{"id":70300,"date":"2008-10-25T12:06:17","date_gmt":"2008-10-25T12:06:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/10\/25\/alerte-rouge-a-propos-du-coming-crash-du-pentagone\/"},"modified":"2008-10-25T12:06:17","modified_gmt":"2008-10-25T12:06:17","slug":"alerte-rouge-a-propos-du-coming-crash-du-pentagone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/10\/25\/alerte-rouge-a-propos-du-coming-crash-du-pentagone\/","title":{"rendered":"Alerte rouge \u00e0 propos du \u201ccoming crash<\/em>\u201d du Pentagone"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un important rapport a \u00e9t\u00e9 adress\u00e9 au secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates, qui dresse un \u00e9tat de la situation du Pentagone et constitue une tr\u00e8s s\u00e9v\u00e8re mise en garde. Venu du Defense Business Board (DBB<\/a>), une commission institutionnelle \u00e9tablie en 2001 et directement contr\u00f4l\u00e9e par le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, le rapport sugg\u00e8re pour la premi\u00e8re fois de fa\u00e7on aussi caract\u00e9ristique des risques de crise ou de rupture syst\u00e9mique, parlant d’une menace contre \u00abthe core of the institution<\/em>\u00bb (le Pentagone). Le DBB s’attache essentiellement aux probl\u00e8mes de d\u00e9veloppement et d’acquisition des programmes et des syst\u00e8mes d’arme, constatant une augmentation de ces programmes de $401 milliards (l’\u00e9quivalent d’un budget annuel du Pentagone du d\u00e9but de la p\u00e9riode consid\u00e9r\u00e9e) sur 7 ans.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn article de Defense News<\/em>, le 23 octobre<\/a>, pr\u00e9sente ce rapport (l’hebdomadaire en a obtenu un exemplaire).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe Defense Business Board Oct. 23 approved a list of studies that sound new alarms from inside the Pentagon about a number of issues, including the growing trend of major acquisition programs far exceeding original cost estimates. Business Board task groups looked at a range of issues, from how the Pentagon generates requirements to managing the Department of Defense to rising military health care costs. The panel was set to deliver the final versions of each study to Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England later that same day. The board intends to present them to each presidential campaign soon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAs part of 18 new reports for the Bush administration, the panel found that over the last seven years changes to initial program plans have cost the DoD $328 billion. Such program changes, typically referred to as requirements creep, have helped swell the price tag for the department’s major programs from $783 billion to $1.7 trillion, according to the panel. Of that increase, $401 billion, or 44 percent, was caused by program cost growth. On one slide, the panel uses striking language to express its concern about the skyrocketing cost of the Pentagon’s next-generation systems, warning it could in times of budget stress, threaten the core of the institution.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOne chart included in the briefing shows that $205.7 billion of the $401 billion in seven-year program cost growth was generated by just five programs: The Army’s Future Combat Systems ($69.7 billion), the tri-service Joint Strike Fighter ($66.8 billion), the Navy’s SSN-774 attack submarine program, the Chemical Demilitarization initiative ($23.4 billion) and the Air Force-run Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program ($18.5 billion). More than 90 programs from across the services accounted for the remaining $195 billion in cost growth. In the coming years, the board warns, the situation could affect the state of the American force. Rising program costs increases unit costs, the briefing states, limiting the ability to recapitalize the force.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl est vrai que ce rapport, par le ton qu’on y trouve, \u00e9voque la possibilit\u00e9<\/a> de ce que l’on d\u00e9signe comme le coming crash<\/em> du Pentagone, dont on commence \u00e0 beaucoup parler ces derniers temps. Outre les remarques mentionn\u00e9es, le rapport ne dissimule pas que cette situation du Pentagone peut avoir un effet direct sur la puissance des USA, voire sur la coh\u00e9sion structurelle de leurs forces arm\u00e9es: \u00abthe situation could affect the state of the American force. Rising program costs increases unit costs, the briefing states, limiting the ability to recapitalize the force.