{"id":70369,"date":"2008-11-28T13:23:38","date_gmt":"2008-11-28T13:23:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/11\/28\/desordre-du-dream-team-et-espoir-des-anti-guerres\/"},"modified":"2008-11-28T13:23:38","modified_gmt":"2008-11-28T13:23:38","slug":"desordre-du-dream-team-et-espoir-des-anti-guerres","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/11\/28\/desordre-du-dream-team-et-espoir-des-anti-guerres\/","title":{"rendered":"D\u00e9sordre du \u201cDream Team<\/em>\u201d et espoir des anti-guerres"},"content":{"rendered":"

D\u00e9sordre du \u00ab\u00a0Dream Team<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb et espoir des anti-guerres<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

La question de la coh\u00e9sion de l’\u00e9quipe de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de l’administration Obama, discut\u00e9e hier<\/a> dans notre rubrique F&C<\/em>, est un cas effectivement de plus en plus d\u00e9battu, y compris dans les milieux anti-guerres et sur les sites qui vont avec. C’est un signe de l’importance de cette affaire, que la complication tenant aux nuances de position et de situation des acteurs \u00e9carte en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des sites politiques non sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Un signe de cette appr\u00e9ciation se trouve dans la chronique d’aujourd’hui<\/a> de Doug Bandow, sur Antiwar.com<\/em>. Bandow fait un tableau tr\u00e8s pessimiste de l’\u00e9quipe de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale d’Obama, du point de vue d’un chroniqueur anti-guerre, – sauf pour la r\u00e9serve que nous d\u00e9taillons ici.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«Barack Obama is nothing if not an accomplished politician. Despite a background as a community activist, conventional liberal stance in the Illinois state senate, extraordinarily liberal voting record in the US Senate, and celebrated anti-Iraq war position, as president-elect he has raced to the center. In doing so he has reassured Americans worried that he wanted to become redistributionist-in-chief. But he also has generated widespread fear that his foreign policy will turn into a slightly housebroken version of Bush-McCain neoconservatism.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»We can’t say we weren’t warned. The foreign policy pronouncements of candidate Obama were notable for their barely muted hawkishness. Thus, the fight against promiscuous military intervention by Washington must continue, only now against the incoming Democratic administration.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Perhaps the best hope is that members of the \u00ab\u00a0team\u00a0\u00bb will spend most of their time battling one another. The rapprochement between President-elect Obama and Sen. Clinton more likely is one of convenience than of conviction. Sen. Biden has spent his entire Senate career on the Foreign Relations Committee, of which he currently is chairman, and as vice president is certain to assert himself. Gen. Jones reportedly has requested Kissinger-like authority, likely to spark turf battles with Secretary of State Clinton, as well as with other cabinet members over such issues as energy. Will Secretary Gates be able to transcend his status as a Bush holdover rather than an Obama loyalist?<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Un autre texte d\u00e9taille cet aspect des choses, au niveau de l’\u00e9quipe de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Il est de Jim Lobe, en date du 25 novembre<\/a>, sur son blog<\/em>. Parlant ici de la nomination de Hillary Clinton, Lobe confirme l’\u00e9volution vers une transformation du d\u00e9partement d’Etat en une forteresse clintonienne, et le NSC en une forteresse de partisans anti-clintoniens d’Obama, avec un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Jones d\u00e9cid\u00e9 \u00e0 s’affirmer avec force.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«If the appointment does indeed take place, it’s hard to imagine a situation where Obama could fire her without incurring an extremely heavy political cost, including the possibility that she could challenge him in 2012. That state of affairs gives her an extraordinary amount of power and independence. And if she or her subordinates at State — think Richard Holbrooke as deputy secretary, for example — assert that independence by failing to coordinate adequately with the White House, foreign interlocutors could become very confused and feel required to develop all kinds of \u00ab\u00a0back channels\u00a0\u00bb to the various players.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Such a situation would be rendered even more likely if the National Security Council staff — presumably overseen by Gen. Jones as national security adviser — consists primarily of Obama loyalists, while State is dominated by officials who supported Clinton during the campaign. Normal bureaucratic rivalries that afflict the foreign-policy apparatus of virtually every administration (George H.W. Bush’s excepted) would, under those circumstances, likely be compounded by the feelings of political — and even personal — betrayal left over from the primary battles, regardless of the wishes and mutual goodwill of the two principals. And even if there is an attempt integrate the two camps by putting Clinton partisans in the White House and Obama people at senior posts at State, there is no certainty that pre-existing cliques of loyalists on both sides will not try to marginalize the outsiders in the policy-making process despite the exhortations of their masters.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»(Take, for example, the case of Susan Rice, a protegee of Madeleine Albright, who was an early Obama supporters and one of his key foreign-policy aides. Since news that Clinton may serve as secretary of state first surfaced, the possibility that Rice would serve in a senior State Department position, possibly deputy secretary of state, seems to have vanished, and now the question is whether she will get an NSC post or be nominated as U.S. ambassador to the UN, a post that normally reports to the secretary of state but has also been made a cabinet position. Which model would Obama choose if he nominates Rice to the post? And how strongly would Clinton insist that Rice report to her?)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Now, it may be that Obama, through Gen. Jones, can impose discipline on the players and the process, and I found it interesting that the Washington Post reported several days ago that \u00ab\u00a0Obama is considering expanding the scope of the (national security adviser) job to give the adviser the kind of authority once wielded by powerful figures such as Henry A. Kissinger.\u00a0\u00bb If true, which I tend to doubt, it raises serious questions about why Clinton would seriously consider the job, unless she believes that, once confirmed in the post, she would indeed enjoy substantial independence whether the White House liked it or not. Jones, on the other hand, would probably have very little patience for the State Department going its own way. So the potential for tension and conflict between the two bureaucracies seems very high to me. (And, incidentally, what will be the role of Joe Biden, whose recognized foreign-policy expertise was purportedly one of the major reasons he was asked to join the ticket, in all of this?)<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Ces diverses pr\u00e9cisions, notamment sur la position et le r\u00f4le de James Jones, renforcent encore plus le parall\u00e8le Brzezinski versus<\/em> Vance de 1977-1980 que nous \u00e9voquions dans notre F&C<\/em>. Dans ce cas, le parall\u00e8le est bien entendu aggrav\u00e9 par la situation sp\u00e9cifique, inexistante en 1977-1980, de l’interf\u00e9rence certaine du Pentagone, de Gates comme alli\u00e9 de Jones, parce que le Pentagone est \u00e0 la fois dans une position d’\u00e9norme puissance et dans une position d’extr\u00eame vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9, – paradoxe courant dans le monde de l’am\u00e9ricanisme aujourd’hui, – cette situation n\u00e9cessitant une d\u00e9fense active de ses int\u00e9r\u00eats et de sa pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rance qui seront n\u00e9cessairement mis en cause par la forteresse Clinton.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

