\tDepuis quelques jours et en relation \u00e9vidente avec la crise financi\u00e8re, surgit \u00e0 nouveau la question du Pentagone, de son budget qui pourrait \u00eatre r\u00e9duit en fonction de la crise financi\u00e8re, mais aussi de sa r\u00e9forme fondamentale. Tous ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements sont \u00e9videmment li\u00e9s les uns aux autres, notamment la r\u00e9duction du budget et le besoin de r\u00e9forme. Actuellement, les partisans d’une r\u00e9forme fondamentale se retrouvent en position de force \u00e0 cause des pressions de la crise financi\u00e8re. On a vu le 10 octobre<\/a> notre r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au texte du 9 octobre<\/a> de William S. Lind. Avec ce texte, on reparle \u00e0 nouveau des r\u00e9formateurs du Pentagone qui eurent leur heure de gloire dans les ann\u00e9es 1970 et 1980 et dont il reste aujourd’hui des partisans, Lind lui-m\u00eame, mais aussi Winslow Wheeler<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLind : \u00abIn the face of falling defense budgets, the work of the military reformers of the 1970s and 1980s may prove useful. They argued that by putting people and ideas over hardware, we could have more effective forces at a lower cost. Military reform was scuppered by the vast tide of money that flowed into DOD starting in 1980.<\/em> [] Fortunately, a few people have kept the reformers’ ideas alive and updated them, waiting for the financial crisis that has now come. Winslow Wheeler and the Strauss Military Reform Project have published several books on the subject, with a new volume soon going to press<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tComme le rappelle Lind, Gates lui-m\u00eame a fait allusion aux r\u00e9formateurs du Pentagone dans de r\u00e9cents discours. C’est une indication qu’il existe dans la pens\u00e9e du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, qui a de solides chances de se succ\u00e9der<\/a> \u00e0 lui-m\u00eame en janvier 2009, une inclination tr\u00e8s nette \u00e0 se tourner vers les id\u00e9es r\u00e9formatrices pour attaquer le probl\u00e8me du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPar cons\u00e9quent, il est tout \u00e0 fait justifi\u00e9 de s’attacher \u00e0 un article que vient de publier Wheeler, notamment dans Armed Forces Journal<\/em> d’octobre 2008, sur le site CounterPunch<\/em> et sur le site de l’institut o\u00f9 il travaille, le Center for Defense Information, le 9 octobre<\/a> pour ce dernier. Ce texte est int\u00e9ressant parce que, au-del\u00e0 de la critique, Wheeler s’attache \u00e0 proposer un sch\u00e9ma fonctionnel pour mettre en place un dispositif permettant, selon lui, de lancer une r\u00e9forme fondamentale du Pentagone avec l’arriv\u00e9e de la nouvelle administration.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl propose de faire appel notamment \u00e0 deux organismes ext\u00e9rieurs tr\u00e8s comp\u00e9tents et int\u00e8gres, pour assurer un audit de la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du Pentagone: le Congressional Budget Office (CBO) et le Government Accounting Office (GAO); de mettre en place une commission ind\u00e9pendante d’enqu\u00eate qui accueillera et int\u00e9grera les donn\u00e9es du CBO et du GAO en m\u00eame temps qu’elle sollicitera divers avis dont seront exclues les personnes et organisations li\u00e9es au complexe militaro-industriel; de geler les proc\u00e9dures d’acquisition a Pentagone pendant que l’enqu\u00eate donne ses effets, pour tenter d’\u00e9tablir une situation nouvelle en int\u00e9grant les orientations de cette enqu\u00eate. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici le passage du texte de Wheeler comprenant ces propositions:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe need for integrity in Pentagon expenses is not just a matter of satisfying green-eyeshade accountants. It also means having reliable estimates of cost, schedule and performance for programs. Habitually, at the beginning of an enterprise, the Defense Department underestimates costs, overstates performance and cites a schedule it cannot maintain. Real reforms could be simple, but vested interests with all the power in today’s system will oppose them vehemently.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbEnding the addition of billions of dollars of dubious pork projects to defense bills each year would require a process to sort out the junk from the worthy projects, if any. Members of Congress who argue that their earmarks are good ideas should have no problem with competent, independent evaluation of their proposals and a good-government process for implementing them. In short, any earmark proposed to any defense (or any other) bill should have:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb An estimate from the Congressional Budget Office for all costs, past, present and future.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb An evaluation from an independent entity (one with no material interest in the project, which eliminates the Pentagon) to determine if the project is needed and, if needed, whether the proposed solution can be effective. In most cases, GAO can and should provide such evaluations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb A requirement that any earmark that successfully emerges from the CBO and GAO evaluations must be submitted to a competitive bidding process, for initial and for any follow-on work.