{"id":70398,"date":"2008-12-11T18:13:06","date_gmt":"2008-12-11T18:13:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/12\/11\/le-f-35-alias-jsf-profite-t-il-de-lattaque-contre-le-f-22\/"},"modified":"2008-12-11T18:13:06","modified_gmt":"2008-12-11T18:13:06","slug":"le-f-35-alias-jsf-profite-t-il-de-lattaque-contre-le-f-22","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/12\/11\/le-f-35-alias-jsf-profite-t-il-de-lattaque-contre-le-f-22\/","title":{"rendered":"Le F-35, alias<\/em> JSF, profite-t-il de l’attaque contre le F-22?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dans la temp\u00eate qu’on voit s’\u00e9lever au-dessus et autour du Pentagone, et au Pentagone m\u00eame, \u00e0 la fois pour la crise centrale de ce point Omega<\/a> et pour celle qui presse le F-22<\/a>, notre ami le JSF, alias<\/em> F-35, a un r\u00f4le et une place \u00e0 tenir. Comme on le signale dans une allusion dans la note pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente, les ennuis du F-22 n’impliquent pas n\u00e9cessairement le bonheur du JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’une fa\u00e7on de plus en plus accentu\u00e9e, la plupart de ceux qui r\u00e9clament l’abandon du F-22 r\u00e9clament \u00e0 haut cri des r\u00e9formes et des r\u00e9ductions des d\u00e9penses, et cela ne rassure pas le parti du JSF. On retrouve cette situation dans les rapports sur une r\u00e9forme du Pentagone, qui pleuvent aujourd’hui de tous c\u00f4t\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Dans le rapport<\/a> du Center for National Policy sur une Strategic Pause<\/em>, dont nous avons parl\u00e9 dans notre Bloc-Notes<\/em> du 10 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>, on dit \u00e9galement un mot du F-35, en m\u00eame temps qu’on r\u00e9clame la t\u00eate du F-22: \u00abSpecific recommendations included ending production of the Lockheed Martin Corp F-22 fighter; scaling back purchases of the F-35 fighter, also being built by Lockheed<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Dans un autre rapport, disons le rapport du jour, en fait du 10 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> et venant du Center for American Progress de Lawrence J. Kolb, la question des avions de combat est trait\u00e9e dans le m\u00eame esprit que pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment \u00abEnd production of the F-22 Raptor immediately at 183 planes. Continue development of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, but do not start full-scale production until flight tests have been completed. Buy F-16 Block 60 fighters, two wings of MQ-9 Reaper drones, and 69 F\/A-18E\/F Super Hornets to make up for the anticipated gap in fighter aircraft.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn a vu dans la note<\/a> pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente, o\u00f9 des d\u00e9clarations de Gates et d’autres experts sont cit\u00e9es sur les besoins de r\u00e9forme du Pentagone, qu’il y \u00e9tait question du F-22, dans des termes assez d\u00e9favorables, mais aussi du F-35, dans des termes que nous jugerions assez ambigus. On cite \u00e0 nouveau, ici, le passage qui nous semble le plus int\u00e9ressant, apr\u00e8s avoir lu et entendu des affirmations assez paradoxales de la situation technologique compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9pass\u00e9e du F-22, par rapport \u00e0 la situation technologique \u00e9tonnamment avanc\u00e9e du F-35 :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWith a funding shortage, the Air Force may have to back off of ambitious technology and purchases. And the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are likely to be forced into developing a more collaborative strategy for tactical aircraft. This could mean tradeoffs among Boeing Super Hornets and Lockheed Martin’s family of fighters. Industry sources note the Air National Guard has expressed interest in the F-16, despite a longtime policy to purchase only stealthy fighters. Additional F-16s and Super Hornets? The Navy has gone that routethe question is, until you get the Joint Strike Fighter, do you go that route or do you try and build more F-22s, Gates notes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDeux choses apparaissent int\u00e9ressantes, effectivement:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La mention, ici \u00e0 nouveau, comme on l’a vue pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment, d’une solution, au moins d’attente, de