Le 20 novembre, la Norv\u00e8ge, ou bien s’agit-il du seul minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense, ou bien de la ministre seulement, bref, on verra, bref, on annon\u00e7ait quelque part \u00e0 Oslo, quelque chose qui ressemblerait au choix norv\u00e9gien du JSF pour l’\u00e9quipement futur de la force a\u00e9rienne norv\u00e9gienne. (Le JSF y \u00e9tait, ou y est encore? en concurrence avec le chasseur su\u00e9dois Gripen<\/em>.) La chose, la d\u00e9cision tombait bien, comme le rachat d’une partie de Lehman Brothers par Golden Sachs en pleine crise de septembre 2008, notamment pour relever le moral des troupes du JSF. Cela tombait aussi par surprise, comme le relevait Defense News<\/em> le 21 novembre<\/a>: \u00abNorway’s decision to reveal the choice of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter as its multi-role fighter on Nov. 20, a month ahead of the planned Dec. 19 announcement, took Saab and the Swedish government by surprise.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPourquoi si vite, pourquoi tant de h\u00e2te? Est-ce la d\u00e9couverte que le JSF est vraiment, magnifiquement en solde pour l’instant, et qu’il ne faut pas rater l’affaire? Il s’av\u00e8re qu’effectivement le JSF aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 offert \u00e0 un prix d\u00e9fiant toute concurrence, selon l’une ou l’autre source au minist\u00e8re; que la ministre elle-m\u00eame d\u00e9clinait de nous en informer pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment; que, le m\u00eame jour, quelque expert norv\u00e9gien fort surpris rem\u00e2chait sa rancur.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe<\/em> [Norwegian<\/em>] minister declined to reveal what flyaway price was agreed between Lockheed and Norway for the JSF, or comment on how much cheaper that was than the Gripen NG.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbEstimates vary, said one source at Norway’s MoD. The basic unit price for the JSF was considered to be lower than the basic price for the Gripen. Norway will pay about $2.5 billion for 48 aircraft or $52 million per unit. This is the no frills price, the source said.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe political debate surrounding the government’s decision is unlikely to end with the announcement, said one analyst. My opinion is that the Joint Strike Fighter will be too expensive to produce, and that the aircraft is developed for the challenges of the 1980s in Europe. I doubt that the U.S. Congress will ever approve the project. In addition, the current financial situation could make the production of this expensive aircraft impossible, said Jon Bingen, defense analyst with the Norwegian Institute of Strategic Studies in Oslo.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPuis, hier 25 novembre<\/a>, le quotidien d’Oslo Dagbladet<\/em> publie une enqu\u00eate de l’un de ses reporteurs, Kristoffer Egeberg. L’affaire est naturellement expos\u00e9e en langue norv\u00e9gienne, et il nous faut \u00e9ventuellement un certain d\u00e9lai pour enqu\u00eater sur l’enqu\u00eate; mais nous devrions y revenir. Il semble bien que le cas soit notamment l’affirmation, selon des experts norv\u00e9giens ind\u00e9pendants ext\u00e9rieurs au minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense et ayant servi comme conseillers dans l’examen du march\u00e9, que les propositions des deux concurrents conduisent \u00e0 chiffrer le JSF \u00e0 $177 millions par exemplaire, contre $71 millions pour le Gripen<\/em>. La diff\u00e9rence, pour le prix du JSF, entre $52 millions et $177 millions, est notable; notable aussi, la diff\u00e9rence entre les prix du JSF et du Gripen<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCela nous permet d’introduire quelques pr\u00e9cisions assez peu ordinaires sur cet oiseau rarissime, le prix r\u00e9el<\/strong> du JSF, au travers de quelques extraits d’un article d’Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> publi\u00e9 le 24 novembre (acc\u00e8s payant<\/a> sur le site<\/a> de l’hebdomadaire). L’article rapporte notamment un \u00e9pisode de la bataille que se livrent le F-22 et le F-35 (alias<\/em> JSF), un des \u00e9pisodes \u00e9piques \u00e0 la vilaine tournure en cours dans le d\u00e9sordre du Pentagone, notamment autour de l’audition de John Young, adjoint au secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense pour l’acquisition, devant la sous-commission des forces a\u00e9riennes et terrestres de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es de la Chambre, le 19 novembre. Young y d\u00e9fend la d\u00e9cision