\tDepuis le 1er octobre 2008, il existe une unit\u00e9 militaire d\u00e9crite comme une rapide-response force<\/em>, forte de 4.700 personnes (personnel combattant et personnel de soutien) affect\u00e9e \u00e0 des op\u00e9rations internes aux Etats-Unis. Il s’agit de la premi\u00e8re unit\u00e9 d’un ensemble de trois, chacune \u00e9tant constitu\u00e9e autour d’une brigade de l’U.S. Army. L’ensemble devrait \u00eatre op\u00e9rationnel en 2011 sous l’autorit\u00e9 de Northern Command. (Ce commandement a \u00e9t\u00e9 mis en place et activ\u00e9 le 1er octobre 2002.) D’autres unit\u00e9s mineures, de la Garde Nationale, compl\u00e8teront le dispositif. Tout cela d\u00e9pend \u00e9videmment de l’in\u00e9vitable et omnipr\u00e9sent Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe Washington Post<\/em> pr\u00e9sente ce dispositif dans son \u00e9dition du 1er d\u00e9cembre<\/a>. Il d\u00e9taille \u00e9galement l’historique de cette initiative, d\u00e9crite par l’adjoint au secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense pour la d\u00e9fense territoriale comme quelque chose qui aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 jug\u00e9e extraordinaire au point d’\u00eatre incroyable avant le 11 septembre 2001.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abBefore the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, dedicating 20,000 troops to domestic response a nearly sevenfold increase in five years would have been extraordinary to the point of unbelievable, Paul McHale, assistant defense secretary for homeland defense, said in remarks last month at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But the realization that civilian authorities may be overwhelmed in a catastrophe prompted a fundamental change in military culture, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe Pentagon’s plan calls for three rapid-reaction forces to be ready for emergency response by September 2011. The first 4,700-person unit, built around an active-duty combat brigade based at Fort Stewart, Ga., was available as of Oct. 1, said Gen. Victor E. Renuart Jr., commander of the U.S. Northern Command.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIf funding continues, two additional teams will join nearly 80 smaller National Guard and reserve units made up of about 6,000 troops in supporting local and state officials nationwide. All would be trained to respond to a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive attack, or CBRNE event, as the military calls it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMilitary preparations for a domestic weapon-of-mass-destruction attack have been underway since at least 1996, when the Marine Corps activated a 350-member chemical and biological incident response force and later based it in Indian Head, Md., a Washington suburb. Such efforts accelerated after the Sept. 11 attacks, and at the time Iraq was invaded in 2003, a Pentagon joint task force drew on 3,000 civil support personnel across the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn 2005, a new Pentagon homeland defense strategy emphasized preparing for multiple, simultaneous mass casualty incidents. National security threats were not limited to adversaries who seek to grind down U.S. combat forces abroad, McHale said, but also include those who want to inflict such brutality on our society that we give up the fight, such as by detonating a nuclear bomb in a U.S. city.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn late 2007, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed a directive approving more than $556 million over five years to set up the three response teams, known as CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces. Planners assume an incident could lead to thousands of casualties, more than 1 million evacuees and contamination of as many as 3,000 square miles, about the scope of damage Hurricane Katrina caused in 2005.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCes informations d\u00e9crivent un mouvement constant depuis le 11 septembre 2001 de militarisation du territoire national des USA. Ce mouvement est fortement critiqu\u00e9 par divers milieux, comme violant le Posse Comitatus Act<\/em> de 1878, une loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale restreignant l’activit\u00e9 militaire sur le territoire national. L’argument initial de l’initiative (lutter contre des attaques terroristes) s’est largement \u00e9tendu \u00e0 d’autres domaines de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 interne, notamment \u00e0 l’occasion des cons\u00e9quences catastrophiques du cyclone Katrina<\/em> (28 ao\u00fbt 2005) qui a d\u00e9truit La Nouvelle Orl\u00e9ans et suscit\u00e9 l’intervention de plusieurs unit\u00e9s militaires de la Garde Nationale. Il est manifeste que les forces militaires de Northern Command sont aujourd’hui affect\u00e9es \u00e0 toutes sortes de t\u00e2ches, y compris le maintien de l’ordre en cas de troubles civils. Cette possibilit\u00e9 de troubles civils est aujourd’hui tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse, dans les circonstances troubl\u00e9es que connaissent les USA. Elle fut \u00e9voqu\u00e9e encore r\u00e9cemment, dans le Guardian<\/em> du 5 novembre<\/a>, par Martin Kettle. Le 10 novembre<\/a>, WSWS.org<\/em> reprenait l’allusion de Kettle pour la commenter.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAcknowledging that Obama’s was an immense and historic victory, Kettle went on to explain that if he had not won the 2008 presidential election and had not won it in some style, it would have been the most shocking political event in modern American political history.’<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe election had been the Democrats’ to lose, he continued. For Obama to have lost the election when the incumbent party had presided over an economic collapse of epochal immensity and over two unsuccessful and unpopular wars, with three quarters of Americans believing their country was heading in the wrong direction and against an opponent who had been nominated by a divided party and who then himself selected a manifestly unqualified and divisive running-mate would have constituted the biggest electoral missed opportunity in generations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHad this occurred, Kettle then warns, It might have persuaded an entire generation that there was absolutely no validity whatever in electoral politics. Millions might have concluded that the only way to get the Republicans out of the White House was by some form of armed insurrection. Later he adds, if Obama had not won well, that too would have been a shattering blow to the Democratic cause at such a time.