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAllant plus loin dans l’analyse, le rapport met en \u00e9vidence l’aspect structurel de la crise, et combien cet aspect structurel touche tous les \u00e9chelons. Le syst\u00e8me politicien lui-m\u00eame contribue \u00e9videmment \u00e0 la situation, avec une extr\u00eame lenteur \u00e0 pourvoir aux postes d’encadrement civil du Pentagone, \u00e0 cause des conditions de nomination, des tractations avec le milieu priv\u00e9 des affaires, avec le Congr\u00e8s, des arrangements partisans, etc., bref tout ce qui constitue les caract\u00e8res d’un syst\u00e8me o\u00f9 les int\u00e9r\u00eats priv\u00e9s et les groupes de pression ont compl\u00e8tement pris le pas sur le service public. Il y a ainsi une paralysie de la direction civile, comme Anthony Cordesman l’affirmait dans son rapport<\/a> du 1er octobre, conduisant \u00e0 des situations ponctuelles o\u00f9 le Pentagone est r\u00e9ellement, physiquement sans direction. (\u00abThe task force uses a chart to illustrate that many top Pentagon jobs are expected to be without a Senate-confirmed official in charge for much of 2009. The chart predicts that following the Nov. 5 election, more and more Bush appointees will step down, leaving fewer than 10 in office on Inauguration Day.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe rapport insiste donc sur cette situation: la crise qu’il d\u00e9crit est une crise culturelle au moins autant qu’une crise de gestion, impliquant par l\u00e0 la gravit\u00e9 de la chose. C’est une crise du comportement fondamental et des jugements, et non plus seulement une crise des d\u00e9cisions (mais cette derni\u00e8re subsistant bien s\u00fbr, et m\u00eame \u00e9tant aggrav\u00e9e). Tout cela est constat\u00e9 au moment o\u00f9 le Pentagone entre dans la situation de crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale que l’on sait, avec les contraintes budg\u00e9taires qui vont s’imposer dans le cadre de la crise financi\u00e8re et \u00e9conomique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abDriven by seemingly unconstrained Pentagon budgets, the cost growth trend is as much as cultural problem as a management issue, the panel concludes. But the board, echoing defense analysts and Pentagon observers, notes acquisition decisions and management likely will be harder for the next administration because annual defense budgets are expected to contract.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAll indications are the department is entering a prolonged period of fiscal constraint in a tough economy with deficits increasing and competitive spending pressures, the briefing states. Actions related to the Wall Street crisis will exacerbate the pressure.<\/em>[] Business as usual is no longer an option, the board wrote. The current and future fiscal environments facing the department require bold action.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl faut insister sur l’importance d’un tel rapport. En lui-m\u00eame, il n’est pas capable de r\u00e9volutionner les choses mais il s’inscrit \u00e9videmment dans une situation d\u00e9j\u00e0 tr\u00e8s fortement d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9e et en renforce cet aspect. Il s’agit d’un rapport \u00e0 la fois officiel et ind\u00e9pendant (les membres<\/a> du DBB sont recrut\u00e9s en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral hors des r\u00e9seaux d’experts proches du Pentagone). Il s’agit du premier rapport de cette sorte qui pr\u00e9sente un avertissement clair de la possibilit\u00e9 d’une crise syst\u00e9mique au Pentagone, en m\u00eame temps qu’il met en \u00e9vidence la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’agir tr\u00e8s rapidement, de fa\u00e7on radicale. C’est un signal convainquant du s\u00e9rieux (nul n’en a jamais dout\u00e9) de la crise du Pentagone et, surtout, de sa r\u00e9alit\u00e9 conjoncturelle et pressante (ce qui est une perception, dite d’un point de vue officiel, assez nouvelle). La nouvelle pr\u00e9sidence, quel que soit l’\u00e9lu, sera un rendez-vous tr\u00e8s important pour la situation du cur de la puissance am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 25 octobre 2008 \u00e0 12H09<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un important rapport a \u00e9t\u00e9 adress\u00e9 au secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates, qui dresse un \u00e9tat de la situation du Pentagone et constitue une tr\u00e8s s\u00e9v\u00e8re mise en garde. Venu du Defense Business Board (DBB), une commission institutionnelle \u00e9tablie en 2001 et directement contr\u00f4l\u00e9e par le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, le rapport sugg\u00e8re pour… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7867,3567,3228,7866,3019,4003,3194,6277],"class_list":["post-70300","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-board","tag-business","tag-crise","tag-dbb","tag-defense","tag-news","tag-pentagone","tag-systemique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70300","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70300"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70300\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70300"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70300"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70300"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}