{"id":70314,"date":"2008-10-31T16:35:39","date_gmt":"2008-10-31T16:35:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/10\/31\/le-coming-crash-du-pentagone-un-calendrier\/"},"modified":"2008-10-31T16:35:39","modified_gmt":"2008-10-31T16:35:39","slug":"le-coming-crash-du-pentagone-un-calendrier","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/10\/31\/le-coming-crash-du-pentagone-un-calendrier\/","title":{"rendered":"Le \u201ccoming crash<\/em>\u201d du Pentagone: un calendrier"},"content":{"rendered":"

La perspective du coming crash<\/em> du Pentagone est une affaire d\u00e9j\u00e0 bien document\u00e9e<\/a>, qui marche de mieux en mieux dans les sp\u00e9culations. Apr\u00e8s le cadre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, on trouve d\u00e9sormais des approches plus pr\u00e9cises, c’est-\u00e0-dire donnant des pr\u00e9visions d’une possible situation o\u00f9 le Pentagone se trouverait dans une situation de faillite par rapport \u00e0 ses obligations de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, ses engagements contractuels, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est le cas avec une intervention de David Morrison, qui fut directeur du personnel de recherche et de documentation de la sous-commission de la d\u00e9fense, li\u00e9e \u00e0 la puissante commission des appropriations de la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants. Morrison dirigeait donc directement, jusqu’en janvier 2008, le travail d’\u00e9valuation et de contr\u00f4le des d\u00e9penses du Pentagone, pour le compte de la commission charg\u00e9e, \u00e0 la chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants, de la comptabilit\u00e9 de ce budget de la d\u00e9fense, dans le cadre du budget f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. Defense News<\/em> rend compte, le 31 octobre<\/a>, d’une conf\u00e9rence de Morrison donn\u00e9e le 30 octobre \u00e0 l’universit\u00e9 du Maryland. Il y pr\u00e9sentait la perspective du credit crunch<\/em> du Pentagone, ou crevaison grandement explosive de la bulle<\/a> du Pentagone \u00e0 l’image des situations diverses de la crise financi\u00e8re. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abHard times are coming for the U.S. military, and they’ll be made even harder by a dysfunctional budget process in Congress and a Pentagon unable to keep weapon programs under control. That’s David Morrison’s view of the future. Morrison <\/em>[] warned that a defense budget Crunch is coming. It won’t happen in 2009 or 2010, but possibly in 2011 or 2012<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe crunch will begin when \u00ab\u00a0emergency supplementals\u00a0\u00bb used to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are dramatically reduced or eliminated, he said. That is likely to happen when U.S. troops begin returning from Iraq in significant numbers. The military services have expanded emergency funding bills to include about 40 percent of the weapons they want to buy. The bills, which topped $189 billion in 2008 and could match that in 2009, include tens of billions of dollars for military hardware, including items like Joint Strike Fighters that aren’t being used in the wars.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe largest single military acquisition of 2008, $17 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, was made outside the regular budget process in the emergency supplemental. The buy was made without much of the normal input such a program would receive from the Pentagon, Morrison said. For the Army, the end of supplementals will mean serious cash flow problems. In 2008, the Army’s procurement budget the money allotted for buying weapons was about $11 billion, Morrison said. However, the 2008 supplemental added $24 billion to that. When the supplementals stop, Army [procurement] programs are going to be rent asunder, Morrison said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe problem is made much worse by the Pentagon’s increasing inability to keep weapon programs on schedule and on budget, he said. Weapons typically double in cost and fall far behind schedule. The performance for some is far worse. The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, for example, nearly tripled in price. And every military satellite program has so far exceeded budgets and schedules as to require restructuring – some of them multiple times, Morrison said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMorrison nous explique ensuite les arcanes des divers blocages du Pentagone. Il conclut, selon Defense News<\/em>, par ce jugement abrupt, qui ne n\u00e9cessite aucun appel: \u00abThe appropriations process is a mess, Morrison said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCertes, la situation du Pentagone est inextricable, mais l’affaire des supplementals<\/em> la rend infiniment juteuse. Il est vrai que c’est sur ces fonds suppl\u00e9mentaires vot\u00e9s ponctuellement par le Congr\u00e8s, destin\u00e9s explicitement aux conflits en cours (Irak, Afghanistan) que, l’ann\u00e9e derni\u00e8re, le Pentagone a d\u00e9gag\u00e9 l’argent n\u00e9cessaire pour acheter deux JSF du programme de production, mais en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 destin\u00e9s \u00e0 l’exp\u00e9rimentation de l’avion, pour une enveloppe budg\u00e9taire proche de $500 millions. A l’\u00e9poque, l’affaire avait fait quelques vaguelettes puisqu’on remplissait l’objectif du programme JSF en nombre d’appareils gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 un financement uniquement destin\u00e9 aux guerres d’Irak et d’Afghanistan. Nous sommes dans un oc\u00e9an de fraude \u00e0 ciel ouvert (doublement fraude, puisque ces JSF sont acquis comme avion de production alors qu’ils sont destin\u00e9s aux tests et \u00e0 l’exp\u00e9rimentation en vol, comme des avions qu’on d\u00e9signait auparavant de pr\u00e9-s\u00e9rie destin\u00e9s \u00e0 compl\u00e9ter les exp\u00e9rimentations sur prototypes). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette situation met en \u00e9vidence combien le Pentagone est aujourd’hui prisonnier du Congr\u00e8s, en m\u00eame temps que de ses gaspillages et de ses fraudes. Si l’on compare cette situation avec les propos de Barney Frank<\/a>, si l’on tient ces propos comme l’annonce des choses \u00e0 venir tr\u00e8s rapidement, ce qui n’est nullement solliciter la pr\u00e9vision, on admet que la situation d\u00e9crite par Morrison pour 2011-2012 pourrait venir beaucoup plus vite, d\u00e8s fin 2009, avec l’incapacit\u00e9 du Pentagone d’honorer ses engagements budg\u00e9taires et contractuels, en plus de devoir sabrer dans ses programmes et dans ses engagements divers. De telles perspectives peuvent d\u00e9stabiliser l’un ou l’autre g\u00e9ant de l’industrie d’armement, dans l’atmosph\u00e8re boursi\u00e8re qu’on conna\u00eet. On voit que les sc\u00e9narios du coming crash<\/em> commencent \u00e0 prendre forme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 31 octobre 2008 \u00e0 16H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La perspective du coming crash du Pentagone est une affaire d\u00e9j\u00e0 bien document\u00e9e, qui marche de mieux en mieux dans les sp\u00e9culations. Apr\u00e8s le cadre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, on trouve d\u00e9sormais des approches plus pr\u00e9cises, c’est-\u00e0-dire donnant des pr\u00e9visions d’une possible situation o\u00f9 le Pentagone se trouverait dans une situation de faillite par rapport \u00e0 ses obligations… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3127,7869,7878,3228,7877,7879,3194,6506],"class_list":["post-70314","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-budget","tag-coming","tag-cradsh","tag-crise","tag-frank","tag-morriuson","tag-pentagone","tag-supplementals"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70314","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70314"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70314\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70314"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70314"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70314"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}