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThere is a degree of hyperbole in Kettle invoking the danger of armed insurrection. Nevertheless there is a serious content to the warning he directs towards the political elite. He made his remarks in the knowledge that, ever since George W. Bush came to power in 2000 thanks to electoral fraud and the disenfranchisement of many voters, confidence in the US electoral system has been at rock bottom. Under conditions of acute social tensions made worse by the onset of recession, the situation in the US is indeed explosive.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCes commentaires montrent que l’id\u00e9e de troubles int\u00e9rieurs est d\u00e9sormais commune, et dans l’esprit des commentateurs, et dans l’esprit des autorit\u00e9s. On n’implique nullement pour autant une intention ponctuelle quelconque dans la mise en place d’une structure militaire interne, ni que l’institution structurelles de forces militaires d’intervention sur le territoire national implique un programme pr\u00e9cis tel qu’un coup d’Etat par exemple. Il existe d’autres formes d’intervention possible pour cette sorte de projet, s’il devait jamais y en avoir, ne serait-ce que parce que les unit\u00e9s de l’U.S. Army ont leurs bases-arri\u00e8res sur le territoire national et s’y trouvent cantonn\u00e9es r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement, entre des d\u00e9ploiements ext\u00e9rieurs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’institution de la chose, et l’affectation d’unit\u00e9s \u00e0 des t\u00e2ches int\u00e9rieures sp\u00e9cifiques montrent effectivement que s’est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e une perception de la situation interne des USA marqu\u00e9e par l’instabilit\u00e9 et la fragilit\u00e9. Cette perception n’est pas seulement due \u00e0 l’attaque du 11 septembre puisqu’elle implique d\u00e9sormais un \u00e9v\u00e9nement comme Katrina<\/em>, qui \u00e9tait \u00e9videmment possible avant le 11 septembre et dans toutes les occasions possibles. Le changement de la perception est bien que la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 US est devenue plus fragile et plus instable dans le cas d’un \u00e9v\u00e9nement comme Katrina<\/em> \u00e9galement, parce que l’instabilit\u00e9 et la fragilit\u00e9 sont d\u00e9sormais jug\u00e9s comme des caract\u00e8res structurels de cette soci\u00e9t\u00e9. Le m\u00eame \u00e9v\u00e9nement a d’autre part renforc\u00e9 la perception compl\u00e9mentaire que les forces publiques \u00e9taient mal organis\u00e9es et mal \u00e9quip\u00e9es pour r\u00e9agir aux d\u00e9sordres, renfor\u00e7ant par cons\u00e9quent la dynamique de la militarisation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tBien \u00e9videmment, si la d\u00e9marche est compr\u00e9hensible, il est \u00e9galement compr\u00e9hensible que ses effets ont fort peu de chances d’am\u00e9liorer la situation. La structure militaire US a d\u00e9j\u00e0 montr\u00e9 son incapacit\u00e9 absolument ontologique \u00e0 s’adapter \u00e0 des situations contrast\u00e9es de troubles divers et civils, quelle qu’en soit la cause, et au contraire sa capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 aggraver syst\u00e9matiquement de telles situation par son intervention. D’autre part, il est \u00e9vident que ces mesures, loin d’apaiser la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, ne font et ne feront qu’aggraver la tension en alimentant tous les soup\u00e7ons \u00e0 l’encontre des autorit\u00e9s centrales, et en aggravant par avance les effets de tout foyer potentiel de trouble par la simple militarisation de ce foyer dans l’intervention contre lui.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn voit dans tous les cas une confirmation de plus que le syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste est incapable d’une autre r\u00e9ponse que la militarisation face aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements qui ne cessent d’aggraver la crise structurelle et syst\u00e9mique de l’ensemble US. Cette militarisation devrait se poursuivre aussi vite qu’il est possible, \u00e0 mesure de la perception de l’aggravation de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Elle porte en soi un facteur d’aggravation des situations qu’elle pr\u00e9tend traiter, contribuant notablement \u00e0 l’entretien du cercle vicieux destructeur caract\u00e9risant le syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste aujourd’hui. Au point d’usure et de scl\u00e9rose o\u00f9 il se trouve, il est inutile d’attendre autre chose d’un syst\u00e8me aussi aveugle qu’il est \u00e9norme et tr\u00e8s puissant pr\u00e9dateur de sa propre puissance. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2008 \u00e0 09H30<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La militarisation interne des USA, au galop Depuis le 1er octobre 2008, il existe une unit\u00e9 militaire d\u00e9crite comme une rapide-response force, forte de 4.700 personnes (personnel combattant et personnel de soutien) affect\u00e9e \u00e0 des op\u00e9rations internes aux Etats-Unis. Il s’agit de la premi\u00e8re unit\u00e9 d’un ensemble de trois, chacune \u00e9tant constitu\u00e9e autour d’une brigade… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[354,370,7635,1368,5379,7939,2804],"class_list":["post-70375","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-354","tag-370","tag-interieur","tag-katrina","tag-militarisation","tag-troubles","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70375","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70375"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70375\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70375"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70375"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70375"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}