9 par une guerre avec toutes ses… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3917,5519,3164,7758,2779,2730,4845,7757,4268],"class_list":["post-70164","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chars","tag-georgie","tag-militaire","tag-obsolete","tag-puissance","tag-russie","tag-sieff","tag-t-72","tag-technologisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70164","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70164"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70164\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70164"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70164"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70164"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}