Le temps des rumeurs sur des grands projets r\u00e9formistes, voire r\u00e9volutionnaires, a commenc\u00e9, \u00e0 deux jours de l’\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle US. Jim Lobe, sur Inter Press Service<\/em> ce 2 novembre<\/a>, annonce l’apparition d’un courant g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, d’une nouvelle pens\u00e9e \u00e0 Washington pour parvenir \u00e0 un r\u00e8glement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des conflits de ce que l’administration Bush a nomm\u00e9 la Great War On Terror<\/em> (GWOT). Lobe pr\u00e9sente ce courant comme repr\u00e9sentant in fine<\/em> un consensus dans l’establishment<\/em>, c’est- \u00e0-dire comme devant exercer son influence quel que soit l’\u00e9lu. Lobe parle d’un transition team<\/em> proposant un tel sch\u00e9ma, comme d’un ensemble qui n’est effectivement li\u00e9 \u00e0 aucun des deux candidats. Il s’agirait de tenter de r\u00e9gler les principaux conflits et crises en cours (Afghanistan, Irak, Iran, conflit isra\u00e9lo-palestinien) pour permettre un repli g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des USA (et des autres puissances qui lui sont associ\u00e9es) et une concentration sur les grands probl\u00e8mes int\u00e9rieurs et les crises syst\u00e9miques en cours.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abA series of interlocking grand bargains’ backed by the relevant regional players as well as major global powers aimed at pacifying Afghanistan; integrating Iran into a new regional security structure; promoting reconciliation in Iraq; and launching a credible process to negotiate a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world must offer a very tempting, if extremely challenging, prospect to any new resident at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRestoring stability to the Greater Middle East and reducing its on-the-ground troop presence would not only greatly reduce the 15 billion dollars a month Washington spends on military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the stress on the U.S. military, and the unprecedented hostility toward among the world’s more than one billion Muslims. It would also permit the new president to focus on tackling the global financial crisis and the deteriorating economic situation at home, including key issues such as health care and the declining middle class, that the public believes, as made clear by this election campaign, have been too long neglected.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhile no senior policymaker has yet used the phrase grand bargain, the notion that the problems faced by Washington in the Greater Middle East — and thus, implicitly, the solutions, too are deeply inter-connected. Gen. David Petraeus, who Friday formally took the reins of U.S. Central Command (Centcom) which covers the entire region and Central Asia and who is certain to have a major say in future strategy, clearly understands this as well as anyone. Where Central Command can help is in looking at this overall challenge as a region, and helping regionally by looking not just at Afghanistan, but also of course Pakistan, at the Stans, Iran and even some of the other countries in the greater region that have been long involved, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf states, and even leaders in Lebanon, he told the New York Times in a September interview.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn one indication of his thinking, Petraeus reportedly requested permission last week to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the subject of a three-year-old diplomatic boycott by the Bush administration, only to be turned down by the White House.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tC’est une id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui est logique, surtout depuis la crise financi\u00e8re encha\u00eenant sur une crise \u00e9conomique; Lobe la qualifie \u00e9galement de nouvelle pens\u00e9e (new thinking<\/em>). Andrew Bacevitch, sur TomDispatch.com<\/em> le 30 octobre<\/a>, fait des observations dans le m\u00eame sens, en constatant notamment que GWOT est une sorte de fiction strat\u00e9gique qui implique des engagements ruineux, sans r\u00e9el r\u00e9sultat sinon les tensions impos\u00e9es aux USA. \u00abA week ago, I had a long conversation with a four-star U.S. military officer who, until his recent retirement, had played a central role in directing the global war on terror. I asked him: what exactly is the strategy that guides the Bush administration’s conduct of this war? His dismaying, if not exactly surprising, answer: there is none.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDevant ce vide, Bacevitch en vient \u00e9videmment \u00e0 la recommandation que le changement d’administration implique n\u00e9cessairement de repenser de fond en comble la strat\u00e9gie (la non-strat\u00e9gie) US dans le monde. Sa conclusion va dans le sens des indications que donne Jim Lobe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abYet the existing strategic vacuum is also an opportunity. When it comes to national security at least, the agenda of the next administration all but sets itself. There is no need to waste time arguing about which issues demand priority action.<\/em> [] To each and every one of these questions, the Bush administration devised answers that turned out to be dead wrong. The next administration needs to do better. The place to begin is with the candid recognition that the Global War on Terror has effectively ceased to exist. When it comes to national security strategy, we need to start over from scratch.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl est incontestable que la crise financi\u00e8re a activ\u00e9 un courant d’une nouvelle pens\u00e9e \u00e0 Washington. (Lobe remarque tout de m\u00eame que cette nouvelle pens\u00e9e existait avec le Irak Study Group<\/em>, ou ISG<\/a>, qui tenta sans succ\u00e8s en 2006 d’imposer une solution n\u00e9goci\u00e9e \u00e0 l’engagement en Irak, jusqu’au d\u00e9sengagement US.) Cette nouvelle pens\u00e9e est effectivement bas\u00e9e sur un constat d’\u00e9chec g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de toute la strat\u00e9gie (la non-strat\u00e9gie) US depuis le 11 septembre 2001. Renverser tout ce courant, toute cette orientation, est un vaste projet et un vaste programme, dont l’\u00e9vidence tombe par ailleurs sous le sens d’une simple analyse de bon sens. Il faut voir comment cette nouvelle pens\u00e9e peut \u00eatre mise en action, comment elle peut arriver \u00e0 s’imposer comme une strat\u00e9gie, d’autant qu’il s’agira d’une strat\u00e9gie de retraite, \u00e0 laquelle les adversaires des USA ne se pr\u00eateront pas n\u00e9cessairement et qui ne sera pas sans provoquer des remous \u00e0 Washington. Dans tous les cas, il s’agit d’une indication de plus que nous sommes dans des temps r\u00e9volutionnaires et que ces temps s’ouvrent imm\u00e9diatement, d\u00e8s l’\u00e9lection du 4 novembre, d\u00e8s la transition<\/a> qui n’en serait pas vraiment une, qui serait en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 une prise imm\u00e9diate du pouvoir par la nouvelle \u00e9quipe devant la d\u00e9gradation<\/a> de la situation int\u00e9rieure et la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’un retrait rapide de certains engagements ext\u00e9rieurs co\u00fbteux. Constatons donc l’existence de ce courant d’une nouvelle pens\u00e9e pr\u00f4nant le d\u00e9sengagement US et observons ce que seront ses premi\u00e8res manifestations dans les semaines qui viennent. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 3 novembre 2008 \u00e0 07H09<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le temps des rumeurs sur des grands projets r\u00e9formistes, voire r\u00e9volutionnaires, a commenc\u00e9, \u00e0 deux jours de l’\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle US. Jim Lobe, sur Inter Press Service ce 2 novembre, annonce l’apparition d’un courant g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, d’une nouvelle pens\u00e9e \u00e0 Washington pour parvenir \u00e0 un r\u00e8glement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des conflits de ce que l’administration Bush a nomm\u00e9 la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5422,7881,7438,7880,1094,2642,2964,7871],"class_list":["post-70317","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bacevitch","tag-bargain","tag-desengagement","tag-great","tag-lobe","tag-nouvelle","tag-pensee","tag-transition"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70317","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70317"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70317\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70317"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70317"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70317"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}