du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense de ne d\u00e9penser que $50 millions pour des pi\u00e8ces suppl\u00e9mentaires du F-22, alors que le Congr\u00e8s avait autoris\u00e9 $140 millions; ce pinaillage autour de quelques mis\u00e9rables dizaines de $millions recouvre un vaste enjeu, puisque c’est celui de laisser ou pas la cha\u00eene de production du F-22 ouverte suffisamment \u00e0 temps pour que l’administration Obama puisse \u00e9ventuellement d\u00e9cider la poursuite de cette production (ce que Young, Gates & compagnie ne veulent pas). On y constate que l’oiseau rarissime, le prix du JSF, est, au long de l’article, l’objet d’un d\u00e9bat parall\u00e8le particuli\u00e8rement confus et r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur, qui laisse de toutes les fa\u00e7ons loin derri\u00e8re le prix de $52 millions l’exemplaire plus ou moins (qui le sait?) annonc\u00e9 par le minist\u00e8re norv\u00e9gien de la d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tYoung \u00abinsists that spending $50 million instead of the full $140 million will save taxpayers $90 million if the incoming administration of President-elect Barack Obama decides not to buy any more Raptors. Critics say the shutdown and restarting of production would cost more and could result in the Air Force’s winding up short of both F-22s and F-35s if the later program is pummeled by funding cuts fueled by a damaged world economy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe next F-22 will cost $153 million under the congressional language, and the next F-35 will cost $203 million, says a congressional analyst. The projected then-year, total program unit cost for F-35As of $96.8 million is just as misleading as when the cost projections were made for the F-22 when it was a 750-aircraft program.<\/em> [Lawmakers<\/em>] need to know that the best numbers available, not John’s counter-intuitive projections, show a cost of up to $500 million more for what the Pentagon<\/em> [civilians are<\/em>] doing if the program proceeds.<\/em> [Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon<\/em>] England is betting it won’t and ensuring that it won’t, since the additional cost will prejudice the Obama administration against restarting production.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn turn, Capitol Hill is showing its opposition to the throttling of Air Force dissent, by giving its own comparison of F-22 and F-35 unit procurement costs that show the most expensive F-35which Pentagon civilian leaders want to acceleratewill cost a lot more, at least until after 2010, than the most expensive F-22.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe price list used by lawmakers (with numbers coming from the Air Force and the F-35 Joint Program Office) show F-22s in the Fiscal 2009 budget costing $143 million each. In 2010, the cost of 20 Raptors would be $153 million each (under the existing Air Force program) or $163 million (under the Young plan if the Obama administration makes a decision by Jan. 21) or $170-178 million (if the decision is delayed until Mar. 1).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn comparison, 16 F-35A\/B\/Cs in the 2009 budget will cost $237 million each. In 2010, 12 F-35As will cost $203.1 million each and 18 F-35B\/Cs will cost $198.1 million apiece. For unit costs over the total program in then-year dollars, 1,763 F-35As will cost $96.8 million each, while the 680 F-35B\/Cs come in at $122.6 million.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 26 novembre 2008 \u00e0 18h29<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le 20 novembre, la Norv\u00e8ge, ou bien s’agit-il du seul minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense, ou bien de la ministre seulement, bref, on verra, bref, on annon\u00e7ait quelque part \u00e0 Oslo, quelque chose qui ressemblerait au choix norv\u00e9gien du JSF pour l’\u00e9quipement futur de la force a\u00e9rienne norv\u00e9gienne. (Le JSF y \u00e9tait, ou y est encore?… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[249,2969,250,3842],"class_list":["post-70365","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-f-22","tag-f-35","tag-jsf","tag-norvege"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70365","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70365"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70365\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70365"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70365"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70365"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}