nouvelles commandes de vieux avions de combat, les fameux legacy aircraft<\/em>, des F-16 (Block 60) et des F-18 (version E\/F, Super Hornet<\/em>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La position assez en retrait de Gates vis-\u00e0-vis du F-35, par rapport \u00e0 ce qu’on en avait fait d’une fa\u00e7on int\u00e9ress\u00e9e. En fait, Gates est plus anti-F-22 qu’il n’est pro-JSF, de m\u00eame qu’il est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral assez adversaire des nouveaux syst\u00e8mes de guerre conventionnelle de haut niveau. Cela refl\u00e8te le changement en cours au Pentagone, notamment \u00e0 l’Office du Secretary of Defense (OSD), avec le d\u00e9part de Gordon England (adjoint au secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense) et de John Young (chef des acquisitions). Voici comment la paire England-Young est d\u00e9crite par Eric L. Palmer, sur F-16.net<\/em> le 19 novembre<\/a> dernier, dans un article intitul\u00e9 : \u00abNew Congress, New President and Futur Air Power Risks for the U.S.<\/em>\u00bb L’article d\u00e9veloppe \u00e9galement la probl\u00e9matique du programme JSF sans l’habituel enthousiasme des services RP de Lockheed-Martin.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThis leads to the F-35 program. If the USAF is willing to kill off large portions of communities listed above, it might be able to afford the F-35 in the numbers it wants. Given the recent economic meltdown and a new DC political change, it is doubtful that USAF will be able to afford the F-35 program unless it wants to slip even more into ruin. The aircraft is years from flying with complete software, real and tested war systems and all of the repair\/fix work of early mistake-jets to do while production spools up during a seriously deficient amount of test hours on record. Yet certain people are hyping the system based on no flight testing of a finished ready-to-fight product.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThroughout the DOD, employees civil and military are taught and warned on the issue of conflict of interest. Part of that training is not just avoiding actual conflict of interest, but the appearance of it. It seems that some didn’t get the message. For example, Gordon England, the Assistant Secretary of Defense has been a consistent cheerleader for the F-35. He has also been a barrier to further F-22 procurement. He claims that the F-35 is somehow affordable and has the needed combat prowess for the future of the U.S. military. This message then gets across to John Young, the top Pentagon procurement official, who’s latest language having to do with the F-35 sounds like a Lockheed Martin press release. This erroneous message is then passed to the boss of the U.S. Defense Department Mr. Gates. From this, the message is pushed that the F-35 will solve all the tactical fighter aircraft recapitalization issues with the U.S. military. All of this when the Boeing F-15 Strike Eagle, F-18 Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-16 and F-22 are proven and in production. The appearance of conflict of interest? Both Mr. England and Mr. Young have strong ties to the Lockheed Martin fighter factory in Fort Worth, Texas where the F-35 is being developed. As DOD employees, this by itself should eliminate them from having any influence with the F-35 program. As it stands now, the Pentagon is lock-step with Lockheed Martin marketing spin to sell the F-35 no matter what.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIf the USAF is ever to save it’s fighter force for the long term, production of the F-22 as well as the F-15 and F-16 is a must so as to properly fill out the USAF AEF structure with reliable combat power. Cutting F-22 aircraft production off at around 200 airframes as well as not buying new F-15’s and F-16s will prevent this from happening. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIf F-22 production is cancelled soon, the first of these aircraft will have to start retirement some time in the 2020’s. Since there is no aircraft on the drawing board with F-22 performance and the fact that development of such an aircraft can take as much as 20 or more years until reaching military service, an early closing of the F-22 line is too dangerous. The gap and unknown years of what lies ahead is too much to risk. With the U.S. in serious debt, the country can’t afford not to continue F-22 production for some time. The U.S. no longer has the fiscal power to develop some kind of F-22 replacement in the coming years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbPlacing all the bets on the yet unproven F-35 is a short-sighted gamble that lacks sound military preparedness to keep the country secure. Senior U.S. Defense leadership is selling the future of air power down the river based on the unfounded claims of superb F-35 performance and value. Some senior DOD employees are giving the appearance of acting like government paid industry lobbyists. For the sake of the nation’s future defense, it should be the job of the new Congress and President to fix these wrongs.