acc\u00e8s payant<\/a>) sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es certaines de ses consid\u00e9rations; Gates a \u00e9t\u00e9 interview\u00e9 le 1er d\u00e9cembre (le jour o\u00f9 son maintien au Pentagone \u00e9tait annonc\u00e9) pour l’hebdomadaire. Il est manifeste que l’ancien-nouveau secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense consid\u00e8re la r\u00e9forme interne du Pentagone comme sa premi\u00e8re priorit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tUn passage est consacr\u00e9 au F-22, d’ailleurs assez confus quant \u00e0 la position de Gates et aux solutions envisag\u00e9es. L’on y apprend, en passant mais avec le plus grand int\u00e9r\u00eat, et comme une nouveaut\u00e9 particuli\u00e8rement succulente, que le F-22 des ann\u00e9es 1990-2000 est technologiquement d\u00e9pass\u00e9; par cons\u00e9quent, qu’il vaut mieux l’arr\u00eater, et, en attendant le JSF, acheter des F-16 et des F-18 des ann\u00e9es 1970<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abAnd the Air Force’s stealthy, twin-engine Lockheed Martin F-22 fighter production line could close because it’s too costly to field in high numbers. One tradeoff is whether to buy more legacy fighters or stealthy F-35s, also built by Lockheed Martin. Gates is aware of the F-22\/F-35 debate and he’s also aware that the Raptor is almost technologically obsolete, says a former Clinton administration Pentagon appointee. It’s showing its age because the development program took so long. The F-22’s processors are far less capable than those in the F-35.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWith a funding shortage, the Air Force may have to back off of ambitious technology and purchases. And the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are likely to be forced into developing a more collaborative strategy for tactical aircraft. This could mean tradeoffs among Boeing Super Hornets and Lockheed Martin’s family of fighters. Industry sources note the Air National Guard has expressed interest in the F-16, despite a longtime policy to purchase only stealthy fighters. Additional F-16s and Super Hornets? The Navy has gone that routethe question is, until you get the Joint Strike Fighter, do you go that route or do you try and build more F-22s, Gates notes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCe qu’il faut retenir, c’est que ce haro sur le F-22 est en train de prendre une forme nouvelle, de se situer dans un courant r\u00e9formiste qui prend une ampleur consid\u00e9rable et qui s’\u00e9largit \u00e0 d’autres facteurs. Pour manifester cette appr\u00e9ciation sur un point pr\u00e9cis, il n’est plus du tout assur\u00e9 qu’un vilain sort du F-22 se traduirait par des avantages pour le F-35\/JSF, car il faut d\u00e9sormais consid\u00e9rer toutes ces suggestions dans une dynamique aux implications beaucoup plus larges que le sort des deux avions concern\u00e9s. Par contre, nous avons ici la confirmation que cela, le cas conjoint du sort du F-22 et du sort du F-35 est bien au centre de l’affrontement et de la temp\u00eate qui montent autour du destin du Pentagone. Ces deux programmes sont \u00e0 la fois exemplaires et symboliques de ce destin. Nous ne sommes qu’au commencement de l’affrontement et de la temp\u00eate. Il devient de plus en plus difficile de penser que la question des affaires militaires va se poursuivre sous l’administration Obama sans autre forme de proc\u00e8s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 11 d\u00e9cembre 2008 \u00e0 12H32<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Un vent de r\u00e9forme anti-pentagonesque est en train de prendre un rythme de temp\u00eate \u00e0 Washington. Le point Omega de cette temp\u00eate autour du point Omega de la crise syst\u00e9mique am\u00e9ricaniste, c’est le chasseur F-22 Raptor et les quelques dizaines d’exemplaires que l’USAF, ou une partie de l’USAF, voudrait encore produire. De tous les c\u00f4t\u00e9s,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4851,249,2969,3984,250,7098,3194,3320],"class_list":["post-70397","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-awst","tag-f-22","tag-f-35","tag-gates","tag-jsf","tag-mullen","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70397","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70397"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70397\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70397"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70397"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70397"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}