L’\u00e9vocation par Lobe de l’attitude d\u00e9concert\u00e9e des pays \u00e9trangers devant le probable affrontement interne dans l’\u00e9quipe de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale est notamment caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e par cette phrase : «…foreign interlocutors could become very confused and feel required to develop all kinds of \u00ab\u00a0back channels\u00a0\u00bb to the various players.<\/em>» Elle rappelle une autre situation, cette fois celle de Kissinger comme directeur du NSC et conseiller du pr\u00e9sident, en 1969-1975. Effectivement, les USA suivaient des diplomaties \u00ab\u00a0parall\u00e8les\u00a0\u00bb, avec la diplomatie secr\u00e8te de Henry Kissinger doublant et marginalisant celle du d\u00e9partement d’Etat et celle du Pentagone. In illo tempore<\/em>, au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990, l’ancien ministre fran\u00e7ais des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Michel Jobert nous avait confi\u00e9 que, durant son minist\u00e8re (1973-1974), Kissinger avait pris l’initiative d’\u00e9tablir avec lui une ligne clandestine directe de contact. Le relais de Kissinger \u00e9tait un ancien g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF, converti en repr\u00e9sentant de Boeing \u00e0 Paris. C’est lui, et lui seul selon les indications de Kissinger, que Jobert devait consid\u00e9rer pour toutes ses relations avec Kissinger, et c’est par lui qu’effectivement transitaient les messages de Kissinger. L’ambassade des USA \u00e0 Paris, d\u00e9pendante du d\u00e9partement d’Etat de William Rogers compl\u00e8tement mis sur la touche, \u00e9tait totalement \u00ab\u00a0brul\u00e9e\u00a0\u00bb par Kissinger et n’avait aucune fonction importante dans les relations d’information et d’\u00e9ventuelle coordination de la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re des USA avec celle de la France. La situation de l’\u00e9quipe de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale d’Obama pourrait \u00e9galement se rapprocher de cette situation, avec la diff\u00e9rence que, dans son cas, le d\u00e9partement d’Etat aurait son action personnelle, qui pourrait avoir autant de poids que celle du NSC. L\u00e0 aussi, comme dans le cas de la psychologie<\/a>, nous souhaitons bon courage aux diplomates europ\u00e9ens qui pourrait se trouver dans une situation bien difficile pour comprendre qui fait quoi, qui dit quoi au nom de qui et, d’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, quelle est la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de l’administration Obama.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mis en ligne le 28 novembre 2008 \u00e0 13H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

D\u00e9sordre du \u00ab\u00a0Dream Team\u00a0\u00bb et espoir des anti-guerres La question de la coh\u00e9sion de l’\u00e9quipe de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de l’administration Obama, discut\u00e9e hier dans notre rubrique F&C, est un cas effectivement de plus en plus d\u00e9battu, y compris dans les milieux anti-guerres et sur les sites qui vont avec. C’est un signe de l’importance de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6799,934,3613,2618,583,3736,1094,2937,6208,7938,3108],"class_list":["post-70369","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bandow","tag-clinton","tag-dream","tag-jobert","tag-jones","tag-kissinger","tag-lobe","tag-nationale","tag-obama","tag-sexcurite","tag-team"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70369","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70369"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70369\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70369"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70369"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70369"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}