{"id":70355,"date":"2008-11-21T06:40:19","date_gmt":"2008-11-21T06:40:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/11\/21\/linsoutenable-pesanteur-de-moby-dick-en-irak\/"},"modified":"2008-11-21T06:40:19","modified_gmt":"2008-11-21T06:40:19","slug":"linsoutenable-pesanteur-de-moby-dick-en-irak","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/11\/21\/linsoutenable-pesanteur-de-moby-dick-en-irak\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;insoutenable pesanteur de <em>Moby Dick<\/em> en Irak"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Musardant dans les colonnes toujours passionnantes de Tom Engelhardt, dans sa derni\u00e8re livraison du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.tomdispatch.com\/post\/175005\/a_consumer_s_paradise_of_war\" class=\"gen\">20 novembre<\/a>, nous trouvons un texte consacr\u00e9 \u00e0, si l&rsquo;on veut, la derni\u00e8re ligne de d\u00e9fense du Pentagone pour ne pas quitter l&rsquo;Irak. (La bataille, \u00e9videmment, se livre entre le Pentagone et la direction politique US, pas en Irak m\u00eame.) Engelhardt r\u00e9f\u00e9rence notamment deux liens, un de Robert Dreyfuss de <em>The Nation<\/em>, du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/doc\/20081201\/dreyfuss\/print \" class=\"gen\">13 novembre<\/a>, l&rsquo;autre du Washington <em>Post<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2008\/11\/17\/AR2008111702327_pf.html\" class=\"gen\">17 novembre<\/a>, qui renforcent son propos.  (Voir aussi, puisque nous y sommes, le Wall Street <em>Journal<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/online.wsj.com\/article\/SB122696942306335651.html?mod=googlenews_wsj\" class=\"gen\">17 novembre<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMais citons Engelhardt:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>It&rsquo;s the ultimate argument, the final bastion against withdrawal, and over these last years, the Bush administration has made sure it would have plenty of heft. Ironically, its strength lies in the fact that it has nothing to do with the vicissitudes of Iraqi politics, the relative power of Shiites or Sunnis, the influence of Iran, or even the riptides of war. It really doesn&rsquo;t matter what Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki or oppositional cleric Muqtada al-Sadr think about it. In fact, it&rsquo;s an argument that has nothing to do with Iraq and everything to do with us, with the American way of war (and life), which makes it almost unassailable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>And this week Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mike Mullen  the man President-elect Obama plans to call into the Oval Office as soon as he arrives  wheeled it into place and launched it like a missile aimed at the heart of Obama&rsquo;s 16-month withdrawal plan for U.S. combat troops in Iraq. It may not sound like much, but believe me, it is. The Chairman simply said, We have 150,000 troops in Iraq right now. We have lots of bases. We have an awful lot of equipment that&rsquo;s there. And so we would have to look at all of that tied to, obviously, the conditions that are there, literally the security conditions Clearly, we&rsquo;d want to be able to do it safely. Getting it all out safely, he estimated, would take at least two to three years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>For those who needed further clarification, the Wall Street Journal&rsquo;s Yochi J. Dreazen spelled it out: In recent interviews, two high-ranking officers stated flatly that it would be logistically impossible to dismantle dozens of large U.S. bases there and withdraw the 150,000 troops now in Iraq so quickly. The officers said it would take close to three years for a full withdrawal and could take longer if the fighting resumed as American forces left the country.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>As for the Obama plan, if the military top brass have anything to say about it, sayonara. It&rsquo;s physically impossible, says a top officer involved in briefing the President-elect on U.S. operations in Iraq, according to Time Magazine. The Washington Post reports that, should Obama continue to push for his two brigades a month draw-down, a civilian-military conflict is inevitable, and might, as the Nation&rsquo;s Robert Dreyfuss suggests, even lead to an Obama showdown with the military high command in his first weeks in office.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl est vrai qu&rsquo;attir\u00e9s irr\u00e9sistiblement par les d\u00e9m\u00eales d&rsquo;Obama avec le CMI (complexe militaro-industriel) \u00e0 propos du syst\u00e8me <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_role_du_bmde_dans_les_grands_marchandages__18_11_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">BMDE<\/a>, nous avions peu pr\u00eat\u00e9 attention aux d\u00e9m\u00eal\u00e9s du m\u00eame tonneau \u00e0 propos de l&rsquo;Irak. La chose est r\u00e9par\u00e9e. Par ailleurs, on constatera que c&rsquo;est la m\u00eame chose<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans les deux cas, un affrontement effectif ou un affrontement possible d&rsquo;Obama avec le CMI s&rsquo;amorce, non pas sur la mati\u00e8re m\u00eame d&rsquo;une querelle qui, en principe et officiellement, n&rsquo;existe pas, mais sur les proc\u00e9dures autour de cette mati\u00e8re. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-l_industrie_et_la_bureaucratie_us_pas_du_tout_a_l_aise_avec_le_couple_obama-bmde_17_11_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">Ici<\/a>, l&rsquo;on pinaille \u00e0 propos de technique ou de coups de t\u00e9l\u00e9phone mal compris, l\u00e0 on parle de capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9montage, de rapidit\u00e9 du retrait, de logistique cahotante et ainsi de suite. Nulle part, on ne s&rsquo;affronte sur quelque chose d&rsquo;essentiel, sur la politique en Irak, sur la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;y \u00eatre ou la d\u00e9cence de n&rsquo;y plus \u00eatre, sur le poids de cette guerre sur la situation \u00e9conomique US (sur la cause du projet BMDE en Europe, sur sa vertu d\u00e9stabilisante, etc.); non, il est simplement question d&rsquo;une comptabilit\u00e9 bureaucratique et des exigences de la logistique, transcrites en termes US,  c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire en termes monstrueux.  Envisager un minimum de 2-3 ans pour \u00e9vacuer un corps exp\u00e9ditionnaire de 150.000 hommes nous para\u00eet moins une manuvre dilatoire qu&rsquo;une impitoyable r\u00e9alit\u00e9 du monstrueux Pentagone, dit <em>Moby Dick<\/em>. Il nous semble vraisemblable que le Pentagone, et notamment l&rsquo;amiral Mullen, n&rsquo;exag\u00e8rent pas vraiment en avan\u00e7ant ces exigences chronologiques et pharaoniques pour un retrait d&rsquo;Irak. (\u00ab<em>This would, as the military now portrays it, be an American Dunkirk stretching on for years<\/em>\u00bb, comme le r\u00e9sume ironiquement Engelhardt.) Il est fort possible qu&rsquo;il faille <strong>vraiment<\/strong> ce temps pour \u00e9vacuer le corps exp\u00e9ditionnaire US d&rsquo;Irak. Cela ne ferait que refl\u00e9ter au niveau op\u00e9rationnel l&rsquo;incapacit\u00e9 de ce m\u00eame Pentagone de produire un programme d&rsquo;avion de combat sans ruiner l&rsquo;USAF et les Etats-Unis d&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique, ou un programme d&rsquo;avions ravitailleurs en vol sans d\u00e9clencher une guerre transatlantique et les foudres des tribunaux.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuoi qu&rsquo;il soit de l&rsquo;innocence approximative du Pentagone, il est vrai qu&rsquo;Obama, s&rsquo;il veut suivre son programme \u00e9lectoral (c&rsquo;est encore \u00e0 voir), ou dans tous les cas s&rsquo;il veut un retrait d&rsquo;Irak (m\u00eame cela n&rsquo;est pas assur\u00e9), trouvera en face de lui la pesanteur bureaucratique du monstre, ses arguments incompr\u00e9hensibles et encombr\u00e9s d&rsquo;acronymes divers, ses calculs sans fin et ses labyrinthes de services d&rsquo;\u00e9valuation. Il est probable que le nouveau pr\u00e9sident y verra une manuvre d&rsquo;obstruction, parce que la chose semblera \u00e9vidente pour lui. (D&rsquo;ailleurs, et pour contredire ce qui pr\u00e9c\u00e8de, ce sera une manuvre d&rsquo;obstruction <strong>autant<\/strong> qu&rsquo;une n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de lourde et implacable logistique; les deux cohabitent et prosp\u00e8rent ensemble.) Dans tous les cas, l&rsquo;aventure irakienne se r\u00e9duira \u00e0 ce qu&rsquo;elle est vraiment : une bataille bureaucratique qui ne sert qu&rsquo;\u00e0 mettre en \u00e9vidence et en fonction op\u00e9rationnelle l&rsquo;impotence ob\u00e8se et obsc\u00e8ne de la puissance US et la crise du pouvoir washingtonien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 21 novembre 2008 \u00e0 06H45<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Musardant dans les colonnes toujours passionnantes de Tom Engelhardt, dans sa derni\u00e8re livraison du 20 novembre, nous trouvons un texte consacr\u00e9 \u00e0, si l&rsquo;on veut, la derni\u00e8re ligne de d\u00e9fense du Pentagone pour ne pas quitter l&rsquo;Irak. (La bataille, \u00e9videmment, se livre entre le Pentagone et la direction politique US, pas en Irak m\u00eame.) Engelhardt&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7921,1381,857,7922,6521,7098,6208,3194,4849],"class_list":["post-70355","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-dick","tag-engelhardt","tag-irak","tag-logistique","tag-moby","tag-mullen","tag-obama","tag-pentagone","tag-retrait"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70355","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70355"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70355\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70355"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70355"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70355"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}