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWeeding out irrelevancies from the military services’ budgets should be performed by an independent panel. While the views of the military services and of other interested parties should be heard, their membership on any such review panel must be barred for it to have credibility. Similarly, retired military officers who have any pecuniary relationship with defense corporations must also be barred. And finally, any person accepting membership on the panel, as well as staff, should be barred from accepting any future position with any entity that can gain from the panel’s decisions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbCommensurate with a review panel should be a pause in new contracting and other expenses in the Pentagon, other than contractual obligations already incurred and war expenses that must be paid. New contract obligations and new program, or milestone, decisions should be held in suspension. The purpose of this important step is to permit the program review panel to operate in an atmosphere of seriousness and purpose, and to force the Pentagon to start down the long-avoided road of financial management integrity.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhile new spending is suspended, the Pentagon’s audit agencies and qualified public accounting firms should undertake a maximum effort to audit the entire Pentagon system. The basis for understanding current programs and the financial consequences of new decisions must be established. Without doing so, there is little hope the hardware review panel will be able to understand the consequences of its own decisions. It is also a fundamental question of the Pentagon finally putting aside its empty promises and to actually fix its financial accounts so that future program enterprises are initiated in a system that understands the future consequences of its current decisions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAfter the initial audit, any program, project or activity that has not received a clean audit should be placed on a public watch list for special oversight and frequent periodic reports to the defense secretary and Congress. Programs and their managers that fail should be noted, and new money for programs and promotions for managers that cannot pass an audit should be suspended, except for programs but not managers that the Pentagon and Congress jointly certify as essential despite their fiscal turpitude.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFailure to fix the Pentagon on this essential measure will mean that none of the other reforms will be meaningful. How can you control an acquisition process that you cannot accurately measure in terms of cost, schedule and performance?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl nous semble manifeste que les propositions de Wheeler tracent une orientation assez pr\u00e9cise vers ce que pourrait \u00eatre une action de r\u00e9forme radicale au sein du Pentagone. L’essentiel est bien entendu de r\u00e9aliser cette action par l’ext\u00e9rieur<\/strong>, hors des canaux et des r\u00e9seaux habituels de la bureaucratie pentagonesques. (C’est la seule m\u00e9thode possible pour les r\u00e9formateurs qui veulent attaquer une citadelle bureaucratique; ce fut notamment la m\u00e9thode suivie par Gorbatchev<\/a> in illo tempore<\/em>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tFace au Pentagone, la chose n’a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 souvent tent\u00e9e, et jamais \u00e0 cette \u00e9chelle bien entendu, qui semblerait impliquer une sorte d’arr\u00eat de fonctionnement du processus d’acquisition et de planification interne pendant un certain temps. Il faut signaler que certaines des initiatives de Gates semblent pr\u00e9figurer cette sorte d’action, comme par exemple le gel<\/a> du processus d’acquisition du programme KC-45. Ce constat renforce l’hypoth\u00e8se d’une complicit\u00e9 entre Gates et les milieux r\u00e9formateurs, qui pourrait \u00eatre soutenue par un Congr\u00e8s qui devrait activer un \u00e9tat d’esprit r\u00e9formateur s\u00e9rieux, pour l’instant encore potentiel mais d\u00e9j\u00e0 manifest\u00e9<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tTout cela est bel et bon mais il n’est pas temps de se dissimuler l’ampleur et la difficult\u00e9 de la t\u00e2che. Si le sch\u00e9ma Wheeler est suivi, le Pentagone identifiera aussit\u00f4t une attaque ext\u00e9rieure<\/strong> et mobilisera toutes ses forces contre elle. Le risque est celui d’une gu\u00e9rilla bureaucratique o\u00f9 le seul fait de gagner du temps repr\u00e9sente une victoire, parce que les r\u00e9formateurs doivent agir vite et efficacement dans une situation o\u00f9 le fonctionnement du Pentagone ne peut \u00eatre interrompu trop longtemps. Si ce fonctionnement reprend, selon les n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s op\u00e9rationnelles, apr\u00e8s une tentative comme celle que propose Wheeler, et cette tentative qui ne serait pas verrouill\u00e9e d\u00e9finitivement, la bureaucratie retrouvera ais\u00e9ment le dessus. L’action r\u00e9formiste, pour esp\u00e9rer avoir quelque espoir de r\u00e9ussir, doit \u00eatre \u00e0 mi-chemin entre la persuasion et le coup d’Etat institutionnel, mais tr\u00e8s vite avec l’accent mis sur le coup d’Etat institutionnel devenant coup de force tout simplement. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 13 octobre 2008 \u00e0 12H46<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Un mod\u00e8le pour la r\u00e9forme du Pentagone? Depuis quelques jours et en relation \u00e9vidente avec la crise financi\u00e8re, surgit \u00e0 nouveau la question du Pentagone, de son budget qui pourrait \u00eatre r\u00e9duit en fonction de la crise financi\u00e8re, mais aussi de sa r\u00e9forme fondamentale. Tous ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements sont \u00e9videmment li\u00e9s les uns aux autres, notamment… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2623,3984,1012,3194,3320,4995],"class_list":["post-70271","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bureaucratie","tag-gates","tag-lind","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme","tag-wheeler"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70271","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70271"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70271\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70271"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70271"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70271"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}