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe constat de Palmer, \u00abAs it stands now, the Pentagon is lock-step with Lockheed Martin marketing spin to sell the F-35 no matter what.<\/em>\u00bb, s’il \u00e9tait valable \u00e0 la mi-novembre, l’est beaucoup moins \u00e0 la mi-d\u00e9cembre. Les choses vont vite. Par contre, ce qu’il dit de l’\u00e9tat du programme JSF, comme le disent implicitement d’autres qui se classent parmi les r\u00e9formistes, est de plus en plus admis \u00e0 Washington; cela entre dans une pr\u00e9vision o\u00f9 un freinage des d\u00e9penses serait consid\u00e9r\u00e9e avec int\u00e9r\u00eat et attention.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl faut donc s’attendre \u00e0 voir le programme F-35 frein\u00e9 plut\u00f4t qu’acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9, tandis qu’on devrait voir r\u00e9activ\u00e9e l’option de commandes suppl\u00e9mentaires de F-16 et F-18. L\u00e0 est en effet le nud de l’offensive pro-JSF, type RP Lockheed Martin, lanc\u00e9e par England-Young tout au long de l ‘ann\u00e9e 2008: au contraire de Gates, elle \u00e9tait plus pro-JSF qu’anti-F-22, et la t\u00eate du F-22 \u00e9tait r\u00e9clam\u00e9e dans la mesure o\u00f9 cela permettait d’affirmer la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer<\/strong> le programme JSF. Il n’est plus du tout s\u00fbr que cette option soit envisag\u00e9e; il est de plus en plus probable qu’on aille, effectivement, vers cette id\u00e9e de pause strat\u00e9gique plus ou moins affich\u00e9e, plus ou moins appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 fond. Le F-22 y serait sans doute abandonn\u00e9 (si le Congr\u00e8s laisse faire) mais le JSF, lui, se retrouverait frein\u00e9. Dans son cas, c’est une catastrophe, parce que les prix augmenteront, les d\u00e9lais aussi, par cons\u00e9quent le d\u00e9sordre qui affecte cet \u00e9norme programme, le JSF, arch\u00e9typique de l’impuissance du Pentagone. Dans une telle situation hypoth\u00e9tique, la r\u00e9ouverture de l’option d’achat des legacy aircraft<\/em>, type F-16 et F-18, constituerait un terrible coup de poignard dans le dos du vertueux programme JSF. Si le JSF survit \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s dans l’\u00e9tat aujourd’hui, c’est qu’il n’y a pas d’alternative; ce qui se dessine n\u00e9cessairement, c’est une alternative, m\u00eame si elle appara\u00eet un peu monstrueuse pour un pays aussi s\u00fbr de sa puissance et de son avancement que les USA, puisque ce serait en revenir au vieux legacy aircraft<\/em>. Il faut dire et redire que la situation du Pentagone est vraiment sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, compl\u00e8tement exceptionnelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 11 d\u00e9cembre 2008 \u00e0 18H13<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dans la temp\u00eate qu’on voit s’\u00e9lever au-dessus et autour du Pentagone, et au Pentagone m\u00eame, \u00e0 la fois pour la crise centrale de ce point Omega et pour celle qui presse le F-22, notre ami le JSF, alias F-35, a un r\u00f4le et une place \u00e0 tenir. Comme on le signale dans une allusion dans… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1015,3713,249,2969,3984,250,7179,7954,3194,3320,3068],"class_list":["post-70398","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-f-16","tag-f-18","tag-f-22","tag-f-35","tag-gates","tag-jsf","tag-legacy","tag-pause","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme","tag-strategique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70398","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70398"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70398\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70398"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70398"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70398"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}