Upping the ante yesterday, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Alexander Grushko, said Moscow would not shift missiles to Kaliningrad if Obama scrapped the missile shield. If the US does not deploy it, then the very need for Russia to take these precautionary measures will be removed, he said.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’indication int\u00e9ressante de Tisdall, c’est son affirmation que la question du BMDE et des relations avec la Russie est une priorit\u00e9 d’Obama (voir le dernier paragraphe de la citation):<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abRussia switched deftly from threats to charm yesterday in an effort to exploit indications that Barack Obama could be persuaded to scrap Bush administration plans to deploy a missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSpeaking after meeting the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, in Sharm el-Sheikh, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov said Moscow was expecting a more flexible approach from the US once Obama took office. We have paid attention to the positions that Barack Obama has published on his site. They inspire hope that we can examine these questions in a more constructive way, the RIA Novosti news agency quoted Lavrov as saying.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbLavrov’s remarks followed a telephone conversation on Saturday between Obama and the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, in which the two men reportedly agreed to meet in the near future. The discussion followed Medvedev’s hostile state of the nation speech last Wednesday in which he sharply criticised the US missile interceptor deployment and vowed to station mobile, short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, bordering Poland and Lithuania, as a countermeasure. His threat drew condemnation from the EU and eastern European leaders.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbA Kremlin statement suggested Medvedev had changed his tone in the telephone call. It said he and Obama discussed ways to create constructive and positive interaction for the good of global stability and development. They agreed a good bilateral relationship is principally important not only for the people of both countries but for the international community as a whole, the statement said.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe row with Russia over missile defence has become Obama’s first foreign-policy test, even though he will not take office until January 20. How he handles it may help determine the way other countries behave in future crises. He has not made clear whether he backs the missile shield or whether the US will proceed on schedule with the Polish and Czech deployments. Aides say he has yet to be persuaded that the missile interceptor system works as advertised and has questioned whether the plan is indeed targeted at Russia, as Moscow claims, rather than at rogue states such as Iran, as the Bush administration says. He also says it must be cost-effective.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIl est manifeste qu’on ne peut parler d’une manuvre isol\u00e9e des Russes. Bien entendu, il y a les habituels experts qui distillent leurs avertissements, selon l’habituelle logique interne au syst\u00e8me (US), et cela donne ceci: \u00abIndependent experts say Moscow is intent on testing the mettle of the incoming US leader in the context of several other ongoing disputes over Nato enlargement, last summer’s Georgia conflict, and Russia’s effort to re-establish cold-war era spheres of influence beyond its borders. But Russian pressure could be counter-productive, the experts say, forcing the inexperienced Obama to take a tough line to prove he has the qualities to be US commander-in-chief.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe commentaire des independant experts<\/em> est du type pr\u00eat-\u00e0-porter, classique dans cette sorte de situation, donc sans nouveaut\u00e9 ni r\u00e9el int\u00e9r\u00eat, les experts font leur travail d’expert. L’int\u00e9r\u00eat et la nouveaut\u00e9 de la situation, on les trouve dans ce qui semble se dessiner de l’attitude d’Obama, notamment son attitude exprim\u00e9e publiquement avec sa rebuffade faite samedi au pr\u00e9sident polonais. Les Russes, qui sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral prudents, ne font que suivre une voie qui leur est sugg\u00e9r\u00e9e par l’attitude implicite du nouveau pr\u00e9sident US. Il semble m\u00eame y avoir un certain degr\u00e9 de concertation, comme le montrerait le coup de t\u00e9l\u00e9phone entre Medvedev et Obama.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tDans cette affaire, Obama est-il bien ce pr\u00e9sident inexp\u00e9riment\u00e9 qui risquerait d’\u00eatre oblig\u00e9 de changer d’avis pour para\u00eetre dur? La question n’est pas vraiment l\u00e0, si l’on consid\u00e8re, avec nombre d’arguments pour cela, que son but est d’abord int\u00e9rieur. Artyom Malgin a raison de citer les questions budg\u00e9taires, mais encore faut-il placer cette question dans le cadre bien plus vaste de la crise financi\u00e8re et \u00e9conomique US qu’Obama d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de traiter en priorit\u00e9. De ce point de vue, l’argument d’un Obama faible face \u00e0 la Russie est beaucoup moins solide; il l’est d’autant moins qu’il s’exercerait dans le cas absolument stupide et primaire du BMDE install\u00e9 face \u00e0 la Russie pour dissuader l’Iran d’utiliser des armes que ce pays n’a pas. La grossi\u00e8ret\u00e9 et la sp\u00e9ciosit\u00e9 de l’argument du BMDE ont des chances de finir par peser de tout leur poids n\u00e9gatif et de se retourner contre ceux qui l’avancent, dans l’int\u00e9ressante partie qui semble s’ouvrir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 10 novembre 2008 \u00e0 07H24<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Changement de ton significatif chez les Russes, concernant les relations avec les USA sur le point particulier du r\u00e9seau BMDE et de toutes les questions qui lui sont li\u00e9es, et notamment les relations g\u00e9n\u00e9rales avec les USA dans le contexte strat\u00e9gique europ\u00e9en. Ce constat s’appuie sur des d\u00e9clarations encourageantes du ministre russe des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4314,2773,2858,6208,2730],"class_list":["post-70333","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bmde","tag-iran","tag-medvedev","tag-obama","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70333","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70333"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70333\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70333"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70333"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70333"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}